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As the new President of The Histories, I was extremely worried about upholding
the high standards of my predecessor Lauren De Angelis. She helped me learn how to
create this amazing journal, which is not an easy job! I would just like to thank her for
being a mentor to me during her years at La Salle University from her undergraduate
career through her masters (and her time as the department secretary).
I
am proud to present this edition, where you, the reader, will find works that span
all areas of history. From ancient China through a legal history of the Second
Amendment and the right to bear arms, I am positive you will find the research of both
the undergraduate and graduate students fascinating. In addition to a capstone honors
project detailing the historical evolution of the Second Amendment through a
hypothetical Supreme Court case, a senior seminar paper about the Hungarian Revolution
is also included in this edition.
I
would like to especially thank Dr. Michael Mclnneshin, the moderator of The
Histories. He has always been available to listen and help me whenever I needed it. I
would also like to thank Dr. Stuart Leibiger, the chair of the department. These two
faculty members, along with the entire department, are integral in the creation of this
publication because they taught these student writers how to research and write about
history. Without them, this edition would be impossible.

Michael McCabe
President
Spring 2012
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I
The “Real” Scientific Revolution; 14th Century England’s Contribution to Modern
Scientific Though
By Lauren De Angelis ‘12

At first glance, the fourteenth century truly appears to be calamitous. Famine, disease,
war, and poor leadership plagued England to the point where one must wonder if anything
positive emerged from this time period. These bleak descriptions, however, fail to depict society
writ large because they ignore indisputable advancements and achievements in medieval society,
arguably the most important being science.
Often, history asserts that the thinkers of the Renaissance, such as Galileo, Kepler, and
Copernicus, are the forerunners of modern scientific inquiry because they used experimentation
and mathematics to explain natural phenomena. However, M.A. Hoskin and A. G Molland
argue, ““The Scientific Revolution” of the seventeenth century cannot adequately be assessed
without an appreciation of the achievements and limitations of those.. .on whose shoulders
Galileo and his contemporaries stood.”1It is necessary then to study those natural philosophers
that worked feverishly in the scientific field during the fourteenth century because it was then
that the real birth of scientific thought occurred. Experimentation, mathematical formulae, and
observational analyses were integral parts of an emerging scientific method from which later
scientists worked. This paper will thus focus on the important legacy of scientific works
introduced at Merton College, Oxford, which became a microcosm of scientific discovery that
inaugurated the modem era of science.
The origins of scientific thought in Europe lay in the early twelfth century, when
cathedral schools emerged as a predecessor to universities. It was in this environment that ideas
emerged regarding the possibility of change explained by ‘“ a common course of nature.’”'1
Curiosity was evidently emerging across Europe as individuals sought to learn about the world,
which stimulated the translations of ancient texts. There was difficulty doing so because most
texts by figures such as Aristotle, Euclid, and Plato were only available in Arabic translations.
Although these languages were lost in the West, universities that cropped up in Spain were
centers of Arabic study. Thus scholars, such as Adelard of Bath, Plato of Tivoli, Robert of
Chester, and Gerard of Cremona, traveled there and began to work with these texts and translate
them into Latin."1These translations provided a vital foundation for the rise of medieval
universities.
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Universities became centers of learning in thirteenth century medieval Europe where
scholars discussed and disputed newly translated ancient texts. Curricula
used by Western universities, which led to the development of a Master of Arts, focused mainly
on courses in logic, physics, astronomy, and mathematics. Translated works studied incorporated
many of Aristotle’s logical and scientific works, including Physics, On the Heavens and World,
Meteorology, and On Generation and Corruption. The study of mathematics mainly consisted of
Euclid’s Element and Boethius’ Arithmetic" These texts inspired and influenced scholars to
openly discuss whether or not the ancients were in fact correct. One can see their influence best
at Oxford’s Merton College, a center of scientific thought in the fourteenth century.
The origins of Merton College arguably date to the eleventh century with the teaching
and scholarship of Adelard of Bath, a man often described as “'the greatest name in English
science before Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon.’”v Adelard’s historical significance lay in
the fact that he was one of the few Western individuals to translate important classical works.
One such work was Euclid’s Elements, which as previously stated, was a key text for the study
of mathematics at medieval universities. This is merely one example of the substantial amount
of translating he contributed to the academic advancement of rising universities.vi His
translations also proved beneficial in his own writings, the most famous being his Questiones
Naturales, which was a scientific work dealing with the natural sciences This work was a
composite of the expanded knowledge he received from these translations.
Adelard was also a renowned teacher in England during the tenth century. He was an
early forerunner to key figures that played an important role in the Mertonian scientific tradition.
Although there is very little biographical information regarding Adelard’s life, one discovers his
teaching career through fragmented notes in some of his contemporaries’ works. For example, a
text used at Trinity College lists him as one of three major geometers in England.viii Charles
Burnett states, “He was evidently the key figure at the beginning of a scientific movement that
developed in England throughout the twelfth century and culminated in the work of Robert
Grosseteste in the early thirteenth century.”IXHe was truly an innovator during his time, and
impacted how scholars in England viewed and understood the natural sciences.
Within Oxford University, Merton College emerged as a center for the scientific
community that built on the work of Adelard and others. Walter de Merton, the founder of the
college, intended to make “his College a foundation for encouraging learning amongst the
secular clergy as distinct from the religious orders. He was raising up a rival to the monastic
system.”x This mission caused a religious struggle at Oxford that led to a fringe group breaking
off in order to study science. That religious group was the Grey Friars, a branch of the
Franciscans who were named for their rough, grey robes. It would be these men who became
extremely influential members in the field of science.
The general mission of the Franciscans was merely to imitate Christ in word and deed.
Their founder, St. Francis of Assisi, never envisioned his followers as educators in any sense;
however education was blossoming. It did not seem practical for the friars to remain uneducated
and in jeopardy of lagging behind their lay counterparts. Robert Grosseteste, one of the prolific
teachers of the Grey Friars even warned “them plainly that walking in ignorance meant walking
in shame.”xi In order to achieve this secular education, the Grey Friars had to fight an ideological
battle because they were only allowed to study theology; those that wanted a degree in the arts
were viewed rebellious.
These radical friars moved away from strict theological study and instead toward
practical study of natural science. One will see the great contributions they made to the scientific
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community thanks to the unique climate at the Merton School during the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries.
Robert Grosseteste was an early forerunner who began scientific work at Oxford in 1214
and lectured the infamous Franciscans studying at the University. Grosseteste wrote various
commentaries on Aristotelian works, including the Posterior Analytics and Physics. Within these
commentaries, Grosseteste declared that “The object of...science...was thus to discover and
define the form or ‘universal’ or ‘nature’, in the sense of principle, origin, cause of behavior and
source of understanding, which could become the start of demonstration."xii He accepted the
opinion of Aristotle that universals could in fact be abstracted from particular instances;
however, these instances produced, in Grosseteste’s opinion, a hierarchy of certainty on whether
or not the universal could be known.
Grosseteste valued the study of science in order to understand nature and even divided
science into three categories: physics, mathematics, and metaphysics. It should be noted that
Grosseteste asserted that mathematics was the only certain science whereas others left room for
error, misunderstanding, and confusion.xiii Despite the uncertainty inherent in two of the
branches, he studied all three avidly and contributed many findings to the scientific community.
His impact was evident in his creation of an early scientific method and his work with
mathematics, and optics.
Grosseteste spent a significant amount of time establishing a proto-scientific method. In
natural sciences Grosseteste held that “in order to distinguish the true causes from other possible
causes, at the end of composition must come a process of experimental verification and
falsification.”xiv Essentially one must rely on experiment, analysis, and experience in order to
come to a conclusion. For Grosseteste it was important to eliminate any possible causes of a
particular problem. His scientific method was based on two important arguments: the uniformity
of nature and the principle of economy. The former basically held that all like things in nature
will act the same. The latter assertion is based on Grosseteste’s statement that it “is better which
is from fewer because it makes us know more quickly.”xv In simpler terms, his theory on
economy asserts that which is the simple explanation is more appealing than one that is more
complicated. These scientific principles proved quite influential to scientists, such as Roger
Bacon and William of Ockham.
Before moving on to his students and followers, it is valuable for one to gain an
understanding of the practical findings Grosseteste made with his scientific forethought. One
area where he particularly shined was in optics. Prior to the thirteenth century, there was little
knowledge or understanding of optics; Adelard of Bath did not even have access to important
Greek and Arab works.XVI By the time Grosseteste was writing he did have crucial translations,
including Euclid’s Optica and Aristotle’s Meterologica. Although modern-day scholars of optics
and physics would scoff at Grosseteste’s incomprehensible descriptions of light, its value lay in
the fact that understanding optics was approached from a mathematical point of view for the first
time.xvii
Grosseteste asserted in Concerning Lines, Angles, and Figures that “all causes of natural
effects must be expressed by means of lines, angles, and figures, tor otherwise it is impossible to
grasp their explanation.”XViii For Grosseteste, these natural effects were essential to the study of
optics. He believed that light was the first ‘corporeal form of original materials and was
responsible for motion and causation, which had the power to act in the universe and affect
change. He called this the “multiplication of species;” a simple way to explain this is through
example. If light travels to something and illuminates it, then that light is multiplied and has
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moved through the body in intervals. The light is now what Grosseteste would call a “species”
because it has emanated from the object and has multiplied. For him, this process formed the
basis for studying optics because it is the visible reaction that can be examined.XIX
Grosseteste also attempted to understand the idea of refraction of light, which he then
applied to his study on the rainbow. He explained refraction as:
the ray incident at unequal angles deviates from the rectilinear path that it had in the first
substance, which would be maintained if the medium were uniform. And this deviation is
called refraction of the ray.xx
This definition when applied to experimentation helped him argue against the Aristotelian
opinion of the rainbow, which was based on reflection. In order to prove Aristotle’s theory
wrong, Grosseteste explained the shape of the rainbow through observation. He declared:
“Nor can a rainbow be produced by the reflection of the rays of the sun.. .because if that
were so the shape of all the rainbows would not be an arc.. .Therefore rainbows must be
produced by the refraction of rays of the sun in the mist of a convex cloud"xxi
According to Grosseteste, the convex cloud had multiple layers in it, which would allow the light
to be refracted multiple times, thus producing the shape of a spectrum of colors.xxii He explained
that if it were reflection, then the rainbow would appear bigger and higher when the sun was
higher in the sky. Similarly, it would be smaller and lower when the sun was closer to Earth. He
observed the changes in the rainbow at different times of day to justify his claim relying solely
on experience and experimentation. He noticed that if the sun was rising or setting, the rainbow
would be semicircular and larger. At any other point in the day, however, it appeared only part of
a semicircle and much smaller.xxiii
Grosseteste also established a theory of color, which would explain why there were
variations of color in the rainbow. He asserted that it was due to the amount of rays of light; the
more rays present allowed for brighter colors, whereas fewer rays displayed only the darker
colors on the light spectrum. Although his theory regarding the rainbow was not wholly correct
because he ignored reflection altogether and attributed the shape of the bow to the denser clouds,
he nevertheless tried to methodically explain phenomena, which was a great scientific
improvement. He reduced the problem down to simple terms and then experimented using math
and observation. This set the stage for Grosseteste’s followers, namely Roger Bacon.
Roger Bacon was a member of the fringe group of Franciscan friars at Oxford, and a
student of Robert Grosseteste; thus, it is unsurprising that he understood science in a similar way.
He pursued his education with great intensity and was suspected of heresy for the new ideas he
had concluded during his studies. Eventually, Pope Clement IV commanded Bacon to write
down his ideas in what became his most famous work, the Opus M aiusxxiv The discussion on
Roger Bacon will mainly focus on his scientific findings in the Opus Maius because it is
arguably his most prolific scientific work.
Bacon had two aims when writing the Opus Maius: to show how philosophy could be
practically utilized and to reform how those in the thirteenth century learned based on the
relative importance of the sciences.xxv In this treatise, he presented his work in almost an
encyclopedic format whereby he broke down different subjects into parts. The most applicable
sections to this paper are Part IV and V, which discuss the importance of mathematical
knowledge and how to apply mathematical principles to the study of astronomy, optics, and even
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motion. One will see in his work that he valued experimental science and above all mathematics
to explain phenomena present in the world.
In Part IV, Bacon wasted no time in establishing the preeminence of mathematics above
all the sciences. He opens with the following statement:
Of these sciences the gate and key is mathematics.. .Neglect of this branch now.. .has
destroyed the whole system of study of the Latins.. .he who is ignorant of this cannot
know the other sciences nor the affairs of the world.xxvi
He believed that this area science was of utmost importance to study for many reasons, including
an individual’s innate capability to understand its logic and the ease that one can comprehend it.
According to Bacon, it is most important because “we are able to arrive at truth without
error. ..since in this subject demonstration by means of a proper and necessary cause can be
given. ”xxvii Mathematics allows one to work out problems and access their validity through trial
and error. The ability to do so was crucial to Bacon because he valued these methods as the basis
of arriving at true knowledge. This understanding of thirteenth century science was extremely
similar to his teacher, Robert Grosseteste, who likely imparted the value of experiment and
observation to his student.
Bacon’s math is extremely difficult to understand, but his findings are not. Therefore, one
must concentrate on his scientific conclusions, and not the math behind them, in order to truly
appreciate his great accomplishments. For example, in the area of optics, he attempted to explain
vision and optics to a greater extent than his predecessors had. He explained sight using the
multiplication of species theory, which is reminiscent of Grosseteste. He declared, “lines along
which multiplication of species occurs do not have length alone.. .but all of them also have width
and depth,” which provides for visibility of an object; If something lacks width, depth, or length,
then it cannot be seen.xxviii He explained that these objects, however, could only be seen through
intromitted rays coupled with visual rays from an individual’s eyes.xxix He essentially
synthesized and built off of what other scientists, such as Aristotle and Alhazen, had already
said; however, he believed his explanation was correct after examining all materials and
knowledge available to him.
Another interesting endeavor presented in Bacon’s Opus Maius was his attempt to plot
places using longitude and latitude. He was able to do so by overcoming some of the difficulties
that occurred when representing the earth on a flat plane.xxx He tried to describe the shape of the
world through the use of diagrams. He first explained that the habitable world from east to west
was “much more than half the circumference of the Earth, and more than the revolution of one
half of the heavens.XXXI From this mathematical supposition, he thus introduced his idea of
longitude and latitude. His method essentially entailed drawing a line parallel to the equator and
reading off its value on the colore, which are the celestial circles that pass through the both
equinoxes and solstices. He then plotted longitude using a meridian that went through a
particular city and then used that meridian to compare its location at the equator.xxxii
This method allowed for him to use arcs and circles to better describe coordinates on a
flat map. Although there were issues and complications that Bacon did not take into
consideration because of the lack of technology and knowledge on the subject, his attempt was
significant because he was one of the first individuals who used math to try and create a world
coordinate system centuries before it was correctly used. The use of coordinates to plot not only
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land, but also celestial regions was examined in the fourteenth century by Richard Wallingford
and later by Galileo during the Renaissance.
Finally, Part V of Bacon’s work dealt with the issue of whether or not a vacuum exists.
Aristotle previously asserted that a vacuum could not possibly occur for various reasons because
the laws that govern the natural world would not apply. One of his most prominent arguments
against a void lay in the fact that bodies that weighed different amounts would, in the absence of
resistance, fall at the same time; this simply was not logical to Aristotle.xxxiii Bacon, however,
tried to refute this Aristotelian argument. In his Opus Maius, Bacon understood the possibility of
a vacuum in mathematical terms. He claimed, “For a vacuum rightly conceived of is merely a
mathematical quantity extended in the three dimensions, existing per se without heat and cold,
soft and hard.. .and without any natural quality.”xxxiv Bacon did not prove the existence of a
vacuum, but merely the possibility of that existence, which Aristotle denied. Bacon’s work
would later inspire Dumbleton to discuss the idea of a vacuum.
Prior to moving on to the fourteenth century Mertonian scholars known as the Oxford
Calculators, one final figure must be noted. That figure is William of Ockham whose
“importance in the history of science comes partly from... improvements he introduced into the
theory of induction, but much more from the attack he made on contemporary physics and
metaphysics.”xxxv His ideas regarding induction were based on two ideas. The first explained
that only certain things in the world could be gained through the senses, which he called
substances. Ockham called this “intuitive knowledge.”XXXViEverything else not included in
intuitive knowledge was not real and represented concepts or qualities.
The second idea is one that he is most famous for: Ockham’s razor. Simply put, the best
explanation is the simplest because it removes any superfluous information that impedes
knowing what is real.xxxvii Ockham’s razor was not an original thought, but actually echoes
Grosseteste’s theory of economy. Using these two ideas, Ockham proposed that “in most cases a
singular contingent proposition cannot be known evidently without many apprehensions of
single instances.”xxxviii It was possible, however, to arrive at the best possible answer by
removing all false suppositions. Ockham applied these aforementioned ideas when he analyzed
the physics of motion.
In his Treatise on Motion, Ockham asserted, “that no other thing is required in addition to
body and place,” which explained the basis of his understanding of motion. XXXIX His definition
essentially asserted an object’s motion was ite continuous existence from one instant to the next
of a permanent body. This understanding of motion actually led to a primitive definition of
inertia, which he explained as:
The moving thing in such a motion (i.e projectile motion), after the separation of
the moving body from the prime projector, is the very thing moved according to itself and
not by any separate power, for this moving thing and the motion cannot be distinguished.

xl

This definition was the foundation from which future scientists, such as Jean Buridan and later
Isaac Newton, formed their definitions of impressed force. Also, one sees Ockham’s influence in
the work of the Oxford Calculators explained the physics of motion using mathematical
principles.
Tracing the research and work of earlier scientific figures in England and more
specifically at Oxford illustrates that as early as the twelfth century strides were being made to
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explain the world using reason, logic, and of course mathematics. It was thus a transitional
period whereby these men took the philosophical explanations of ancient writers and tried to
either prove or disprove them using experimentation and observation. The strides these natural
philosophers made in science did not halt in this generation; rather they set the example for
future scholars who utilized their scientific approaches, and actually expanded on them by
mathematically analyzing natural phenomena using more complex mathematical formulae. The
work of the Mertonian scholars in the fourteenth century evidently shows this advancement, and
also serves to support that there was indeed growth during this turbulent time.
The first prominent Mertonian of the fourteenth century was Thomas Bradwardine who
became a fellow at Merton College in 1323 and stayed in residence there until 1335. One of his
first works written at Merton College was the Geometria speculativa, which was a compilation
of Aristotle’s works on geometry. Although this treatise was used as a textbook for students, and
held no original findings, it nevertheless is an important text in Bradwardine’s scholarship.
Through the analysis and compilation of Aristotelian texts, he was able to form his own opinion
on proportions, which he understood to be based on a logical division of ratios.xli This analysis
formed the basis of his most influential work, Tractatus de Proportionibus, which was an
original discourse that attempted to resolve the problems he saw in how Aristotle related
velocity, force, and resistance.
Bradwardine’s Tractatus de Proportionibus “performed a crucial service to the
development of mechanics, for in it we find the juncture of two important traditions of
mechanics, the philosophical and mathematical.” When writing this work, Bradwardine sought
to discover a mathematical function that would explain Aristotle’s law of motion that “velocity
was proportional to the power of the mover divided by the resistance of the medium.”xliii There
was an issue, however, that “if the power was smaller than the resistance it might fail to move
the body at all.”xliv Aristotle never explained that problem; however, later writers reasoned that
the velocity was proportional only to the excess of power when compared to resistance. When
the power was greater than one, motion would occur.xlv Reason was not enough for
Bradwardine, which led to his mathematical treatise.
In order to explain Aristotle’s principle mathematically without any discrepancies, he
first detailed all necessary mathematical definitions, properties, and types of proportions. For
instance, he focused on explaining rational and irrational proportions and how each applied to
the different branches of mathematics.xlvi He even went as far as breaking down all possible
structures for proportions. He then used these mathematical principles to explain correctly how
change in velocity correlates to the force and resistance. The resulting theory is as follows: “The
proportion of the speeds of motions varies in accordance with the proportion of motive to
resistive forces, and conversely... This is to be understood in the sense of geometric
proportionality.”xlvii Using this proportional explanation, Bradwardine improved on the
Aristotelian theory by avoiding its inherent pit falls. If force is greater than resistance, then
motion occurs; if resistance is equal to or greater than the force, movement is not possible. Thus,
Bradwardine’s principle remained in line with the discourse of the day, but branched out using
mathematical analysis to avoid any intellectual attacks on his work.xlviii
The mathematical and scientific jargon used in Bradwardine’s treatise is not easily
appreciated by the modern scholar; however, it proved instrumental to other natural philosophers
who sought to “reduce all motion to local motion and to explain their variation according to the
Bradwardine function.” The Mertonian scholars, which included William Heytesbury, John
Dumbleton, and Richard Swineshead, indeed did extensive work using Bradwardine’s theory,
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resulting in the revolutionizing of the study of dynamics and kinematics. Each man contributed
greatly to this revolution; however, the scholarship is conflicted on the chronology of their
works. Therefore, this paper will analyze individually the contributions of each scholar in the
following order: William Heytesbury, John Dumbleton, and Richard Swineshead.
William Heytesbury was affiliated with Oxford beginning in 1330. His main work, Rules
for Solving Sophisms, used proportions to explain degrees of qualities and how they applied to
motion. The idea that qualities could be understood quantitatively was not a novel idea, but
actually dated back to the time of Aristotle. Heytesbury understood this concept by viewing an
object as individual parts that made up the whole. It is evident in his writings, as well as in his
fellow Mertonian’s, that the Aristotelian understanding of quality and quantity could be
mathematically applied to acceleration and velocity, thereby explaining different types of
motion.xlix Heytesbury’s Rules for Solving Sophisms was one of the first works that used this
application, which his contemporaries later referenced and improved upon.
In his treatise, Heytesbury made it clear that he was working with premises that could be
described and explained using only logic and math. He first differentiated between uniform and
non-uniform motion. He stated uniform motion occurs when “an equal distance is continuously
traversed with equal velocity in an equal part of time” whereas non-uniform motion can “be
varied in an infinite number of ways, both in respect to the magnitude, and with respect to time.”
1Using these definitions, he formed various sophisms whereby he tried to show how velocity and
acceleration altered each type of motion. These explanations are extremely difficult to follow,
therefore, one needs only to note his most famous case, “The Mean Speed Theorem,” which
elucidates how uniformly difform motion occurs.
In order to understand the aforementioned theory, one must grasp the concept of uniform
acceleration first. Heytesbury defined this idea as an equal extension of velocity gained in an
equal amount of time. He then applied this definition, along with that of instantaneous velocity,
and arrived at “The Mean Speed Theorem.” Heytesbury explained that:
when any mobile body is uniformly accelerated from rest to some given degree [of
velocity], it will in that time traverse one-half the distance that it would traverse if, in that
same time, it were moved uniformly at the degree [of velocity] terminating that latitude.
For that motion, as a whole, will correspond to the mean degree of that latitude, which is
precisely one-half that degree which is its terminal velocity.
In simpler terms, Heytesbury asserted that an object that is uniformly accelerated would travel
the same distance as one that has the same degree of velocity, as long as it is half of the final
velocity of the accelerated object.lii Although Heytesbury’s assertion offered the true nature of
local motion, he was not able to completely prove it. Other scholars at Merton however worked
with this definition and attempted to arrive at a clearer conception of how to explain an object’s
motion. Thus, one will see that the “Mean Speed Theorem was a collaborative work that is
attributed to all Oxford Calculators.
John Dumbleton was Heytesbury’s contemporary, but his work is not often valued as
highly because he lacked the mathematical genius for which the Oxford Calculators were
famous; often his arguments would be weakly supported or nonexistent. This statement does not
insinuate however that he is less important within the Mertonian tradition because his most
famous work The Summa o f Logical and Natural Things extensively discussed the intension and
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remission of qualities, also called latitude, and how it applies to motion. Thus, his scholarship is
worth mentioning in this narrative on scientific discourse of the fourteenth century.
The Summa is a large compilation of treatises that are divided into ten parts; part one
concentrates on logic and parts two through ten handle different aspects of the natural sciences.
His greatest focus, however, was on the problems the Mertonian scholars were grappling with
during that time, namely the function of motion and how to explain it logically.1iii Dumbleton
explained the intension and remission of qualities through the Bradwardian understanding of
proportionality, concluding that velocity and acceleration adhere to geometric proportionality.
Understanding the variables of motion in such a way provided him with the basis for his
conclusion on the measurement of local motion.liv
Part III Chapter ten of Dumbleton’s work explains, albeit convolutedly, how to measure
local motion. He purported:
It is proved that a latitude [velocity] corresponds to its mean degree [of velocity]. It is
demonstrated in the first place, however, that if some latitude of velocity terminated at
rest [and uniformly acquired] is equivalent to a degree [of velocity] greater than its mean,
then it is refuted that the less half of the latitude terminated at rest corresponds to [a
degree of velocity] less than the mean of the same half.lv
This definition is similar to that of Heytesbury’s, but the ways in which he confirmed its validity
differed substantially. Heytesbury used sophisms to explain the “Mean Speed Theorem,”
whereas Dumbleton relied more on geometrical diagrams and proofs. For example, he stated, “If
C is greater than B, then R is greater than D.”lvi Each letter represented a different part of motion,
such as acceleration and velocity; this is merely one example of the type of math used by
Dumbleton, which was quite complicated and extensive. Although Dumbleton made an effort to
use geometrical proofs correctly, he never definitively arrived at the end result of the proof,
which left his treatise substantially vulnerable to attacks. It would thus be the work of Richard
Swineshead, perhaps the greatest of all the Oxford Calculators, that remedied the flaws of both
Dumbleton and Heytesbury, thus producing the most advanced explanation of the “Mean Speed
Theorem.”
Prior to moving on to Swineshead, one final unique topic of Dumbleton’s scholarship
should be discussed: the possibility of the existence of a void. As previously mentioned, Aristotle
denied the possibility of a void because it was against the laws of nature. Bacon, however,
confronted Aristotle’s belief with a theoretical proposition that it could be explained
mathematically. Dumbleton too worked to disprove the Aristotelian understanding like his
forbear had. He used the movement of celestial bodies to explain his argument. Dumbleton
stated, “to maintain contact celestial bodies would, if necessary, abandon their natural circular
motions as particular bodies and follow their universal nature or ‘corporeity’, even though this
involved an unnatural rectilinear movement.”lvii" Dumbleton understood the planets as needing
one another, so if an instance occurred that broke with the laws of Aristotle, then an unnatural
motion would occur that could not be explained by Aristotelian logic. The planets would
necessarily cause a void in order to follow their internal nature. Dumbleton obviously never
observed an unnatural occurrence of the planets, but it nevertheless illustrates that this
conundrum of “nature abhors a vacuum” was still debated in the fourteenth century.lviii
The final Oxford Calculator to be discussed is Richard Swineshead who is often cited as
the Calculator because of his treatises known as the Liber calculationum, a work that corrected
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much of the ambiguity present in Dumbleton’s Summa.lix David Lindberg writes, “Swineshead
set down what clearly seems to be both the most brilliant application and the most brilliant
development of Bradwardine’s function that the Middle Ages was to see.”lx Swineshead great
achievement centers on the examination of falling bodies towards the center of the Earth, which
proved that a body acts as a single entity and not as separate parts.
He declared in his treatise On Falling Bodies, “When an earthy body is in such a position
that part of it is on the other side of the Centre, it is reasonable to enquire whether that part will
resist the descent either of the whole or of the part on this side of the Centre.”lxi In this
statement, he essentially said that once a body passes the center it becomes its own resistance,
which would impede its motion. This resistance is contingent upon, however, whether the part
below the center of the world is a separate entity altogether. Swineshead applied Bradwardine’s
theory through complicated and convoluted propositions, which resulted in the conclusion that if
the body does act as separate parts of the whole, its center could never overlap with the center of
the world; this he declared is impossible.1xiiInstead, he purported:
the whole and the part have the same natural place and both desire it.. .the part desires the
same place when it is part of something as it does when it is by itself.. .the part beyond
the Centre will naturally recede from the Centre, because it is part of a while and its
desire is part of the total desire.1xiii
Swineshead’s innovation thus clarified many of the debates his contemporaries were having
about the motion of objects.
On Falling Bodies was not Swineshead’s only major contribution to the scientific
disputations of the time. He also wrote extensively on the intention and remission of qualities.
This topic had already been discussed and analyzed by the other Mertonian scholars; however,
Swineshead’s explanation in Intension and Remission o f Qualities, Remission o f Forms, is
arguably the clearest and proves how qualities could be understood quantitatively. He offered
various opinions describing intension and remission, but rejected many of the one’s already in
existence. The one he most favored however asserted that “the intension of any quality is
measured by the proximity to the most intense degree of its latitude. Remission in this position is
measured by he distance from the most intense degree.”lxiv Although he favored this premise, it
was not the best explanation of the function of intension and remission, which thus drove him to
find the answer on his own.
Swineshead extensively wrote out various propositions to show how difficult it was to
illustrate the measurements of intension and remission; however, the three main propositions
that best serve his purpose are as follows:
1. Whether uniform acquisition of intention follows from uniform loss of remission
2. Whether remission is increased equally proportionally and with equal velocity as
intension is decreased
3. Whether two things which begin from zero degree of remission to acquire remission
equally fast continue to remain equally remiss.lxv
Although he ultimately tried to negate each of these premises, he came to the conclusion that
they were mostly correct, save one component of proposition number two. The issue that arises
in the second premise derived from the fact that intension and remission are not the same, and
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thus cannot be proportionally compared. Swineshead provided the soundest argument that
qualities could in fact be treated quantitatively.Ixvi
All of the Oxford Calculator’s greatly impacted the scientific community in the
fourteenth century, which was mainly theoretically based. Therefore, much of their work did not
contribute to many of the pragmatic problems facing those in the fourteenth century. There were
other natural philosophers, however, associated with Merton who used scientific inquiry and
mathematical knowledge to address practical issues and created instruments that led to
advancement in society. One such individual was Richard Wallingford who was affiliated with
Oxford in the early fourteenth century. The value of his work lay in his invention of the
mechanical clock and the alboin, devices that greatly improved the study of astronomy.
Wallingford was an abbot of St. Albans, and it was in this role that he gained the
opportunity to create the mechanical clock. He actually spent so much money on his invention
that King Edward III complained he did not put enough resources into the church. Wallingford
responded by frankly stating, “there would be many abbots after him who could build churches
but none who could complete the clock.”lxvii He believed that he was the only person who could
accomplish such a feat because he had an extensive background in mathematics and astronomy,
fields that many religious felt threatening to their beliefs. Wallingford, however, used his
knowledge to create many scientific works that aided him in his mechanical endeavors.
His most famous writings, Quadripartitum and Exafrenon pronosticacionum temporis,
both demonstrate the importance of applying trigonometry when studying astronomy. He used
this math to calculate many coordinates of stars and planets, which he then represented in his
inventions. His clock, for instance, had the ability to track the seasons, stars, planets, and of
course time.lxvii His device was without known precedence because it used an astrolabe-type
design that worked in reverse of contemporary astrolabe arrangements.Ixix His other major
invention that used theories of mathematics was the alboin, a device that plotted celestial
coordinates; this instrument served in replacing more laborious, manual calculations. It is evident
that Wallingford’s practical applications of math actually revolutionized how individuals
examined the celestial region.
All of the aforementioned Mertonian scholars impacted scientific thought in substantial
ways throughout the fourteenth century. Their work with dynamics and kinematics arguably was
their greatest contribution because it revolutionized how natural philosophers measured and
calculated speed. Although these men are famous for their scientific endeavors during such a
turbulent time in history, they were not the only individuals experimenting; there were also men
in Paris working in the area of dynamics. The two most influential natural philosophers in Paris
were Jean Buridan and Nicole Oresme. One will see that these two individuals worked with
similar ideas as the Mertonian scholars and left their own legacy that set the stage for the
scientific revolution in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
John Buridan was affiliated with the University of Paris and is often sited as the founder
of the school of mechanics there.Ixxi His major contributions to this niche were his theory of
impetus as it relates to projectile motion and his explanation on a body s acceleration in free fall.
His elucidation on the theory of impetus built off o f the already existing work presented in
Ockham’s Treatise on Motion. Ockham’s work had not led to substantial work until Buridan
because his contemporaries did not agree with him. Buridan however sought to answer the
question of “whether a projectile after leaving the hand o f the projector is moved by the air, or by
what it is moved.”lxxii He believed Ockham’s premise was in fact correct, and thus tried to prove
it using his own theories.
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Buridan falsifies each theory held by his contemporaries, such as air could propel a
moving object, through the use of logic. He instead asserted that the mover imparted force on the
object moved, called persistent impetus, which would cause the object to move with the same
velocity until acted upon by an external force. A projectile, for instance, was slowed through air
resistance and the force of gravity downward. If there were no resistance, then the object would
theoretically project forever.
Buridan then related the quantity of matter to how far a particular object would project.
He asserted:
I can throw a stone farther than a feather... [because] all forms and natural dispositions is
in matter and by reason of matter. Hence, the greater quantity of matter a body contains
the more impetus it can receive and the greater the intensity with which it can receive
Ixxiii

The more matter an object has allows for it to retain a greater amount of impetus, thus resulting
in a greater distance traveled. His association of quantity of matter, which would later be called
mass, with that of force explained the deviations in amount of space traversed by a falling object.
This idea was the foundational basis used by Galileo in his law of inertia, which he purported
during the Scientific Revolution in the seventeenth century.
Buridan made use of the impetus theory in his own time by applying it to the explanation
of a falling body’s acceleration. Prior to Buridan, the rate at which a body accelerates during a
fall was wholly ignored; often the fall was merely examined in regards only to an object’s
weight. Buridan saw these explanations as weak, which led him to equate the weight to the
amount of impetus gained and retained in the falling body.lxxiv He declared, “a heavy body not
only acquires motion unto itself from its principal mover, i.e. its gravity, but that it also acquires
unto itself a certain impetus with that motion.” lxxv Through this acquisition of impetus, the object
actually moves faster because the fall is now caused by its own weight and the motion
downward. Until some sort of resistance acts upon it, the body will continually increase its
acceleration. Buridan’s genius in the area of dynamics rivals that of the Oxford Calculator’s of
the time, and shows that even on the continent advancement was in fact occurring.
Oresme was Buridan’s successor at the University of Paris and worked with many of the
same principles. He actually altered the argument put forward by Buridan regarding the nature of
impetus. For Oresme, impetus derived from the initial acceleration, which then allows the object
to increase its speed. He stated in Book II of De caelo, “Because it is accelerated in the
beginning, it acquires such an impetus and this impetus is a coassister for producing movement.
Thus with other things equal, the movement is faster. ”lxxvi One sees an evident difference
between Oresme’s proposition and Buridan’s because Oresme’s explanation relies on both
velocity and acceleration to create impetus.lxxvii
Oresme also left a lasting mark in other areas of natural philosophy. For example, he tried
to extend the application of Bradwardine’s Function using a series of proofs to work with ratios
and proportions. He also extensively contributed to the field of cosmology through his work on
the possibility of a vacuum. He discussed the vacuum in “The Possibility of a Plurality of
Worlds,” and came to the conclusion that “if two worlds existed, one outside the other, there
would have to be a vacuum between them for they would be spherical in shape.”lxxvii Essentially,
Oresme asserted that their motion was individual in nature and thus did not rely on the other to
move. Therefore, there had to be some type of space between them in order to prevent them from
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acting on one another. His work with voids eventually led scientists such as Newton and Samuel
Clarke to work with the plausibility of voids in the seventeenth century.
During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, an evident scientific revolution occurred,
which led to advancements in the fields of mathematics, physics, astronomy, kinematics, and
dynamics. The origins of this revolution are found in the rise of universities, which caused men
to congregate and dispute the ideas of the great minds of the past. These institutions became the
centers of scientific thought during this time. The greatest example was in fact Merton College,
which proved to be controversial place during the thirteenth century because it emphasized the
importance of studying the natural sciences in order to explain the world. Men early associated
with this place, including Grosseteste, Bacon, and Ockham, paved the way for future scientific
thought by illustrating the importance that observation and experimentation played in one’s
understanding the world. Collectively they helped established a new mindset whereby one needs
more than sheer logic to explain natural phenomena. The stage was thus set for the natural
philosophers in the fourteenth century to build off of these ideas and work toward a new body of
knowledge based on scientific inquiry.
Modem scientific inquiry inarguably began in the fourteenth century, which has been
made evident in this paper. Each natural philosopher’s contributions have been examined in
order to show how substantial their work was for future scientists. Though many of their
propositions and findings have since been disproved, they are nevertheless important to
understand. Without the introduction of certain ideas, such as the intension and remission of
qualities, “The Mean Speed Theorem,” and the theory of inertia, scientists who came later would
have had no foundation on which to stand. The work of fourteenth century scholars is often
forgotten when compared with the great minds of Galileo, Kepler, and Copernicus who are
idolized in history. It should be remembered, however, that their work relied on their scientific
forebears who started to look at the world through a new lens. Thus, men like Bradwardine,
Heytesbury, Dumbleton, and Swineshead deserve to be remembered in history as the fathers of
modem science because without their genius and drive, later scientific thought would have been
significantly impeded.
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II
The Dramas of Wang Zhaoiun
By Lauren Nelson ‘14

The legend of Wang Zhaojun is one of the most infamous and beloved stories in pre
modern Chinese history. Tales of her great beauty and courageous heart have been passed down
from generation to generation. With the many various adaptations and retellings of her story the
line between fiction and truth has blurred together but by looking at each individual telling of the
story we can see the influences and attitudes of the Chinese people during the time period the
adaptation was written. Chinese drama, written works, such as poetry, epics, and plays, and oral
traditions have become one of the most reliable ways to get a sense of what the society and
culture was like during specific periods of time. The different interpretations of the Wang
Zhaojun legend are a perfect example of how the culture of the time shines through the story.
It was during the time of the Han dynasty that the story of Wang Zhaojun originates. The
Han Dynasty, a dynasty that last from 206 BCE to around 220 CE, had replaced the Qin Dynasty
after the people’s dislike of the harsh government system had created unrest in the empire. After
facing a devastating civil war, the Han Empire was in a state of weakness which gave Xingu, a
nomadic people from the Steppe, the opportunity to attack. After much destruction and fighting,
the Han Empire began to negotiate with the Xiongnu in the hopes of keeping them from taking
over completely. The Hans began the practice of sending princesses to the leader of the Xiongnu
in the hopes he would take them for brides. The Hans saw having to do this as humiliating and
after sixty years ended the practice when the empire was strong enough to resist the attacks. 1 In
order to keep good political ties with the Xiongnu, the Han resumed the practice using women
from the common class because “...exchange of gifts, including Chinese royal brides, ensured
periodic peace and trade around the gates of the Great Wall.
Wang Zhaojun was a member of an important family that lived in the south part of Nan
County, which was located in the western part of the Han Empire. Wang Zhaojun was said to be
exquisitely beautiful and was known to be a talented musician. When she became old enough her
family sent her to live in the harem of Emperor Yuandi, where she served as a lady in waiting, in
the hopes what she would one day become his bride. Wang Zhaojun lived in the harem for a
number of years where she was never called upon by the Emperor and became rather depressed.
During diplomatic trip to the Han Empire, the Xiongnu leader Huhanye asked Emperor Yuandi
1Xinro Liu, The Silk Road in World History (USA: Oxford University Press, 2010), 4-5.
2 Ibid.
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for a Han princess to make his bride as a way of strengthening the alliance between the two
empires. Yuandi refused to give the Xiongnu leader a princess, but instead offered to give him
five women from his harem. The Xiongnu chief agreed and five women were selected, one of
them being Wang Zhaojun. It is said that the Xiongnu chief was captivated by Wang Zhaojun’s
beauty and married her almost immediately after his return to the steepe. Together they had a
number of children but only one son is believed to have survived into adulthood. Huhanye died a
few years after his marriage to Wang Zhaojun leaving the kingdom to his oldest son, one born of
one of his first wives, who took Wang Zhaojun as his wife and produced two daughters.3 Both
the Han and the Xiongnu people fell in love with Wang Zhaojun because of her beauty, courage
to live in a foreign land, and her unending devotion to the Han people even after her marriage to
the Xiongnu leader. After her death the built a number of temples and monuments in her honor
along the Silk Road and immortalized her forever in the form of songs, art, and literature.4
By looking at the different works about Wang Zhaojun’s life we can decipher the beliefs,
customs, and social culture of the time period for which is was written for. The first telling to be
examined comes from a song the second century CE, whose composer is unknown, which has a
different take on how things happened after the death of the Xiongnu leader who originally
brought Wang Zhaojun to the steppe. In this version after the death of her husband Wang
Zhaojun’s oldest son Shiwei becomes leader and asks to marry her, his mother. Before she gives
him an answer she asks him if he believes himself to be Xiongnu or Chinese. When her son
answers Xiongnu Wang commits suicide and after her burial the grass that lies on top of her
grave never dies.5
In this version of Wang Zhaojun’s life the main themes for the story are national pride
and complete devotion to ones country. By asking her son this question Wang Zhaojun is testing
to see where her son’s loyalties lie and when he answers that he considers himself to be Xiongnu
she believes that it would be the greatest dishonor to her people to marry him. She sees suicide as
the only option that will show her devotion to her country. By depicting her this way the author
is showing us that in his society honor and national pride are consider of the utmost. By also
writing the grass on her grave never dies shows that they have beliefs in metaphysical and
spiritual sense. He also has a messenger from Xiongnu say “.. .our women are ugly and inferior
to Chinese Women” 6 which, again shows pride in their country but also shows feelings of
superiority over other countries.
The next version is a drama titled Hangong qui, written in the thirteenth century by
author Ma Zhiyuan. In this adaptation a crooked politician convinces Emperor Yuandi to take a
bride and the Emperor orders him to paint a picture of every available girl. All of the girls bribe
the politician to make their pictures beautiful, all except Wang Zhaojun, whose portrait is
disfigured in anger. The Emperor looks past Wang sending her to the harem, where ten years
later he hears her playing her lute and is captivated by her beauty. They fall in love and the
Emperor banishes the politician who flees to Xiongnu where he shows the chief Wang’s portrait.
He falls in love with her demanding her hand in marriage and the Emperor is forced to comply to

3 Susan F. Henssonow, Lambert M. Surhone, and Mariam T. Tennoe, Wang Zhaojun, (Betascript Publishing, 2010)
4 Xinro, The Silk Road in World History, 6.
5 Daphne Pi-Wei Lei, “Wang Zhaojun on the Border: Gender and Intercultural Conflicts in Premodem Chinese
Drama” , (Asian Theatre Journal, 1996) 4.
6 Ibid.
t o
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keep the peace. Wang says goodbye to the Emperor and on her way to the Xiongnu throws
herself in the river.7
This version of the story was written during the Mongol rule of China, where the Chinese
people were considered to be the lower class. Her suicide shows how frustrated the people were
being under Mongol control, who they believed to be barbaric and uneducated. The Chinese
were at a point of weakness and the “Chinese cultural and moral superiority over the barbaric
neighbor tribes has to be reinvented and reaffirmed whenever China is militarily weak.” 8
Meaning when they are at their weakest they must finds ways to show they are superior to the
ones holding them down. Her suicide represents her courage in standing alone and fighting
against the enemy, showing an independence and strength not normally associated with women
during this time.
During the time that Wang Zhaojun would have lived women were not very highly
regarded in society. They were seen only as property to their husbands or fathers and were only
worth how pretty they were. Women live in an “a subordinate position in the family” and their
day to day chores around the house were seen as “unimportant when compared to those of their
ancestors or their husbands”. 9 The way Wang Zhaojun has been remembered and regarded
shows a change in how society viewed women. By hearing Wang’s story and seeing the love and
support she received from the Chinese people, women of pre-modem had someone be inspired
by. They began to see that women were not as inferior as society told them they were and realize
they are capable of doing anything they want to. Wang helped a country begin to move forward
towards equality and provided millions of people with hope, entertainment, and a way of
expressing themselves.

9 Deng Xiaonan, “Women in Turfan during the Sixth to Eighth Centuries: A Look at Their Activities Outside the
Home”, (Association for Asian Studies, 1999), 89.
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III
Soviet Security and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956
By Mike McCabe ‘12

“No event in recent history has been so much lied about, distorted, and besmirched as the
Hungarian Revolution.”1

World War II marked a decisive end to a very sad chapter of history. Fascist leaders of
two European countries were defeated as the Allied powers achieved victory in both the Atlantic
and Pacific theatres. Unfortunately, the conclusion of global conflict did not come with
international peace. Two global, rival superpowers emerged and rather than dig physical trenches
as in wartime, the world became a battleground of ideology. Whether it was seen as democracy
against authoritarianism or capitalism versus communism, nearly every country around the world
was impacted by ideological warfare of the Cold War.
As the Soviet Union began to consolidate its Warsaw pact states, all located in the Soviet
Bloc of Eastern Europe, it grew ever fearful of the United States and her allies in NATO. The
battlegrounds in Europe between these two opposing ideologies, as it happened to turn out,
would all be located inside the former Axis powers. Berlin would be a consistent problem in
U.S.—Soviet relations. Vienna, Austria was to be partitioned off between the victorious powers
much like Berlin. Hungary would be a different case. The Hungarians were subject solely to a
Soviet puppet government; there would be no other Western powers to oversee control of
Budapest. Although Hungarians would never fully support any version of Soviet occupation,
Hungary would still be incredibly important in the Soviet Union’s grand scheme for defense
against outside threats. In the past two centuries Russia had been invaded by the formerly great
European powers of France and Germany. For the Soviets after World War II, a precarious
situation would have developed should Hungary have joined the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. Understanding that, the Revolution of 1956 in Hungary became not merely a
struggle over one nation’s freedom—but rather, a chance for the West to gain a significant upper
hand in security operations in Europe; a chance that Moscow could not allow to come to fruition.
The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was a substantial event in the Soviet Government’s
consolidation of power at the beginning of the Cold War. For twelve days Hungarian rebels,
1Quote from American Journalist Leslie B. Bain, as it appears in Paul Lendvai’s, One Day That Shook the
Communist World: The 1956 Hungarian Uprising and Its Legacy, Princeton. Princeton University Press, 2008, 1.
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mostly students and writers, fought against the communist puppet government. The Soviet Union
was forced to make a drastic decision: allow the revolution to take place and risk losing Hungary
as a satellite state or order the Red Army into Budapest to crush the opposition. The free world
looked on as the Kremlin decided on the latter.
The events that unfolded in 1956 are very unique in terms of a revolution. First, it began
as a peaceful protest of students and writers. Unlike the Russian Revolution of February, 1917,
there was no food shortage, labor problems, or socialist discontent.2 It came from the
intellectuals—many of whom were very well paid, but discontented with the Soviet Occupation
and the Stalinist Hungarian leader, Erno Gero.3 Therefore, the story of the Hungarian
Revolution cannot be told like the other revolutions of history. A second unique circumstance
was that (for the most part) the revolt was contained inside the capital city of Budapest. If the
ideals of the revolution spread into the countryside, the will to fight did not. For the Soviets to
restore communistic order they had to defeat a group of lightly armed, militarily untrained
intellectuals.
Given the unique circumstances of Budapest, 1956, the question of whether it was really
a revolution must be addressed—a revolution being distinct from a rebellion. The answer is yes.4
The Hungarians resorted to violence in 1956 because of their desire for a multi-party democracy.
The freedom fighters would not have been satisfied merely with Gero’s abdication, they wanted
an end to the Soviet occupation—a Hungary ruled by the Hungarians (Magyars). These young
intellectuals were engaged in a full social revolution. At the very least, those fighters who were
communists were rejecting the corruption of Marx caused by the Soviet imperial dogma.
Revolutions rarely follow a blueprint.5 Doctrines may influence the politics of those
involved; however, the operations are often sporadic.. The only driving factor behind the
revolution was the Hungarian people’s thirst for freedom. The short-lived uprising changed
everything—from how Hungarians saw themselves under communist rule to how the other Bloc
countries perceived their political situation. Most importantly, for a short time it appeared that
Hungary would be a free nation.6
The Soviet regime had to face the reality of the situation. They were caught off-guard by
the seeming incompetence of the Hungarian leaders, coupled with the quick organization of the
freedom fighters into militias. There would be no negotiating with the freedom fighters. They
quickly dismantled all relics of Soviet Occupation—from statues of Lenin and Stalin to
Communist Party headquarters and buildings. The situation would end in a free Hungary or a
further repressed one, and as history will tell, the Soviet Union ordered the Red Army into
Budapest to destroy any elements of resistance to the occupation. The Soviet Union acted in its
own best security interests in crushing the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.
This paper will attempt to show that the Soviet Union could not allow a free Hungary if it
was to remain a threat against American hegemony. If the Bloc states began to crumble and
revolt, the collapse of the Soviet Union would have surely been escalated—not only by the loss
2 For more details surrounding the Russian Revolution of 1917 see Orlando Figes. A People’s Tragedy: The Russian
Revolution 1891-1924. New York: Penguin Books, 1998.
’ Noel Barber, Seven Days o f Freedom: The Hungarian Uprising, 1956, New York: Stein and Day, 1975, 31.
4 The uprising of 1956 was a revolution; however for the sake of prose the Hungarian people’s plight against the
Soviet imperialists will be referred to as a rebellion, revolution, and uprising throughout the paper; however, the
word choice does not change this stance.
5 Ibid, 30.
6 Victor Sebestyen, Twelve Days: The Story o f the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, New York: Random House, 2006,
xxiv.
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of economic territory, but by the assured strengthening of the NATO alliance. This thesis will
not attempt to apologize for the brutality of the Russian forces or any of the decisions made in
the Kremlin. As the Hungarians suffered immensely against the Russians, the human element of
the revolution should not be forgotten. If nothing else, the uprising in Hungary of 1956
represents one of the greatest tragedies of 20th Century history. A group of people unified by
their hatred for civil, political, and social repression fought in a David versus Goliath battle for
their freedom. This time, David lost.
The Iron Curtain Descends
By the time of the Revolution in 1956, Hungary was an established communist nation,
having been under Soviet domination for almost a decade. A common historical misconception
is that control of Hungary was given to Stalin in Yalta in 1945; however, there were several
preexisting factors determined by the Allies that allowed for a Russian dominated Hungary
following the conclusion of the war.7 Churchill, with Roosevelt’s begrudging acquiescence,
agreed in 1943 to hold zones of influence with Stalin; however, the most important factor in
determining the fate of post-war Hungary was the geographical positioning of the Allied
powers.8 It would be the Soviet Red Army who would ‘liberate’ (certainly not a liberation if one
were to ask a victim of the violence of 1956) Hungary from Nazi Germany mostly due to
Hungary’s location in Eastern Europe, but make no mistake—the Allies had no intention of
willingly subjecting Eastern Europe to another repressive regime so quickly after the defeat of
another.9
One of the first viewpoints to emerge from the West regarding the Soviet Union’s
domination of Eastern Europe in the post-World War II era was the bloc nations needed Russia
to support them. These western intellectuals argued that without support from Moscow these
fragile states would collapse without Soviet military and secret police forces.10 The truth was
much more complicated than that sweeping, generalized statement (as it is with much of Soviet
history). Initially it appears that Stalin acted both out of fear for the West and a desire to recreate
the Russian Empire as the Soviet Bloc developed in the years after the war. As Stalin moved to
consolidate power, there began to emerge a less publicized, but very important conception of the
communist system. At the onset of the Cold War Western politicians, writers, and intellectuals
thought that the Soviet Union was indestructible from the inside—to them only exterior pressure
would threaten Soviet hegemony.11 The Hungarian Revolution, even though it failed, would test
this theory. For Khrushchev’s government it was a zero-sum game—to fail in Hungary meant
that the other Bloc states would come to understand interior revolution could collapse the Soviet
imperialism.
The Hungarian communist experiment was not unique. Hungary’s experience paralleled
the other Eastern European bloc states. After Stalin and the Red Army defeated Nazi Germany,
Stalin rapidly consolidated power in Budapest. The new communist puppet regime quickly
7 Miklos Molnar, A Concise History o f Hungary, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 295.
8 Ibid.
9 According to the Michael Charlton in The Eagle and the Small Birds: Crisis in the Soviet Empire: From Yalta to
Solidarity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984 , 13 Stalin allegedly said that he would not subject a larger
powers decisions, no matter the subject, to the approval of a lesser power.
10Agnes Heller & Ferenc Feher, From Yalta to Glasnost: The Dismantling o f Stalin' s E
mpire, Cambridge (MA):
Basil Blackwell, 1991, 37.
11 Ibid.
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liquidated all non-communist political parties, nationalized the economy with a focus on heavy
industry, and began to arrest (and execute) both real and imagined political opponents.12
Logically then, the question arises, why did revolution break out on the streets of Budapest in
October, 1956? Moreover, why was Hungary so important? Could the Soviet Union have simply
let Hungary out of its bloc—perhaps Khrushchev could have tested the theory that without
Moscow’s support these Eastern European states would have collapsed. To pursue that course of
action would have proved too risky for the Kremlin. The Hungarian Revolution had to be put
down with force if the Soviet Union were to remain a power in Europe. To answer the
remaining questions, Hungary’s history from the beginning of the Cold War until 1956 and the
relationship between Budapest and Moscow must be examined further.
The Soviet Union had been a power player in global politics far before 1956 when
international attention quickly diverted to the cause of a group of young intellectual Hungarians.
The Soviet Union, despite any critics who would say otherwise, saw itself as a primarily
European power. For Stalin, the bloc states were areas of great strategic importance. After the
war it became clear that once the mutual threat of Nazi Germany was defeated, the Soviet Union
and the United States would no longer be able to cooperate as allies. Stalin had a justifiable, and
logical, fear of the new NATO alliance. Moscow saw any of the Border States in the bloc as
potential targets for the U.S. and its allies to engage the threat of communism.
American politicians saw the Soviet Union as the main cause of the Cold War; however,
a non-partisan assessment could see that the Soviet Union felt just as slighted by the United
States. The Soviet Union—especially the ever distrustful Joseph Stalin—believed that the
United States had left the Soviet Union to fight a separate war during their alliance. From
Stalin’s perspective it was only the Red Army’s successes at Stalingrad and Kursk that sped up
the opening of a second front in France—something Stalin had been lobbying for long before
June 1944.13 In addition, Moscow felt that the United States was continually pursuing a policy
after the defeat of Hitler that went against Soviet interests. The U.S. tolerated many
governments in exile inside America (particularly the Baltic States), but the U.S. would not let
the Soviet Union occupy Japan (despite the Allies sharing both Berlin and Vienna). Additionally,
it was clear to the Kremlin that the Marshall Plan was a direct threat to the wall of communism
that the Red Army had fought for.14 All of these decisions by the United States significantly
contributed to the Soviet Union’s inferiority complex when it came to politics in the European
Theatre of the Cold War. It is the next logical step to suggest that the policy of the United States
directly contributed to Moscow’s decision to brutally repress the Hungarian Revolution.
Without a fear of NATO support for Hungary, perhaps the Soviet Union would have been
infinitely more willing to open negotiations for reform, even potential freedom for a Hungarian
state.
Russian history played an important part in the patriotic storm Stalin created around the
civilian and military war effort against Hitler and the Third Reich. Stalin and the Bolshevik
leaders who would follow him would not soon forget the heroics of the Russian people in beating
back the Germans. Looking back over the last 150 years, Russia had been engulfed in a
European war three times, and all three times the invasion of the Motherland had come through
Eastern and Central Europe. In the first 25 years of the Soviet Union’s existence, there was a

12 Lendvai, 25.
13 Klaus Von Beyme, The Soviet Union in World Politics, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987, 36.
14 Ibid, 36-37.
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noticeable absence of Russian influence in the bloc states.15 It is a safe assumption to presume
that the Soviet Union would not let a lack of regional presence in Eastern Europe cause another
conflict—big or small.
It becomes clear that Hungary was a piece of an intricate security network that the Soviet
Union established throughout Eastern and Central Europe; however, the unique conditions that
made Hungary a boiling pot for revolution well before any other Soviet dominated country still
needs to be established. Hungary’s World War II history is unique among many of the other
bloc states. Hungary fought on the Axis side and did not attempt to switch to the Allied cause.
Hungary was seen as a defeated nation—unlike Poland, Romania, or Czechoslovakia, who were,
in the eyes of the world, seen as victorious (the extent of their “victory” is a topic for another
paper, but they were all fighting against Nazi Germany by 1945).16 Hungary lost a significant
amount of territory after the war and had to bear the shame of being referred to as “Hitler’s last
satellite.”17
Besides the partitioning of Poland no other European nation has been treated with such
malfeasance by the Great Powers.18 Throughout the Modern Era Hungary has been on the
defeated side of several European conflicts. After each rout a large amount of territory had been
stripped from Hungary—their influence both in political power and geographical dominance had
been decreased significantly. Just as the Soviet Union’s inferiority complex led Moscow to
pursue a policy that at all costs would prevent NATO expansion in Eastern and Central Europe,
Hungary’s people possessed an inferiority complex due to their constantly subjugated position in
European geopolitics. Psychological factors can be powerful motivational apparatuses, even if it
is an unconscious awareness. Young, educated Hungarians rebelling—with little chance of
success—against a repressive Soviet occupation becomes easier to understand given Hungary’s
recent embarrassments in European politics.
History, culture, and heritage have always been compelling factors in nationalistic
struggles, which is ultimately what the Hungarian Revolution was—a nationalistic rebellion. It
is easier to appreciate Hungarian nationalism once the heritage of the Hungarian people is
understood. Inside the Soviet bloc, Hungary did not share the cultural heritage that Bulgaria,
Romania, and even Yugoslavia had with their Russian overlords. The Hungarians are not a
Slavic people. Their cultural heritage can be linked to the Magyars. The Hungarian name for
their language is Magyar—linked most closely to Finnish and other languages to flow out of the
nomadic steppes in early history.19 Culturally, Hungary is much more closely linked to Germany
and Austria. Historically, Hungary was part of the Hapsburg Dynasty and Austro-Hungarian
Empire. Both Austria and Hungary would fight alongside of Germany in both of the World
Wars. The Hungarian cultural history is an important reason the Magyar people were not willing
to submit to a Slavic overlord.
Hungary was the outlier in the Soviet Bloc—in culture and politics. However, Hungary’s
post-World War Two government was an eager participant in Stalin s bloody version of
communism. Understanding the Hungarian communist party and their affair with Stalinism is
crucial to understanding one of the driving factors toward revolution. First, Stalinism was the
15 Hugh Seton-Watson, “Eastern Europe,” in The Soviet Union in World Politics, edited by Kurt London, Boulder:
Westview Press, 1980, 61.
16 Lendvai, 27.
17 Ibid, 28.
18 Ibid, 25.
19 Molnar, 5.
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communist system under Stalin that consisted of all parts of life. Stalin and his cult declared that
there was only one way to achieve a perfect communist society—through dedication to the
Bolshevik party.20 Stalinism penetrated every aspect of Soviet life—the economy was centrally
planned with a dedication to heavy industry.21 The best way to explain Stalinism is that “the
party controlled the state, the state controlled society and these two, together with the now
transformed social institutions, controlled the individual.”22 Perhaps the most significant
characteristic of Stalinism was the terror. According to the memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev,
Stalin’s government had a considerable distrust of what Khrushchev terms, the bourgeois
intelligentsia.23 This suspicion was manifested in Stalin’s numerous purges of all elements of
society, eliminating any and all potential opponents of the Revolution.24
In Hungary, the post-war dictatorship was headed by Matyas Rakosi, who was a
dedicated Stalinist. Rakosi would be responsible for the largest and bloodiest purges in any of the
Eastern Bloc states before and after Stalin’s death.25 Rakosi was a cold, calculating politician
who described himself as “Stalin’s most apt pupil.”26 Rakosi was more than willing to push
Stalinism’s political purges on all aspects of Hungarian society, starting with Hungary’s
communist party. He had a simple message: “if the powerful officials of the communist
dictatorship can vanish from one day to another, how much more defenseless a simple citizen
must be.”27
The purges under Rakosi began with the party; however, their impact was felt in all the
elements of Hungarian society. Perhaps the greatest institution affected was the Roman Catholic
Church. The Church held the unenviable position as being the last independent institution in
Stalinist Hungary. Starting in 1949 Rakosi began using what he termed ‘salami tactics,’ meaning
a slice-by-slice disposal of political opponents.28 In the early weeks of that same year the Rakosi
regime had already arrested 225 members of the Catholic clergy and organized show trials in the
famous Stalinist procedure for Cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty and Archbishop Grosz.29 The
Catholic Church served as an indication that no person or institution would be safe from Rakosi,
who was always eager to prove himself as Stalin’s henchman. In a two-year span starting in
1950, over 100,000 middle-class Hungarians, primarily residents of Budapest, were either
deported or placed in appalling internment camps. Overall, between 1948 and the year of the
Revolution, over 350,000 Hungarians suffered from the Rakosi purges.30
One of the great ironies of the Rakosi regime is that the feeling of admiration was never
reciprocated by Stalin. In fact, Stalin hated Rakosi—the self-proclaimed greatest of Stalin’s
20 G. Shopflin, “Hungary after the Second War,” In The Hungarian Revolution o f 1956: Reform, Revolt and
Repression 1953-1963, Edited by Gyorgy Litvan, translated by Janos M. Bak and Lyman H. Legters, London:
Longman, 1996, 15.
21 For more on Stalin’s centrally planned heavy industry and his pre-war Five Year Plans see Stephen Kotkin’s
Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as Civilization, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997.
Shopflin, 16.
23
Nikita Khrushchev, Memoirs o f Nikita Khrushchev: Volume 2, Reformer 1945-1964, edited by Sergei
Khrushchev, translated by George Shriver, Providence: Brown University Press, 2004, 128.
24 In Stalinist terms everyone who opposed the party and Stalin’s control was a counterrevolutionary and had to be
destroyed (referring to 1917).
25 Lendvai, 29.
26 Shopflin, 17.
Ibid, 19.
Lendvai, 30.
29
Ibid.
30 Shopflin, 19.
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hangman. Rakosi was a Jew—an immediate source of distrust from Stalin.31 Additionally,
Rakosi was one of the only members in the hierarchy of the Hungarian government who spoke
English, and Stalin used a photo of Rakosi laughing with Harry Truman as a delusional source of
proof that Rakosi was an American spy.32 Rakosi, as twisted as he was, acted in a way almost
like a son whose father never gives approval would—always eager to prove his allegiance and
dedication to the cult of the bloody dictator.
The Rakosi regime and its purges would be one of the leading factors in causing the
massive discontent of the Hungarian people that would lead to the turbulence in October, 1956.
Stalinism, and the subsequent denouncement of it by Nikita Khrushchev, would be influential in
the events to play out in the fall of 1956. Rakosi’s counter on the liberal side of the Hungarian
communist party was Imre Nagy. Nagy would become a cause of concern for the Soviet
leadership. Nagy’s calls for reform would start the path toward an armed insurrection against the
communist government. The stage for the Revolution became set due to all of these factors early
in the Soviet occupation of Hungary; however, one event would perhaps be the most influential
in leading the citizens of Budapest to revolt. In 1953, Joseph Stalin died somewhat suddenly
from an apparent stroke. A power vacuum opened in the Kremlin, and the future of the Soviet
Union seemed uncertain for a short time.
The “Liberals” Rise: Khrushchev and Nagy
With the death of Stalin also brought about the end of Stalinism. This departure meant
greater emphasis was placed on the political and cultural side of Soviet life than on the
economic. Collectivized agriculture would no longer be implemented; however, focus on heavy
industry would be a token of the Soviet Union until its collapse in 1991. Despite the
denouncement of Stalin’s policies in regards to Hungary, most of the damage Stalinism had
inflicted seemed irreversible. The Stalinist model of collectivized industry had encumbered
Hungary with a high operating cost and a simultaneous decrease in industrial structure and
standard of living. 3 The resulting economic decline, along with problems arising from
Stalinism’s insistence on collectivized agriculture, hit the intelligentsia the hardest. Stalinism’s
ultimate (and only) truth lay in the communist party leaving little, if any, room for intellectual
freedom. The intelligentsia found themselves in a constant struggle with the government’s drive
for total control.34 The revolution that would occur only three years later would be started by the
students and the writers—members of the intelligentsia that Stalin’s regime had repressed. Their
discontent in 1953 began to create the situation in which a revolution from below could gain
traction.
As the situation in Hungary reached a critical stage, there remained a looming question of
who would come to lead the Soviet Union after the death of the Stalin—who had ruled for
almost thirty years. Books have been written about the political game played around the power
vacuum created by Stalin’s death; however, for this thesis it is not important to delve into the
details. In the end only one of Stalin’s cabinet could assume his role as General Secretary.
Nikita Khrushchev was thrust onto the international stage. He won the power battle over long
time Stalinists Lavrenti Beria, Lazar Kaganovich, and Vyacheslav Molotov. Khrushchev would
31
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lead the Soviet Union on a very different course than the vision Stalin for the nation. While
much of Khrushchev’s legacy remains in question by historians of the Soviet Union, most of that
debate includes superfluous details to include in this paper. One important idea to keep in the
forefront of any discussion of Khrushchev’s succession of Stalin is that while Nikita Khrushchev
never identified himself as a Stalinist, he was a product of the Soviet system and remained
trapped within the confines of the very same structure.35
Unfortunately, the trappings of the Soviet state would factor into Khrushchev’s eventual
decision to use military force to end the Hungarian Revolution. During the Stalin years, the
Soviet Union underwent a significant transformation in international identity. He radically
departed from Lenin and his 1917 Revolution (though Stalin would never publically admit it),
which brought along with concept of a communist upheaval spread throughout Europe. Stalin
was a man of many faces, but above all else he was a political realist. He saw that an
international revolution was not going to occur and he decided to create a socialist utopia inside
the confines of the Soviet Union’s borders.36 While this chimerical idealism brought a focus on
heavy industry, class-based terror, and collectivized agriculture, it was also accompanied by a
passionate defense of the ever-expanding border of the Soviet Union.37 For Khrushchev in the
mid-1950’s—now dealing with the newly built NATO alliance—defense of socialism inside the
Soviet Union remained a prima facie issue. To allow a free and independent Hungary would
send a message to any other discontented communist state, most notably Poland, that a
revolution from below would be successful.
Was Khrushchev a liberal? In the true definition of the word, probably not. Khrushchev
had been appointed to head the Ukrainian reconstruction project by Stalin and during the Stalin
years continued to serve the dictator faithfully.38 To mistake Khrushchev as a man not capable of
violence would be a terrible misunderstanding. Khrushchev’s record inside the communist party
would prove that he possessed the ability to order and execute incredibly violent acts. He had
been bloodthirsty during the Terror of 1937-1938 and engaged in Stalin-like political violence
while reclaiming Western Ukraine after the Great Patriotic War.39 Unlike his predecessor,
Khrushchev understood that the Soviet Union needed to be taken in a different direction—the
War had exposed far too many Soviet citizens to the Western World and complete Soviet
isolation was no longer a viable policy option. When addressing Hungary in 1956, Khrushchev
was at a cross-road of his early years in office. Without a doubt, Khrushchev was certainly more
than capable, and willing, to order the Red Army into Hungary, but there would be no massive
blood purges—at least, nothing close to the political violence committed by Stalin and his
omnipresent NKVD officers.40 Khrushchev’s years in power were a series of contradictions, and
there existed a constant tension between reform and repression; however, compared to his
predecessor, Stalin, Khrushchev was significantly more open to the idea of reform—and for
Soviet internal politics that fact is what really mattered.
In February of 1956, Khrushchev appeared before the 20th Party Congress and gave a
report titled On the Personality Cult and Its Consequences—more commonly referred to as his
“secret speech.” This address has been named the defining moment of Khrushchev’s political
35 Jeremy Smith, “Introduction,” In Khrushchev in the Kremlin: Policy and government in the Soviet Union 19531964, Edited by Jeremy Smith and Melanie Ilic, New York: Routledge, 2011, 1.
The famous quotation attributed to Stalin is “Socialism in one country.”
37 Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin, New York: Basic Books, 2010, 388.
38 William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era, New York: W.W. Norton, 2003, 182.
39 Snyder, 371.
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career by many historians and can be seen as a critical turning point in Soviet history.41 Despite
being nearly three years after the death of Joseph Stalin, this meeting would be the first time the
Party Congress had been convened since the dictator’s death. By Khrushchev’s own admission
in his memoirs, the secret speech had a profound impact on the situation in Hungary which had
already reached a critical point.42
The lengthy speech consisted of a systematic and methodical deconstructing of the Stalin
era, denouncing the genocidal dictator for the creation of a personality cult. Just over 10 years
prior Stalin led the celebration of the Soviet Union’s victory in the Great Patriotic War over Nazi
Germany; however, Khrushchev criticized Stalin for a lack of preparation and for his disbelief at
the outbreak of the conflict. Most importantly for the Soviet Bloc nations, Khrushchev took
Stalin to task for his consistent breach of Soviet rule of law in dealing with political opponents:
Facts prove that many abuses were made on Stalin’s orders without reckoning with any
norms of Party and Soviet legality. Stalin was a very distrustful man, sickly
suspicious...This sickly suspicion created in him a general distrust even with eminent
party workers whom he had known for many years. Everywhere and in everything he saw
enemies, “two-facers,” and spies.” Possessing unlimited power, he indulged in a great
willfulness and choked a person morally and physically. A situation was created where
one could not express one’s own will.43
Although meant to be secret, foreign journalists were allowed access to the speech
material, ensuring that the entire world would hear of Khrushchev’s new anti-Stalin stance. For
the Hungarian intelligentsia Khrushchev’s speech had several implications. First, even though
Khrushchev had not specifically denounced the Rakosi regime in his speech (or any other
communistic leaders beside Stalin) he had criticized the Stalinist purges that Rakosi employed to
consolidate power. For the Hungarian people there was little distinction between Rakosi and
Stalin—both had broken Soviet legality under Khrushchev’s interpretation. Additionally, both
men had created a personality cult (though a drastically larger one in Stalin’s case) and removed
political opponents. Again in Rakosi’s case the purging of the Catholic Church in Hungary was
the biggest example. Finally, Rakosi had followed Stalin’s lead and created conditions in
Hungary where it had become impossible to “express one’s own will.” Khrushchev’s critique of
Stalin’s removal of intellectual expression was seen by the writers and university students as a
call for a free press—something Moscow could not allow if Hungary was to remain a loyal
Soviet satellite. Khrushchev’s “secret speech” had profound effects in being the final catalyst
from Moscow in the Hungarian Revolution and Khrushchev’s contradiction of his own words
was what brought the revolutionary upheaval to an abrupt end. The situation and main players in
Moscow have been set up; however, to understand why the Hungarian people rebelled and why
they may have been misled, the situation in Hungary after Stalin’s death must be examined
further.
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Nearly 2,000 kilometers away from Moscow in Budapest the post-Stalin thaw had begun
to take place. Imre Nagy, a little know member of the Politburo, was promoted to prime minister
replacing Matyas Rakosi.44 The order for Nagy’s promotion came directly from Moscow, but
the official reasoning behind the choice is still unclear. Nagy was relatively young did not
belong in the core group of leaders in the Hungarian communist party because he had fallen onto
bad terms with the party due to his opposition to collectivization.45 From the leaders in the
Kremlin, there were several reasons to prefer Nagy to Rakosi and his henchman. First, Nagy
was not a Jew. Even so shortly after the Western World had become aware of the Holocaust,
Anti-Semitism still had an influence on Soviet party decisions. Second, Nagy’s popularity with
the Hungarian people continued to rise because of his work on implementing a successful land
reform as Minister of Agriculture.46 Perhaps the party bosses thought that Nagy could find
common ground between the gap that still existed between the communist party and the
agricultural peasantry.
Nagy’s appointment made one thing clear: Moscow was not happy with the Hungarian
party’s leadership. In a party memo from Moscow, the Rakosi regime was heavily criticized for
the decreased standard of living for the Magyar working class and for seeing industrialization as
an end in itself, not as a means to provide economic security for the working socialist citizens.47
Nagy’s opposition to collectivization put him at odds with the Hungarian communists; however,
his anti-Stalinist policies seemed to have endeared him with the party heads in Moscow.
Inside the party memo it is clear that the rapidly deteriorating social situation in Budapest was
known to those in the Kremlin. The memo notes that in 850,000 cases the Hungarian AVH (or
secret police, the Hungarian version of Stalin’s omnipresent and feared NKVD) imposed
“penalties.” One is left to guess what these penalties might have included; however, given the
number of Hungarians purged under Rakosi, certainly some of the 850,000 suffered the worst
possible fate. Moscow’s insistence that Rakosi resign and their appointment of Nagy at least
tacitly shows their acknowledgement of the precarious situation that was beginning to develop in
Hungary, 1953.
The situation in Hungary following Stalin’s death was unique. In no other Eastern Bloc
country did a communist leader suggest that the socialist system was open to reform and
humanization.49 The Hungarian Revolution would occur over a decade before the Prague Spring.
If nothing else, Imre Nagy and his failed attempt at reform points to the fact that there was a
significant gap between what the party said and what the policy would be. Moscow could not
allow a liberal Hungary because once concessions had been made, the people would only want
more. Surely the leaders in Moscow were familiar with Tsar Nicholas II’s attempted liberal
reforms following the squashing of the 1905 Revolution and when those same reforms were
never realized the February, 1917, Revolution became inevitable.
Nagy’s reformist policies became known as the ‘New Course.’ It would become the liberal fore
runner to the Prague Spring of 1968 and Mikhail Gorbachev’s Glasnost and Perestroika in the
1980’s.50 A liberal agenda and certainly a reformist one, Nagy had no intention of breaking
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Hungary out of the Soviet Union. Nagy’s belief in socialism never wavered; he merely wanted
to implement a better version, one that broke away from the economic woes that Stalinism had
brought after the end of the Second World War. It appeared that Moscow had appointed a man
who could lead Hungary out of the economic depression that it faced, while keeping the Magyar
people dedicated servants of the Soviet Empire. Unfortunately for Khrushchev and his advisors,
Nagy’s plans would never be implemented fully.
Books could be written detailing the failures of the pre-Revolution Nagy-led government;
however, the blame should not be placed solely on Nagy. Three reasons exist for the failure of
the liberal reforms and the continued intellectual discontent on the party of the Hungarian
intelligentsia. First, after the death of Stalin, there were a series of riots in Eastern Germany that
began when the East Berlin construction workers went on strike. The riots had a profound effect
on Hungary (as well as the other Bloc states). It is important to remember that the Bloc states
did not operate inside a vacuum. When a crisis arose in one state, Moscow then had to decide
how that situation might affect other Soviet dominated countries. The Red Army was quickly
sent in to violently crush the revolt. Coming after a short period of relaxation by the central
party following Stalin’s death, the Red Army’s military triumph over a group of non-centralized,
liberal revolutionaries would serve as a blueprint for Soviet imperialism three years later in
Hungary.51 For Soviet interests, East Germany could not allowed to be a free country.
Khrushchev saw that allowing East Germany to be free would allow the United States to gain a
further foothold in Germany and potentially reunite Germany as one nation.52 The same logic
would be applied to Hungary and the NATO alliance.
Second, Nagy’s freedom to govern as he chose would be limited after Berlin, 1953. The
party always came before the national government in Soviet politics.53 Nagy was a dedicated
socialist; however, he was still primarily a Hungarian—not in a militarist or nationalist sense, but
as a politician who would look after the interests of the Hungarian people. It became impossible
for him to operate in the government when the government apparatus still obeyed Rakosi and his
Stalinist clique.54 There was a clash of ideals inside the Hungarian communist party, and the
party structure made it impossible for Nagy to be victorious.
The third reason was that Nagy lacked liberal allies inside the government. Just as
Rakosi still controlled the AVH and other state-controlled organizations, Nagy did not have the
support from any powerful groups for his proposed reforms.55 The final result would be to make
Nagy a martyr to the liberal Hungarian intelligentsia.56 Nagy may have been idolized by the
liberal elite in Hungarian society, but their dedication to him was not enough to appease their
desire for freedom. The liberal elite that formed a pseudo-coalition group around Nagy became
the first significant anti-Stalinist reform movement in any of the Bloc countries. Their
organization unmasked the Hungarian Stalinists and helped the Hungarian people ready
themselves for revolution.57
In terms of the Hungarian Revolution, perhaps the biggest shortcoming of Nagy’s first
term as prime minister was the failure to reexamine any of the public or secret political trials
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undertaking by the Rakosi regime.58 Nagy’s shortcomings in liberalizing the economic, social,
and cultural situation in Hungary become understandable after examining the situation in the
Hungarian political party; however, had Nagy been able to open the files on many of the political
trials, even restore some of the Catholic Church’s power in Hungary, there could have been a
chance that Nagy could have successfully began the process of liberalizing Hungary. In those
purged by Rakosi, Nagy would have found allies. Perhaps for that very reason Nagy’s enemies
blocked any chance of reversing the show-trial’s decisions.
The situation in Hungary would become incredibly fluid over the next three years and
Moscow had a difficult time dealing with the crisis leading up to the Revolution. The party
bosses in Moscow were stuck between choosing a liberal reformer, who in some ways they
feared, and a Stalinist, in Rakosi—that they wanted purged from the party—but had too many
allies in Budapest. It would be Khrushchev’s speech to the 20th Party Congress that would
formally end Rakosi’s political career. The removal of Rakosi after his ‘secret speech’ would
symbolize a common occurrence during the Khrushchev era.
Nikita Khrushchev’s eleven years as head of the communist party was marked by broad
contradictions.59 He called for domestic reform and peaceful coexistence with the capitalist
world; however, he treated the Bloc states as tools to buffer against his perception of NATO’s
imperialist agenda. Khrushchev responded to NATO’s skepticism of the new Soviet doctrine by
distrusting the West’s intentions—thus dooming any significant change in international relations.
Unfortunately for the Hungarian people, Khrushchev would respond with military force to their
revolution—-just as he did in Berlin in 1953. For a politician who marked his career with the
liberal thaw and a period of de-Stalinization, Khrushchev appeared to respond to crisis situations
by following the model of the preceding party dictator. Khrushchev was a man marked by
internal conflict and so too was the story of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956—one that was full
of contradictions, misguided allusions, and violence.
1956: The Communist Experiment Hangs in the Balance
Nikita Khrushchev stated after the Hungarian Revolution took place, “If ten or so
Hungarian writers had been shot at the right moments, the revolution would never have
occurred.”60 Khrushchev’s quote signifies how unique the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was in
comparison to other armed rebellions. It began with a small group of writers and university
students and spilled over to a twelve-day struggle of Hungarian nationals fighting against an
organized military force, superior in both quality and quantity of troops. The Red Army had
proven itself in both conventional and guerrilla warfare. During World War II, Operation
Bagration swept through Germany advances, and within one year from its launch date, Soviet
forces reached Berlin. Combating guerrilla and partisan forces in Berlin, 1953, the Red Army
successfully, and brutally, restored order.
For the Hungarian liberals, the Nagy prime minister experiment lasted only two short
years as he was forced out by changes in Moscow. Nagy was forced to resign from his position
as prime minister and was expelled from the communist party. His replacement, Andras
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Hegedus, would reinstitute the policies of the Rakosi regime.61 Before his exit Nagy correctly
predicted that reinstating Rakosi and Stalin’s policies (or further roll-back of the Hungarian
people’s liberty) could not be the alternative to reform. According to Nagy, should the
Hungarian people be left to decide between Stalinism and revolution, they would choose the
latter:
Today, probably a return to the policy of the New Course and the application of June
[1953] principles to the economic, political, and social life of the nation could still check
the growing crisis and avert catastrophe. But it is doubtful whether a return to the June
principles would suffice as a solution tomorrow.. .there is a danger that the masses,
having lost their faith, will reject both the June way and the Communist Party, and it will
become necessary to make a much greater retreat in order to keep the situation under
control.62
Neither the Communist Party in Budapest nor Moscow would heed Nagy’s warning. The country
was set on a path for revolution that would begin on the streets of the Hungarian capital city on
the evening of October 23, 1956.
The beginnings of the Hungarian Revolution echo the start of the Russian Revolution in
1917—a series of peaceful protests, as a result of continued decreases in the quality of life,
exploded into violence after an initial response by the military. In the Hungarian case, the large
group of writers and university students were gathering in the streets of Budapest as the AVH
gathered on the rooftops above them. After a series of blanks were fired to disperse the crowd, a
single can of tear gas was hurled into the crowd. Panic ensued in the streets of the Hungarian
capital city as the young, unorganized intelligentsia scrambled for cover from the secret police.
Thus began the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.
The revolution possessed no organization; it was simultaneously spontaneous and
inevitable. Had the AVH allowed the students to protest down the streets of Budapest, the
fighting likely would not have occurred in the night of October 23rd; however, referring back to
Nagy’s prediction, the Hungarian intelligentsia would not abide by the one party communist
system. The Hungarian people proved for twelve days that they possessed the will to fight for a
multi-party government. Despite his expulsion from the communist party Nagy would return to
attempt to lead the Hungarian people through the crisis of the Revolution. Had the freedom
fighters ultimately won their independence from the Soviet Union, more than likely Nagy would
have been the head of the new multi-party Hungarian government.
Before covering the details of the Revolution and the decision from Moscow to ultimately crush
the will of the Hungarian people with a major offensive, some facts have to be addressed. One
of Khrushchev’s motivating factors in using military force to end the Hungarian Revolution was
the threat that an independent Hungary and NATO posed to the Soviet Union; however, there is
no evidence to suggest that the Hungarian people desired to be a member of the NATO alliance.
The revolution was mostly contained within the city borders of Budapest and only around 15,000
Hungarian men and women took up arms against their Soviet occupiers. It was a nationalistic
and patriotic revolution, but not an antisocialist one.6 However, to prove the necessity of
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Moscow’s actions, the desires of the Hungarian people do not matter—only Moscow’s
perception of their wishes. Khrushchev thought that NATO would immediately enter Hungary
forcing Capitalism on the Magyar people regardless of whether the Hungarian freedom fighters
desired to be a member of the United States alliance.65 Contrary to the Kremlin’s belief, the
Hungarian people who fought for their freedom did so solely because they wanted a government
for the Hungarian people by the Hungarian people. They did not want Moscow to continue to
dictate the life of the Magyars.
Second, Moscow did not engage in a trigger happy defense of their empire. New
evidence suggests that Khrushchev would have been willing to listen to Nagy’s demands had he
given a centralized list of what the Hungarian people desired and how those requests would have
benefited the overall Union of Socialist Republics.66 Ultimately Moscow did decide that a
military option was preferential to any peaceful negotiations so there should not be too much
weight put into this claim. While Khrushchev mulled the decision to use force for nearly a week,
his decision was necessary for the Soviet Union’s continued status as a major European power. It
is unfortunate for the Hungarian people that the lack of leadership in the Revolution (and Nagy’s
inability to centralize the people’s demands into a clear policy) forced Khrushchev into ordering
direct military action.
Third, Washington was completely taken by surprise by the outbreak of the Revolution,
proving how spontaneous it was.67 The CIA possessed no Hungarian-speaking official on the
entire European continent.68 The United States had few options given the short timeframe of the
Revolution. Although the United States was caught off guard by the outbreak of the Revolution,
they should share some culpability of the blame for the failure of the Hungarian freedom
fighters. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, failed the Hungarian people in what amounted to
one of the lowest moments of his term in office.69 Dulles had called for insurrection against the
Soviet occupation of the bloc states; however, at the outbreak of the Revolution he did nothing to
aid the freedom fighters. Dulles did not attempt to open a dialogue with the Soviet governments,
instead choosing to focus on the crisis over the Suez Canal.70 Additionally, the United States
found itself in a ‘Catch-22.’ A free Hungary was in its interests, but to openly aid the Hungarian
freedom fighters, either economically or militarily would have risked turning the Cold War into a
hot one. Given the assets available at the time and the logistical realities of the situation, the
United States’ only option was to sit on the sidelines and hope for a successful Hungarian
victory. Only eleven years after World War II, Eisenhower—ever fearful of war and the military
industrial complex—surely did not want to risk the third global conflict of the 20th Century.
It is a common misperception by American Cold War politicians that the Soviet Union
looked to engage or provoke the West into another global conflict. In a document published nine
months before the Hungarian Revolution, the Soviet Foreign Ministry outlines the Soviet
Union’s desire to maintain peace inside the Bloc. Should any of the Bloc states be granted their
freedom, there was a legitimate fear in Moscow that those states (at the time most likely Poland
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or Hungary) would appeal for NATO support.71 The Soviet logic flows from the realistic fact
that the United States and its allies would have insisted that the Bloc countries be given the right
of self determination because foreign occupiers could be seen as substantial causes to both of the
20th Century’s global conflicts. Granted, NATO operated under the assumption that given a
choice between democracy and communism Eastern and Central Europe would also choose the
former because communism was an oppressive exterior government. However, Khrushchev
responded to such a claim in his memoirs. Khrushchev acknowledged that the Soviet Union
established communist governments inside the Bloc; however, he argued that the United States
did the same with capitalism in Western Europe, citing a capitalist inspired civil war in Greece.72
The truth behind such a claim can surely be debated, but it is not the facts in this case that matter,
merely Khrushchev and Moscow’s perception of the West. This line of logic naturally leads to
the question: so was the Soviet Union’s fear of the West really unfounded or did it have basis in
reality?
From Moscow’s point of view, the Soviet Union had just as good a claim to fear the
NATO as the western alliance was scared of the USSR. As the Soviet Foreign Ministry pointed
out, the United States and Great Britain had authorized the rearmament of West Germany and
granted its status as a member of NATO.73 Washington and its allies had the ability to strike the
heart of the Soviet Union with much greater ease than vice versa. Although the Soviet Union had
successfully tested its nuclear program, the USSR remained far behind the United States in
nuclear capacity at the beginning of 1956. Additionally, the Soviet Union lacked any long range
strike at the United States. A consistent problem in United States-Soviet relationship during the
Cold War began with missile defense. The United States had military bases spread throughout
Europe, meaning that America possessed a greater capacity for first strike potential against
Moscow. If the Soviet Union were to lose any more territory in Central Europe, it would have
marked disaster for the security status of the entire Bloc.74
Again, in early 1956 the Soviet Foreign Ministry was open to improving relations with
the Western Capitalist world, except that this enhancement predicated on two stipulations. First,
the geographical boundaries of the Soviet Union (of 1956) remain completely intact. Second,
there would be no further encroachment on the Soviet Union’s security network. A western
political scientist or politician could easily dismiss the Soviet Union’s insistence on Eastern
European domination as tyrannical and imperial; however, from the perspective of the politicians
inside the Kremlin it can be seen that there was a legitimate fear of the West. It should not be
too far a stretch to think that the Soviet politicians realized what had happened to Japan in 1945
and feared the United States might use nuclear weapons against major Russian cities. Granted,
given that mutually assured destruction ensured that scenario would never play out, Soviet
politicians feared the United States as much as the politicians of the U.S. were scared of the
Soviets. Khrushchev would eventually see the situation in Hungary as being inspired by the
Capitalist countries of the West—similar to his allegation of the West’s agitation of the Greek
Civil War.
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The United States knew that the “political, military and economic power of the Soviet
Union” was greatly augmented by the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.75 It is clear that
both sides of the Cold War knew of the importance of the Bloc states. The Hungarian
Revolution stood in direct opposition to the Soviet concept of security. Unbeknownst to the
Hungarian intelligentsia, this game of international power politics was the context of the 1956
Revolution. As the Hungarian AVO began to fire on the peaceful protesters in Budapest,
Moscow began to scramble—unsure what the extent of the protest would amount to, or if for the
second time since the death of Stalin, the Red Army would have to be utilized to subdue an
unruly Bloc nation.
It should be noted that the Soviet Union began to build up its military presence in
Hungary three months before the Revolution. This military deployment constituted a blatant
violation of the terms of the Warsaw Pact. Although it was easy for Moscow to disregard the
terms of the treaty without rapprochement, the action should be indicative of Moscow’s
awareness as to how the situation in Hungary had already developed. Nonetheless, the military
buildup should not indicate Moscow’s eagerness to crush any opposition with the force of the
Red Army. Had that been the case surely there would have been Stalin-like purges following the
conclusion of Hungarian resistance, but Khrushchev did not resort to such measures. In fact, the
few executions were mostly undertaken by the Hungarian communist party, one was the
execution of Nagy—understandable, but not justified, given his assumption as the leader of the
freedom fighters. Again, Moscow’s use of force should not (and will not, by this paper) be
excused or justified from a humanitarian perspective, however, in international security an
unfortunate truth exists—the moral compass and the direction of a state’s best interest often point
in two separate directions.
In Hungary the fighting escalated quickly as hundreds of thousands met on the streets of
Budapest. Although the students, writers, and other Hungarian nationalists had no central
organization, there were two reasons for why violent protest spread rapidly. First, in the early
weeks of October, 1956 there were a series of mass demonstrations at various points around
Budapest—the discontent was visible, it was not as if thousands of Hungarians randomly poured
onto the streets of Budapest.76 Second, although there was no central organization, a central
motive existed, which was Hungarian independence. In no less than twelve hours since the
outbreak of the rebellion, before the morning of October 24, the radio station—a symbol of
Soviet propaganda—had been set ablaze. The writers were behind the arson; however, as they
took to the streets at the beginning of the night they had possessed no plans for violence.77 The
radio station had refused to broadcast a patriotic message written by the writers and as the
students joined them on the streets, pandemonium ensued as discontent turned to anger and anger
to bloodshed.78 Moscow’s initial reaction was to do nothing—their troops were stationed on
alert; however, a similar situation in Poland had recently been put down without violence. The
Kremlin hoped for the identical result in Hungary—after a night of rioting, peace would return to
the streets of Budapest. Hoping for such a fairy tale ending showed that even though Moscow
had begun to take measures to counteract a Hungarian revolt, the Soviet politicians were
desperately out of touch with the reality of the situation in Budapest.
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Nikita Khrushchev’s decision to call in military support was not one that he made lightly.
Why did Khrushchev decide that an independent Hungary was not in the best interest of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics? The internal debate that Khrushchev experienced before
deciding the fate of Hungary should not be mistaken for compassion. Khrushchev showed little
concern for the fate of the Hungarian freedom fighters, but rather he needed to determine what
the best course of action was for the Soviet Union. Granting Hungary a semi-independent status
would have been a risky endeavor for several reasons.
First, Yugoslavia and Tito had been granted that same position and had been a constant
tension point in Soviet-Bloc relations. Tito consistently dissented from Moscow’s party line,
leading to the question of whether Tito was a nationalist or a communist first. It is often difficult
to separate the two (in Tito’s case) in order to make a clear distinction. In post-World War II,
Soviet relations between Belgrade and Moscow were constantly strained over the planned
economy. According to Khrushchev, Tito and members of the Yugoslavian government refused
to have their economy subject to the bureaucratic red-tape of the Soviet Union.79 Most
importantly, Yugoslavia did not just ask for independent status in international relations, Tito
actively campaigned for all socialist countries to share this status.80 For reasons still unclear,
Khrushchev allowed the dissent from Tito, and Moscow granted Yugoslavia the right to export
its products to capitalist markets. However, due to Tito’s campaigning for an alliance of
independent socialist states, a free Hungary would be dangerous. It seems under Khrushchev’s
logic one country makes an exception, two makes a norm. It seemed that only Tito would receive
a special status from Moscow—Khrushchev could not allow an independent Hungary.
Additionally for Khrushchev, in 1956 a situation developed in Poland that required the
attention of Moscow. Poland, much like Hungary, suffered from imposed Stalinism after World
War II and shared an equal if not more extreme hatred of the Russians stemming from the
constant Polish subjugation to Russia’s will throughout history.81 While the tension in Poland
was long standing, the spark in 1956 was a shortage of food. The significant difference in the
Polish case was that a liberal communist, Wladyslaw Gomulka, exerted enough influence over
the Polish rebels to ensure an end to the protests. Khrushchev was ready to order in Soviet
troops; however, assurances made by Gomulka successfully backed Khrushchev down.82 This
strategy would be almost identically similar to Khrushchev’s initial stance on the Hungarian
crisis (he wanted to allow Nagy to negotiate a peace between the communist party and the
freedom fighters); however, Khrushchev could not continually appear weak in the Soviet satellite
states before protests turned into a full-scale revolution.
The Polish issue had a direct link with Hungary—the two states shared in their hatred of
their Russian overlord. The demonstration that began on October 23, 1956, in Budapest was
inspired to show solidarity with the events occurring in Poland in October.83 Likewise as the
Polish people protested for bread and freedom, several demonstrators clamored under the tagline
‘Warsaw-Budapest-Belgrade.’84 Khrushchev began to lose control of the Bloc states. He first
ordered the Soviet Army into Warsaw and after a bloody day of fighting, order was restored to
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the Polish capital city. In contrast to the Hungarian freedom fighters, the Poles were organized,
but possessed little to no military equipment in order to resist the Red Army. Khrushchev had
hoped for a similar result in Hungary after the protests became widespread because Moscow
could not allow the crisis in Eastern and Central Europe to escalate further. To do so would have
meant a substantial decrease in Soviet hegemony in the area, and as a byproduct, the
strengthening of the NATO alliance.
Again, the issue of NATO cannot be overstated. Khrushchev was keenly aware that the
United States and its allies were closely watching the communist Bloc, especially the border
states that were prime for rebellion. The NATO alliance established a diplomatic and military
alliance between the Capitalist powers in Western Europe and North America. While the
alliance’s charter primarily dealt with defensive agreements should any of the signatory nations
come under armed attack, it did much more than that. It became the bulwark of anti-communist
nations that were constantly watching for holes in the Warsaw Pact (or in the Soviet Russia’s
domination of the remainder of Communist Europe). Against these background issues, as the
situation in Hungary began to deteriorate further and it became clear no peaceful negotiation or
reform would occur, Khrushchev was forced to consider a military option for the continued '
existence of Soviet hegemony.
Soviet troops first entered Budapest on Wednesday, the 24th of October—a full day after
the fighting had broken out. By this point the freedom fighters had seized several (including the
largest) ammunition depots in Budapest and two of the city’s finest military academies had
joined the cause of the Revolution.85 The AVO had lost control of the city due to the growing
numbers, and growing military supplies, of the freedom fighters. The Red Army entered the city
with 6,000 men and 700 tanks with another 20,000 infantry men and 1,100 tanks placed on high
alert; however, the Soviet army expected to perform a routine military police operation and crush
rioting students—very similar to their experience in Berlin three years prior.86 Perhaps if the
story of the Hungarian Revolution ended there, it would not have been worth telling. If only a
group of rowdy students had been dispersed and protests banned, it would only be an underscore
to the entire Cold War—of course, that is not the case. The freedom fighters fought the
occupying Soviet army viciously, beginning on the morning of the 24th of October. The
Hungarian citizens were desperately struggling for their freedom, but unfortunately for the
Magyar people it was a battle they had no chance of winning.
Even before the Moscow ordered its own troops to crush the freedom fighters, the West
began to see the hopelessness of the situation. A British memorandum, authored by Thomas
Brimelow, dated October 25, 1956—eleven days before the Red Army marched triumphantly
through Budapest—details the West’s attitude toward the Hungarian Revolution.
This is full of pitfalls. We must be careful not to say anything which might encourage
hotheads in Budapest to further useless rioting. We might express our disapproval of the
intervention of Soviet forces, but the Russians are forearmed with the answer that they
went in by invitation. We could criticize Mr. Nagy for calling the Russians in and for
suppressing the riots with such brutality. But it may be to our interest to have Mr. Nagy
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in power. At the moment he seems to offer the best prospects for a more liberal
Communist regime in Hungary...I recommend that we should say as little as possible.87
Even though at the time of the outbreak of the Revolution, Khrushchev had only been in
power for three years, he was no beginner when it came to international relations and Soviet
politics. When the Soviet troops began to march into Budapest, Moscow released a statement
condemning the violence in Hungary as counter-revolutionary (to the Russian Revolution nearly
40 years prior). Additionally, Khrushchev’s government placed NATO in a difficult position—
Moscow’s statement disclosed that the Hungarian people’s government had asked for the Red
Army to restore peace under the terms of the Warsaw Pact.88 Surely NATO could see through
the facade that the Soviet Union had placed around Hungary; however, under international law
there was nothing they could do. Additionally, any resolution brought before the United Nations
to order a ceasefire or a peace-keeping operation in Hungary would have, without a doubt, been
vetoed by the Soviet Union, a fellow Security Council member. Khrushchev had skillfully
negated any potential that the West could intervene in Soviet internal affairs in Hungary.
Khrushchev did not anticipate how important his skillful political game would become
regarding the Hungarian Revolution. He shared in the Soviet military’s preconceived notion that
order would be quickly restored in Hungary through the superior training, weaponry, and man
power of the Red Army. It was nearly midnight when an emergency cabinet meeting shared the
bad news with Khrushchev: there had been 60 Russian casualties, in addition to four tanks and
four armored vehicles being destroyed.89 Quickly Khrushchev began to lose total faith in any
non-violent, political solution repairing the problem in Hungary. The Premier sent a message to
Tito stating “The West and anti-Soviet elements in Hungary have taken up arms against the
Socialist camp and the Soviet Union. The West is seeking a revision of the results of World War
II. It has started in Hungary, and will then go on to crush each socialist state in Europe one by
one.”90 It is unclear if Khrushchev believed his words or, in a more sinister manner, wanted Tito
to believe them—so that Tito would approve of military action against the Hungarian people.
Regardless, it is clear that Khrushchev remained a devout communist throughout the entirety of
his reign. To allow a free Hungary would be a significant back-track in the goals of a global
communist revolution and to the status of Soviet security in Europe.
Once Khrushchev understood that Russia was dealing with a much greater threat than a
large group of disgruntled intellectuals, due to the Revolution spreading to Hungarian nationals
and nearly all other members of Hungarian society he began to realize that there could be no
middle ground in Hungary—no negotiations and no compromise. He saw the situation in classic
Bolshevik terminology. The freedom fighters were counter-revolutionary elements and the
Soviet Union was aiding the Hungarian working class to realize the ideals of communism.91 His
memoir would have one believe that he had known this fact from the outset; however, it is clear
that is not true. It took almost a week of debate in the Kremlin, before Moscow offered an
official policy on Hungary. On the night of October 30, (as usual during the Hungarian crisis)
Khrushchev tossed around, unable to sleep. He initially had approved a plan granting Hungary
87 Thomas Brimelow, “Memorandum from Thomas Brimelow to the British Foreign Office News Department,” in
The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents, 234.
88 “Excerpts from Soviet Government Statement, October 30, 1956, in The Cold War. A History through
Documents, 91.
89 Sebestyen, 137.
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the status of a semi-autonomous independent nation on par with the likes of Austria, Yugoslavia,
and Finland.92 The story of Khrushchev’s decision had already been printed for the morning
headlines of Pravda. During Khrushchev’s sleepless night he unsurprisingly decided to reverse
his initial plan. Had Khrushchev’s original arrangement been implemented it would have
changed the course of history in Eastern Europe. Certainly it would have removed a substantial
cause of the cold war from the American perspective, which was Soviet domination of Eastern
and Central Europe.93 One of the motivating factors in Khrushchev’s decision was selfpreservation. He feared (rightfully so) that his rivals in Moscow would pounce should he give
proof of his willingness to cooperate with the Capitalist powers through his seeming
acquiescence on the Hungarian issue.94
The decision was then made that the Hungarian issue would be resolved with the might
of the Red Army. The United States and its NATO alliance had been effectively neutralized by
the statements of the Soviet government detailing Hungary’s begging for military action to
restore order. Eisenhower would address the nation condemning the violence of the Soviet
military and refuting the claim that Hungary needed the assistance of the Russians—“after World
War II, the Soviet Union used military force to impose on the nations of Eastern Europe
governments of Soviet choice—servants of Moscow.”95 Eisenhower’s impassioned speech
would amount to little. The Hungarian people were left alone to fight one of the greatest military
forces of the 20th Century. What could Eisenhower have done? Khrushchev absolutely would
have been willing to go to war over the issue of Soviet power projection in Eastern Europe.
Under this framework, Khrushchev ordered the commencement of Operation “Vertex” on the
morning of November 1, 1956.
Up to this point, a pseudo-cease fire had been in effect and Soviet forces were pulling out
of Hungary. Early on the first morning of November, Nagy received a report that the largest
Russian force yet, backed by 850 tanks, had reentered Hungary. Nagy’s days as prime-minister
were numbered—the Soviet Army had begun its full invasion of Hungary.96 Operation “Vertex”
fully restored the ‘national-democratic’ government in Hungary by November 4; twelve days
after the fighting had broken out.97 Nagy was arrested and later executed. He would be replaced
by Janos Kadar. Kadar was willing to comply with Moscow’s demands thus ending any threat of
a free Hungary. Kadar remained subservient to the Kremlin; however, he showed his brutal side
in his execution of Nagy and several of Nagy’s allies in a brilliantly designed trap after Nagy
attempted to seek refuge in Yugoslavia.98 Almost a decade of uneasy Soviet-Hungarian relations
was decided in twelve bloody days with a devastating Soviet victory.
Legacy
The Hungarian Revolution was dismissed from serious academic study for quite some
time for two reasons. First, serious studies of Soviet history were limited until the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991 and the opening of the Soviet archives. Second, near the end of the
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Hungarian Revolution international attention quickly shifted to the crisis in the Suez Canal that
had the potential to cause another global conflict. The Hungarian Revolution became an
afterthought as foreign media covered the Suez crisis with much greater zeal. For many years,
the unfortunate deaths of the Hungarian freedom fighters and reformist leaders were completely
forgotten—one of the biggest tragedies of the entire affair. Regardless, the success of Operation
“Vertex” marked a return to ‘normalcy’ in the Soviet Bloc. The Red Army made an example of
the Hungarian people to show the entire Bloc what would happen should they follow the
Hungarian path.
Leading up to the events of the Hungarian Revolution, Poland and Hungary were de-facto
allies inside the Bloc given their status as problem states for the Russians. The new Polish
government, under the leadership of Wladyslaw Gomulka followed the day-to-day events of the
Hungarian Revolution very closely. While the Kremlin did its best to prevent information from
leaking out of Budapest, Poland used its embassy in Hungary to gain as much intelligence as
possible." Once it became clear that the Hungarian cause was lost, Gomulka officially
condemned Nagy’s revolutionary government, and by 1958 the Polish communist party had fully
accepted Kadar’s ordered execution of Imre Nagy—no matter how uncomfortable it made the
Polish leaders.100 The Polish people, once united in cause, gave up on their Hungarian freedomdesiring brethren. A sense of complacency began to dawn over the entire Soviet Bloc—for it
seemed better to acquiescence to Moscow’s demands then to suffer that fate of Hungary in 1956.
Khrushchev established a precedent in his ordering of the Red Army into Budapest on
November 1st. In his memoirs Khrushchev showed no regrets in his decision to crush the
freedom fighters in Operation “Vertex.” In fact, Khrushchev argued that the use of force was
completely justified for two reasons. Since Hungary was a member of the Warsaw Pact and of
the Soviet Union it was Khrushchev’s obligation to maintain order—especially in one of the
capital cities.101 Additionally, Khrushchev argued that the use of force became morally
justifiable.102 Khrushchev’s concept of morality (deriving from communism’s atheistic belief)
certainly would have been different from Western notions of morality; however, from the
perspective of Moscow Khrushchev’s argument did hold weight. From Moscow’s perspective,
the Hungarian Revolution exhibited an explicit danger to the Hungarian workers and inspired
counterrevolutionary zeal in Budapest—neither of which could be morally tolerated under Soviet
doctrine.
Khrushchev made sure that his order of force did not fall upon deaf ears. He
intentionally visited with nearly every single communist Bloc leader to inform them of his
decision to authorize military action. His memoirs would have one believe that he wanted to
ensure that no further dissent broke out over the Red Army’s actions.103 It is clear, however, that
Khrushchev had a more sinister purpose for traveling to each European communist capital city.
Khrushchev wanted to inform each of the party leaders of his decision so that they would have
no thoughts to aid or follow Hungary.104 While the Hungarian Revolution would be the first
major uprising against Soviet imperialism it would not be the last. Certainly Khrushchev’s
decision had a direct impact on his successor, Leonid Brezhnev s decision to invade
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Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring of August 1968. Ultimately the Hungarian Revolution
failed at creating an independent and free Hungarian state; however, the rebellion can be seen as
the starting point for the decline of the Soviet Union because “it gave the Soviets a jolt from
which they never entirely recovered.”105 Khrushchev’s decision had ramifications in the entire
Soviet society; however, it remains the correct one in terms of a rational state protecting its
interests—Khrushchev cannot be held responsible for the economic, social, and political
shortcomings of his successors Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko.
The ramifications of the Soviet decision to invade Hungary in 1956 were never fully
manifested in Soviet-NATO relations. The Suez crisis and subsequent negotiations displaced the
tension that the Hungarian issue had created and formed another crisis point in Soviet relations to
the West. For the United States the Soviet crackdown on Hungary was an unfortunate and
shocking setback; however, it provided additional opportunities. 106 The United States was able to
portray the Soviet Union as reformist in dialogue only—despite Khrushchev’s ascension to
power, the USSR was still an inherently evil nation-state.107* While the United States failed to
help the Hungarian freedom fighters, and in some cases misled them, the United States redeemed
itself slightly. Over 50,000 refugees from Hungary fled the Soviet violence and successfully
sought asylum in the United States and the government set up several relief organizations for the
newest immigrants to America.
“Temetni tudunk!” This Hungarian expression best translates to English as ‘what we are
really good at is burying people.109 Over a fifteen-year span, Hungary saw some of the worst
foreign state-sponsored bloodshed in modem European history between the Nazi Germany
occupation beginning in 1944 and the immediate Soviet ‘liberation.’ Against this context the
legacy of the Hungarian Revolution remains to this day an incredibly tense issue in Hungary.
The Hungarians never forgot that the first anti-Soviet revolution ended in bloodshed; however, it
immediately became a source of national pride for the Magyar people. This act of rebellion
demonstrated for the first time that totalitarianism was not destined to control Hungary, Eastern
Europe, or any nation in this world for centuries.110 This was Hungary’s victory in defeat. For
current residents of Budapest there are sights around the city that serve to remind them that their
ancestors proudly stood up to the imperialism of Nikita Khrushchev and the entire Soviet Union.
Even Khrushchev recognized that the Hungarian people would have no love for their Russian
occupiers—a hatred that continues today.111
Conclusion
The year 1956 belongs to no one group of people. There are many different sides of the
same story. The Hungarian people hoped and fought for their independence. The United States
had no deployable assets in the area to respond effectively or supply aid to the freedom fighters.
Additionally, if the United States had supported the rebels, a potential global conflict could have
started with the streets of Budapest serving as the front-lines. The Soviet Union saw a situation
which had direct ramifications to its entire security and hegemony in the Communist Bloc. All
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three stories are both separate and intertwined; however, this paper attempts to retell the
motivating factors in Khrushchev’s decision to authorize Operation “Vertex.”
The Soviet Union acted in its best interest with its decision to crush the Hungarian
Revolution of 1956. The Soviet Union, and its leader Nikita Khrushchev, were ever fearful of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Despite there being no evidence that the Hungarian
freedom fighters desired to be a signatory nation to the treaty, it is a logical thought that the
United States would intervene and force Hungary’s compliance. It would not have been the first
or the last time in the Cold War that the United States undertook questionable methods in the
name of anti-communism.
The situation in Poland and Yugoslavia certainly (and for Soviet hegemony, rightfully)
influenced Khrushchev’s decision to order the invasion of Hungary. For Soviet security,
Khrushchev needed Nagy out of power and installed a ‘yes-man,’ Janos Kadar, in his place. The
Bloc nations received the message of Operation “Vertex” and their relative obedience to
Moscow continued without major incident until the Prague Spring nearly twelve years after the
Hungarian Revolution. In hindsight, Khrushchev’s decision played a substantial role in the
return of the party-line in all of Eastern and Central Europe. Additionally, Khrushchev tightened
his grip on power—which he would hold until being forced out by political rivals in 1964 after a
series of embarrassments at the hands of the West (the Cuban Missile Crisis).
The Hungarian Revolution remains one of the greatest tragedies in the entirety of the
Cold War period of modem history. A group of guerrilla freedom fighters fought for their
nation’s independence from their Soviet overlords and for twelve days had one of the largest
land-based empires of the modem world on the ropes. Khrushchev was one restless night away
from granting a semi-autonomous declaration to Hungary—instead he swiftly reversed course
and ordered the complete annihilation of the counter-revolutionary forces in Hungary. In this
battle, Goliath bested David in a bloodbath. The Soviet actions were reprehensible and cannot
be justified on a moral basis. Khrushchev deserves no apologies. The Hungarian people suffered
immensely as a result of 1956; however, the story of the Hungarian Revolution is an incredibly
inspiring one. One small, unique European nation taking on the Soviet Union’s oppression is a
story that deserves to live on through the annals of history—no matter if Khrushchev made a
rational policy decision.
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V
The Second Amendment: In Defense of Self or State?
By T.J. McCarrick ‘12

The recent assassination attempt on the life of life of Representative Gabrielle Giffords
has once again forced questions concerning gun regulation to the forefront of the American
political conscience. With its 2008 decision in District o f Columbia v. Heller and its 2010
decision in McDonald v. Chicago, the Supreme Court has, for the first time, established the core
protestation of the Second Amendment as individual keeping and bearing of arms for self
defense in the home and that this right is incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment. And still, the debate between individual rights advocates and collective rights
advocates continues. Caroline Kennedy and Ellen Alderman effectively describe both sides of
the debate, writing, “Individual-right advocates argue that the Framers intended to protect a
personal right to bear arms when they wrote the Bill o f Rights because such a right was widely
accepted in the eighteenth century ... Gun control proponents respond that the common law right
to keep and bear arms was not an individual right to keep weapons, but primarily existed for the
defense of the state and community.”1With the lack of any clear test to assess the legitimacy of
government regulation which seeks to curtail aspects of the Second Amendment guarantee,
lower courts have been placed in a position of chaos, making ad hoc rulings concerning a host of
gun regulations. As such, this paper will proceed in the form of a Supreme Court majority
opinion ruling on the circumstances provided by a hypothetical, fictional test-case.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
MORRIS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. CITY OF MIAMI
_____________ ON W RIT OF CERTIO R A R I TO THE UNITED STA TES CO U RT OF A PPEA LS FOR TH E ELEVENTH CIRCU IT
April 28, 2 011

Justice McCarrick delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider whether a Miami gun ordinance violates the Second Amendment to the
Constitution. Through analyzing the text, history, and jurisprudence of the Second Amendment
we answer the following questions: (1) What is the core substance of the Second Amendment’s
guarantee? (2) What is the bright line test to determine the constitutionality of legislation
restricting that right? (3) Is this right incorporated against the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution?

I
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The city of Miami generally prohibits the possession of firearms. A City ordinance
provides that it is a crime for any person to possess a firearm for which they do not hold a valid
registration certificate. The code goes on to forbid the registration of handguns, shotguns, long
guns, rifles, assault weapons, and military-grade weaponry, effectually banning private
possession of any weapons by almost all citizens residing in the City. That very same ordinance
also holds that residents keep any lawfully owned firearms stored in a locked container, bound
by a trigger-lock, or unloaded and disassembled. The final relevant piece of the City’s ordinance
is its restriction on concealed carrying of weapons.
When studying such gun regulations, it is important to bear in mind that Miami is a city
historically plagued by above average crime rates. With a Crime Risk Index of 346, Miami ranks
as the seventh most dangerous city in the United States according to U.S. News and World
Report} Despite recent reductions in Miami’s violent crime rate, that figure still ranks well
above the national average “with 680 [violent crimes] per 100,000 people, compared to the
national figure of 429.”3 Included in this figure are the troubling statistics revealed by the 2003
report of the Miami-Dade County Violent Injury Statistics System. Of the 155 homicides
committed in 2003, 76 percent were committed using a firearm. Of those cases in which the
particular type of firearm was identified (80 percent), 21 percent were committed using a 9mm
semi-automatic handgun, 13 percent involved a .38 caliber revolver, 7 percent involved assault
rifles, and 3 percent involved shotguns.4
Given these statistics, petitioners have been subject to zealous enforcement of the abovedescribed ordinance. Each contends that, in one way or another, the Miami gun ordinance
violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Linda Morris,
an elderly homeowner in her mid-sixties living in a high crime neighborhood, applied for and
was denied a registration certificate for a handgun she wished to keep at home for self-defense
purposes; Steven Patton, a world-renowned crocodile hunter, applied for and was denied
registration certifications for two rifles and two shotguns he wished to keep at home for hunting
and sport; John Prendergast, an off-duty Drug Enforcement Agency officer subjected to
numerous threats by local drug cartels, desires a concealed-carrying permit for his handgun;
Michael McCabe, a videogame enthusiast, sought and was denied a permit for an assault rifle, a
Famas, he wished to keep in his home as homage for the best-selling videogame, Call o f Duty;
finally, Michael Dillon, a member of the National Guard, was denied a registration certificate for
a military-issue bazooka he sought to privately own. The District Court rejected petitioner’s
challenge, noting that the right guaranteed under the Second Amendment is restricted to keeping
and bearing arms when in active service of a militia and that naturally, such a collective right
designed to protect State sovereignty would not be incorporated against the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. We granted certiorari.
II
A
In interpreting the text of an organic document, such as the Second Amendment to the
Constitution, our analysis is informed by the principle that the text was written in such a manner
that the words and phrases employed were to be understood by the voters, by “the People”
identified in the Constitution’s preamble. This principle finds support in the advocacy of the
Antifederalists, a group instrumental in securing the existence of a bill of rights to provide
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protection against federal encroachment. The Federal Farmer, in his sixteenth letter concerning a
codification of a bill of rights, writes, “we ought to establish it [a right] generally; - instead of
the clause of forty or fifty words relative to this subject, why not use the language that has
always been used in this country...These [rights] may be secured by general words...5 Thus, any
genuine effort to identify the salient features of a right must be informed, but not shackled, by
the founding generation’s conception of that right. As the legal maxim states: Verba aequivoca,
si per commune usum loquendi in intellectu certo sumuntur, talis intellectus praeferendus est.6
Although particular concerns of the founding generation may constitute the impetus for
the codification of a given right, such as the Second Amendment, time and generation-sensitive
concerns cannot be construed to limit the entire scope of the right. Former Chief Justice
Rehnquist, in his law review article, The Notion o f a Living Constitution, writes, “The framers of
the Constitution wisely spoke in general language and left to succeeding generations the task of
applying that language to the unceasingly changing environment in which they would live.. .they
have given latitude to those who would later interpret the instrument to make that language
applicable to cases that the framers might not have foreseen.”7 Given this, it is easy to be held
captive by the illusion that the meaning of the Constitution changes and expands with time and
circumstance. Rehnquist, however, is not and to the extent, that is true, it does not suggest that
the understanding of the language employed and understood at the time of the founding is
meaningless. The founding language bears upon, informs, and even limits current constructions
and applications of that language.
Acknowledging the above doesn’t require that idiomatic meanings of certain words and
phrases be excluded from constitutional interpretation. Indeed, idiomatic understanding of
constitutional language is demanded and necessitated in instances where such language was of
common usage and understanding at the time. The question, therefore, revolves around what
exactly the founding generation understood to be the outstanding features of the Second
Amendment.
It is natural, then, to present the words of the Second Amendment which provide: “A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”8 Structured as such, the amendment is clearly and
naturally divided into two distinct parts: a prefatory clause and an operative clause. What is less
clear is the scope and relation between the two. But to engage in lengthy commentary and
argument here, before any understanding of the relevant words of the Second Amendment has
been demonstrated, would be premature. It would be tantamount to putting the rabbit in the hat
and waiting to declare “Voila!”, as if the outcome were the surprising result of unbiased analysis
instead of a rigging of a preordained result. As such, the Second Amendment will be scrutinized
in the natural order in which it is read —the prefatory clause first, and the operative clause
second.
1.

A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State

In assessing the above prefatory clause, its primary object is clear — Militia.” When we
conceive of the militia today, we are guided by the 1903 Militia Act, which defines membership
to include all able-bodied males between ages 17 and 45, excepting a few very narrow classes of
persons. In short, the militia is currently comprised of those persons eligible for a draft. Indeed,
“militia” meant very much the same thing to persons of the founding generation An early
definition offered by Webster provides, “ t h e m i l i t i a o f a c o u n t r y a r e th e a b l e b o d i e d m e n
organized into companies, regiments and brigades...and require by law to attend military
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exercises on certain days.”9 Because of the great similarity between the above two definitions, it
is possible to locate them under the slightly broader definitional umbrella such that their implicit
assumptions may be made more clear. Black's Law Dictionary defines “militia” as “A body of
citizens armed and trained, esp. by a state, for military service apart from the regular armed
forces.”10 In analyzing the subtle, but crucial, distinctions made here in light of the remaining
words of the prefatory clause, their relevance and function become all the more apparent.
If “militia” is the primary object contemplated by the prefatory clause, it is natural to
proceed with an analysis of the words qualifying that object - “well-regulated.” That adjective
holds no hypertechincal meaning, instead referring to what it plainly suggests - the imposition of
proper training and discipline. This conclusion is supported by countless founding era
documents, and, though a deeper historical analysis will be conducted later, I will employ one
instance here to illustrate the general point. During the debates over the framing and ratification
of the Constitution, the framers thought uniform regulation and discipline as key to the ultimate
success of the militia. James Madison, recounting statements made at the constitutional debates
writes:
MR. MASON moved as an additional power ‘to make laws for the
regulation an discipline of the militia of the several States reserving to the States
the appointment of officers.’ He considered uniformity as necessary in the
regulation of the Militia throughout the Union.
GEN. PINCKNEY mentioned a case during the war in which a
dissimilarity in the militia of different States had produced the most serious
mischiefs. Uniformity was essential.11
The only means to achieve such uniformity of discipline and training was to provide that
the militia be well-regulated, a power granted to national government in Article I, Section 8 of
the Constitution.
As to what purpose this “well-regulated Militia” is to be directed, we now proceed to the
remainder of the prefatory clause. The framers were quite direct in their identification of the
militia’s necessity; the ultimate end contemplated is “the security of a free State.” This phrase
means nothing more than the overall security of a free polity or nation-state, in short, the
common defense. St. George Tucker, in his View o f the Constitution o f the United States with
Selected Writings (1803), explains:
The.. .want of uniformity of organization, and of discipline, among the
several corps of the militia drawn together from the several states, together with
the uncertainty and variety of the periods of service, for which those corps were
severally embodied, produced a very large portion of those disgraces, which
attended the militia of almost every state, during the revolutionary way.. .By
authorizing the federal government to provide for all these cases, we may
reasonable hope, that they are the most safe, as well as most natural defense of a
free state.12
This quotation is particularly helpful in illustrating the argument that “the security of a
free State” is distinctly security-related and national in character. Through demonstrating the
critical importance offederal discipline and organization of state militias, Tucker shows the
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defense to be provided by those militias as national defense. In other terms, only a federally
“well-regulated Militia” could provide the necessary “security of a free State.”
Historical evidence from the time of the founding confirms the notion that “the security
of a free State” was an 18th century term of art concerned with the common defense of a free
polity, as evidenced by similar variations in wording used in a militia-centric context. In No. 29
of the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton, a key framer of the Constitution, makes the very
same connection as made by St. Tucker above, in illustrating the dynamic relationship between
proper regulation and national defense. He writes, “If a well-regulated militia be the most natural
defense of a free country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation and at the disposal of that
body which is constituted the guardian of national security (italics added).”13 Similarly, James
Madison’s original drafting of the Second Amendment confirms the above notion, stating, “The
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed and well regulated
militia being the best security of a free country... (italics added).”14
And with good reason. The immediate post-Revolutionary period was one of prolonged
crisis. From Indians to pirates to internal rebellions, the fledgling republic was pitted against a
seemingly endless list of adversaries, both foreign and domestic. Regarding the case of Indians,
especially at the outer reaches of the States’ borders, the union formed under the Articles of
Confederation was ill equipped to respond. Pauline Maier in her encyclopedic work Ratification:
The People Debate the Constitution writes that the United States’ “army had shrunk to some 625
unpaid, poorly equipped men, mostly in Western Pennsylvania - too few to prevent squatters
from moving onto Indian land, which threatened to provoke war at several points along the
western frontier.”15 Such a pathetic, ragtag group was unlikely to provide the security needed to
protect the Confederation’s citizens residing in the west, especially as they increasingly engaged
in skirmishes with Indians over territory. As such, personal possession of firearms was viewed as
critical among the colonists in case of confrontation.
Similarly, it was unlikely that such an uncoordinated group would serve as an effective
deterrent against evermore hostile policies enacted by rival European powers. From British
blockades of American imports to Spain’s closing of the Mississippi to American shippers, the
Confederation Congress was utterly powerless to institute any policy or orchestrate a show of
force to prompt change. Perhaps most troubling was the continued presence of British outposts.
Pauline Maier explains, “In late 1785, the British formally refused to evacuate their posts in the
northwest, arguing that they were not obliged to honor the peace treaty while the Americans
violated it.”16 It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the founders sought to project an image of
military capability. As Maier writes, “All governments, including the Confederation, had to
‘maintain the appearance of strength’ even in times of tranquility, and the exercise of military
power was safe ‘under the control and with the restrictions which the new constitution
provides.’”17 In this vein, the militia was viewed as the proper vehicle to strike a balance
between the demands of national security on the one hand, and fears of standing armies on the
other.
A final dagger pointed at the heart o f the young republic was internal instability. In
addition to financial problems caused by currency difficulties and a lack o f clearly defined taxing
powers, the outbreak o f numerous insurrections posed an existential threat to the survival and
workability o f the Confederation government. Whether prompted by unpaid debts to soldiers o f
the Continental Army as in the case o f Shay’s Rebellion in Massachusetts or by dissatisfaction
with taxation policies as in the case o f the Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania, substantial
groups o f armed men banded together to oppose government, government w hich was powerless
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to stop them. Pauline Maier writes, “A sense of helplessness made a bad situation almost
unbearable. Congress could only call troops for Massachusetts by pretending they would be used
against Indians: the Articles of Confederation did not give it a clear and indisputable power to
suppress domestic insurrections. The states were equally powerless...The state treasurer couldn’t
even borrow money to supply a volunteer army.”18 It is no wonder, then, that the institution of
the militia was at the forefront of the founder’s minds.
The ultimate conclusion was that individual states, left to their own devices, would be
reluctant to properly address these pressing security matters. Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist
No. 25 explained that:
The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations in our
neighborhood do not border on particular States, but encircle the Union from
Maine to Georgia. The danger, though in different degrees, is therefore
common.. .The States, to whose lot it might fall to support the necessary
establishments, would be as little able as willing, for a consider time to come, to
bear the burden of competent provisions. The security of all would thus be
subjected to the parsimony, improvidence, or inability of a part.19
It was with these concerns in mind that the federal Congress was granted powers to
regulate the militia, found in Article I, Section 8, a topic which will be considered later.
But before we proceed to the operative clause, there is another, less likely yet critically
important, interpretation of the phrase “being necessary to the security of a free State” meriting
attention. Instead of referring to the defense of a free polity, some suggest the above phrase is
intended to protect the security of the individual sovereignty of the several states. It is true that
the framers of the Constitution had deep-felt concerns over the threat posed to liberty by standing
armies. In the ratification debates, Elbridge Gerry noted, “The clause as it stands [referring to
Article I, Section 8’s provision for an army] implies that there is to be a standing army, which is
unnecessary even for so great an extent of country as this, and dangerous to liberty.”20 However,
supposing that this and other similar quotations are pieces of silver bullet evidence confirming
the existence of a federalism concern on the part of framers for state sovereignty in the context of
the Second Amendment’s preamble is foolish. Such an interpretation reads into the above
statements an explicit concern that simply is not there. The historical record is silent on this
matter, as there exists no known source explicitly connecting concerns over standing armies and
individual state sovereignty.
Proponents of the federalism reading of the Second Amendment counter the preceding
argument by noting the deliberate use of the word “State” in the amendment’s text. It is true that
elsewhere in the Constitution, the term state “State” clearly refers to the individual states. It is
also true, as Justice Scalia explains, that many of these “other instances... are typically
accompanied by modifiers making clear that the reference is to the several States - “each state,”
“several states,” “any state,” “that state,” “particular state,” “one state,” “no state.”21 As such,
when a word in a document such as the Constitution clearly possesses more than one meaning,
context becomes critical. And given the previously discussed historical context and textual
analogues linking militia-related concerns with the national security of a country, a federalism
interpretation of “security of a free State” is fundamentally untenable. This conclusion is borne
out by similar uses of the term “free State” in a non-militia, but rights related context. For
example, in 1797 A Defence o f the Constitutions o f Government o f the United States o f America,
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John Adams writes, “there can be no constitutional liberty, no free state, no right constitution of
a commonwealth, where the people are excluded from the government.”22 That statement is
about qualities critical to ensuring a nondespotic form of government, not a statement concerning
protecting of States’ rights from federal encroachment.
Furthermore, a federalism reading of the Second Amendment makes very little
organizational sense. It would seem rather strange for the framers to have interjected a States’
rights protection in the midst of seven other individual rights protections - free speech, free
press, trial by jury, prohibitions on quartering of soldiers and cruel and unusual punishment, and
the like. This is not to say that there were no serious misgivings over federal control of the
military; there were. James Madison, again in the ratification debates, explained this point,
saying, “As the greatest danger is that of disunion of the States, it is necessary to guard against it
by sufficient powers to the Common Government and as the greatest danger to liberty is from
large standing armies, it is best to prevent them, by an effectual provision of a good Militia.”23
However, the body of evidence, historical and otherwise, tends to support the conclusion that the
framers dealt with concerns over control of the militia elsewhere, namely, in Article I, Section 8
and the Tenth Amendment.
For example, in the ratification debates, John Dickinson expressed concern over total
state abdication of control over the militia. James Madison recounts Mr. Dickinson’s opinion as
follows: “We are now come to a most important matter, that of the sword. His [Dickinson’s]
opinion was that the States never would nor ought to give up all authority over the Militia.” 4 As
such, compromises were sought. George Mason, for example, attempted to strike a balance
between federal and state authority over the militia. James Madison recounts Mr. Mason as
saying, “Power should be granted the general government to make laws for regulating and
disciplining the militia, not exceeding one tenth part in any one year, reserving the appointment
of officers to the states. A select militia is as much as the general government can
advantageously be charged with. By granting greater authority, insuperable objections will be
created.”25
To that end, authority over the militia was divided in Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution which reads that Congress shall have the power to, “provide for organizing, arming,
and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them may be employed in the
Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the
Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by
Congress.”26 It is this clause, not the preamble of the Second Amendment, which ensures divided
authority over the respective state militia. To suggest that it is the preamble of the Second
Amendment that secures divided sovereignty would fundamentally change the substance of the
right. First, it would suggest that militias are reliant upon the Second Amendment for their
existence. This Court is aware of no evidence tending to support the claim that militias are
dependent upon that instrument for their being. Second, instead of being a privilege exercised at
the discretion of the individual, keeping and bearing arms would essentially turn into an
affirmative obligation upon on citizens since a well-regulated militia would be a necessary
precondition to a free State.
Concerns over where to lodge authority over the militia do, however, furnish a final
argument undercutting a federalism misreading of the Second Amendment. The record of the
ratification debates over Article I, Section 8 reveals that the primary concern at the heart of
militia-related matters was that of government disarming its citizens. Elbridge Gerry, a delegate
to the Constitutional Convention, noted that, “Less power over the militia should be vested in the
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general government. The states will be only drill-sergeants. The citizens of Massachusetts might
as well be disarmed as to have command taken from the states and given to the general
Legislature. It will be regarded as a system of despotism.”27 This quotation reveals the
fundamental, underlying, and paramount concern of the framers concerning the populace’s
possession and use of arms - widespread disarming of the citizenry. Seen in this light, the
Second Amendment’s primary concern is for an individual exercise of the right to keep and bear
arms, not a collective right to participate in the militia. This notion will be further explored in the
following section.
2.

The right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed

In analyzing the above operative clause of the Second Amendment, we begin with the
possessor of the right - “the people.” The phrase “right of the people” appears two other times in
the Bill of Rights - once in the First Amendment’s petition and assembly clause and once in the
Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure clause. Similarly, the people’s retention of
unenumerated rights in the Ninth Amendment is a very close analogue. The salient feature of all
of these instances is the codification of an individual right. Again, the words of the
Antifederalists regarding the necessity of establishing a Bill of Rights are instructive. The
Federal Farmer, again in his sixteenth letter, writes, “perhaps it would be better to enumerate the
particular essential rights the people are entitled to ... these rights are ... established, or enjoyed
but in few countries: they are stipulated rights almost peculiar to British and American laws. In
the execution of those laws, individuals, by long custom, by magna charta, bills of rights &c.
have become entitled to them.”28 Clearly, then, it was understood at the time of the framing that
those liberties secured in the Bill of Rights were intended to be held by individuals.
As Justice Scalia explains, “All three of these instances unambiguously refer to
individual rights, not ‘collective’ rights, or rights that may be exercised only through
participation in some corporate body.”29 Though assembly, and to some extent petition appear
more collective in nature, the right to engage in that collective action may only be secured
through the protection of individual rights. As such, any question of protection of collective
rights that may or may not be contemplated by the amendments to the Constitution always
devolves into an affirmation of a guarantee of individual liberty as the avenue through which one
may exercise corporate action. Further case law supports the interpretation of “the people” to
refer to individual rights. The Court in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez states that:
‘The people’ seems to have been a term of art employed in select portions
of the Constitution... [Its uses] sugges[t] that ‘the people’ protected by the Fourth
Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and
powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of
persons who are part of a national community30
The implication, therefore, is clear: the people protected in the Second Amendment have
an individual right to keep and bear arms.
However, before turning to an analysis of the substantive right of the operative clause, it
is important to address the alternate interpretation of the words “right of the people,” the
collective rights interpretation. It is argued that like the petition and assembly clause of the First
Amendment, the Second Amendment’s use of “the people” contemplates collective action. This
distinction is bolstered by the absence of the term “the people” as a qualifier for other First
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Amendment rights. In his dissent in District o f Columbia v. Heller, Justice Stevens explains, “In
the First Amendment, no words define the class of individuals entitled to speak, to publish, or to
worship; in that Amendment it is only the right peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances, that is described as a right of “the people.” These rights
contemplate collective action.”31 So too, the argument goes, does the Second Amendment, where
“the people” described in the operative clause reference the “Militia” announced in the prefatory
clause. Therefore, the use of the words “the people” in the operative clause does not expand the
right to keep and bear arms beyond the context of membership in a militia. As the Court held in
United States v. Miller, “In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of
a “shotgun having a barrel of less than eight inches in length” at this time has some reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the
Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.”32
Such an interpretation, however, is simply untenable. First, basic logic would seem to
dictate that any exercise of a collective 8 be conditioned on the preexistence and maintenance of
an individual right. For example, had I no individual right to peaceably assemble, I could never
do so in concert with others. Furthermore, textually speaking, it makes little sense that a textual
provision guaranteeing a right of “the people” would effectually only protect a subset of those
people. Holding that only able-bodied men between the ages of 17 and 45 possessed a right to
keep and bear arms, and only insofar as they were actively associated with a militia, is to imply
that many of the very framers of the Amendment, in effect, codified a right they did not
themselves possess. And to suggest that John Dickinson or Benjamin Franklin could believe such
a thing strains credulity. Not a single other amendment, even the guarantees of petition and
assembly, require involvement in some corporate body to be maintained. The entire point of
establishing a right is to make it of stronger stuff such that it might be unconditioned, free to
everyone, of course with reasonable exceptions.
It is now critical to elucidate the substance of the right enshrined in the Second
Amendment - “to keep and bear arms.” As with the prefatory clause, it is fitting to begin any
analysis with contemplation of the primary object of the operative clause - “Arms.” The 18th
century meaning of the word differs very little from contemporary understanding. Justice Scalia
explains that “The 1773 edition of Samuel Johnson’s dictionary defined ‘arms’ as ‘weapons of
offence, or armour of defense’... Timothy Cunningham’s important 1771 legal dictionary defined
‘arms’ as ‘any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to
cast at or strike another.’”33 From these definitions, it becomes clear that the word “Arms” at the
time of the founding, as today, applied to weapons not exclusively designed for military use.
We proceed, then, to the phrases “keep arms” and “bear arms.” The same edition of
Johnson’s dictionary defined “keep” as, “to reain; not to lose...and to have in custody.”34 Again,
the founders’ understanding parallels our own. Merriam-Webster s dictionary defines “keep” as,
“to retain in one’s possession or power.”35 Similarly, Black s Law Dictionary defines the “right
to bear arms” as, “the constitutional right of persons to own firearms.’ Though such a
definition would be more coherent had the word “keep been used in place of “bear”, the point is
clear, namely, substance of the right enshrined in the Second Amendment is believed by many
contemporary Americans to be a protection of an individual right to possess a firearm. Seen as
such, the appropriate reading of “keep Arms” in the context of the Second Amendment is “to
have weapons.” Though there is scant historical evidence containing the employment of the term
“keep Arms,” what examples there are seem to confirm the above reading of the Second
Amendment. The example of Sir William Blackstone is instructive. A key influence on the
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thinking of the founding generation, Blackstone writes in his Commentaries on the Laws o f
England that Catholics convicted of not observing the Mass of the Church of England must,
among other things, “not keep arms in their houses.”37 Similarly, Justice Scalia cites a colonial
law of Virginia clearly providing for the keeping of arms outside of a military context. It read,
“Free Negros, Mulattos or Indians, and Owners of Slaves, seated at Frontier Plantations, may
obtain License from a Justice of Peace, for keeping Arms, &c.”38 This evidence does not negate
the body of evidence in which “keep Arms” was employed in a militia-related context. It simply
and convincingly suggests that the right was conceived and understood as a general protection
for everyone not solely militiamen.
This interpretation of the Second Amendment is confirmed by the both modem and 18th
century understandings of the term “bear Arms.” In Muscarello v. United States, Justice
Ginsburg writes that, “surely a most familiar meaning is, as the Constitution’s Second
Amendment.. .indicate[s]: ‘wear, bear, or carry.. .upon the person or in the clothing or in a
pocket, for the purpose.. .of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of
conflict with another person.’”39 Such an interpretation captures the natural meaning of the
phrase “bear Arms” as carrying a weapon for the purpose of confrontation. Again, founding era
dictionaries including Johnson and Webster define “bear” as meaning “to carry.”40 As such, it is
clear that the words “bear Arms” did not have an exclusive military connotation. For example,
four years before the first draft of the Bill of Rights was presented, the framers employed the
phrase “bear arms” in an explicit nonmilitary context. James Madison submitted a Bill for the
Preservation of Deer, drafted by Thomas Jefferson, before the Virginia General Assembly which
read, “And, if, within twelve months after the date of the recognizance he shall bear a gun out of
his inclosed ground, unless whilst performing military duty, it shall be deemed a breach of the
recognizance, and be good cause to bind him a new, and every such bearing a gun shall be a
breach of the new recognizance and cause to bind him again.(italics added)”41 Here, the phrase
“bear a gun” can be understood in no other context than a nonmilitary one, as the act clearly
exempts military related carrying of weapons from the general prohibition. Clearly then,
Madison, and many if not all of the framers, would have possessed an understanding of the
phrase “bear arms” that was not uniquely militant in nature and could easily encompass uses of
weapons for hunting and self defense.
Despite this fact, there is some evidence to support the notion that “bear Arms” bore a
military-specific connotation. Justice Stevens, quoting the Oxford English Dictionary in his
dissent in District o f Columbia v. Heller, writes, “The term ‘bear arms’ is a familiar idiom; when
used unadorned by additional words, its meaning is ‘to serve as a soldier, do military service,
fight.”42 One pre-ratification example of this interpretation is found in the Declaration of
Independence. Objecting to the tyrannical policies of King George, it reads, “He has constrained
our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against their country.”43
Another such example is found in the words of the Providence Gazette of 1775 which state, “By
the common estimate of three millions of people in America, allowing one in five to bear arms,
there will be found 600,000 fighting men.”44 Given this evidence, it is not wholly unreasonable
to suggest that the phrase “bear Arms,” unadorned by any identification of protected nonmilitary
purposes, naturally refers to a military-related right.
Very similarly, there exists evidence that the word “keep,” as used in the Amendment,
also connotes a military meaning. Again Justice Stevens in his dissent points to a number of
militia laws enacted around the time of the founding which use the term “keep” in a particular
military context. He offers the example of a Virginia military law which held that, “every one of
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the said officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates shall constantly keep the aforesaid
arms, accoutrements, and ammunition, ready to be produced whenever called for by his
commanding officer.”45 Such an interpretation very clearly contextualizes and embodies the
identified militia-related concern of the preamble and protects the unitary ability to possess and
use arms in connection with such a militia. As Justice Stevens puts it, “the single right that [the
Second Amendment] does describe is both a duty and a right to have arms available and ready
for military service and of use them for military purposes when necessary.”46
Unfortunately the military-centric interpretation of the Second Amendment fails
to grasp the fundamental point. The right guaranteed by the Second Amendment is not to secure
the right to participate in a militia. And to continuously point to the repeated militia-related
contexts surrounding the Amendment is no answer. It is both unsurprising and unremarkable that
the terms “keep arms” and “bear arms” were most often used in a military context. Founding era
sources would have few other occasions to employ such terms outside concerns of national
security and standing armies. So, to assign Second Amendment language an exclusive meaning
borders on ridiculous. Justice Scalia explains “This is rather like saying that, since there are
many statutes that authorize aggrieved employees to ‘file complaints’ with federal agencies, the
phrase ‘file complaints’ has an employment-related connotation.”47 Such a reading is especially
ridiculous given the previously proffered examples of founders using the phrases “keep arms”
and “bear arms” is evidently non-military contexts. This fact is underscored by the absence of
any dictionary definition qualifying the possession or use of arms as exclusively related to
service in a militia.
Proponents of a collective -right interpretation counter the above argument by pointing to
James Madison’s early drafts of the Second Amendment, and particularly, the inclusion of a
conscientious-objector clause. The proposal of Madison’s Virginia’s Ratifying Convention read,
“The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed, and wellregulated militia being the best security of a free country; but no person religiously scrupulous of
bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in person.”48 From this and other
similar conscientious-objector clauses, Justice Stevens concludes that the Amendment possesses
a distinctly military context as compulsory militia service would be the sole situation in which
such a provision could be invoked. As such, because Madison and the framers did not insist on
the inclusion of language explicitly protecting nonmilitary uses of arms, “bear Arms” means the
very same thing in the substantive portion of the Amendment (IE-the protection from
infringement) as it does in the conscientious-objector portion.
Such an analysis is faulty, however, and cripples collective-rights advocates’ arguments
in contradiction. First, it is always dubious to draw conclusions concerning the meaning of an
amendment from proposals rejected during the drafting process. It is rather bizarre to derive what
Justice Stevens calls “the central meaning” of the Second Amendment from a provision not even
included in the final product. Similarly, any conclusion based on an omitted proposal is
guesswork at best, as there is no possible way to know with any degree of certainty what
Madison meant by the initial inclusion and eventual exclusion of the conscientious-objector
clause. Allow me to concede for a moment what Justice Stevens would have us believe, namely,
that Madison included protections for religiously scrupulous persons against compulsory military
service to contextualize the military-related nature of the right. Wouldn' t the logical consequence
of accepting that argument, given Madison’s subsequent elimination of that provision, yield the
very opposite reading of the Amendment that Justice Stevens intends? Given Madison’s
previously referenced uses of the term “bear Arms” in civilian contexts, it would be entirely
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reasonable to speculate that the elimination of the conscientious-objector clause was intended to
broaden the protection of the Amendment to civilian uses. But, this conclusion, like Justice
Stevens’, is conjecture at best.
Second, this piece of historical evidence clearly confirms the previously disputed position
that “security of a free State” refers to a national polity. A federalism reading of the Second
Amendment makes logical sense only if “security of a free State” refers to the protection of the
individual sovereignty and political autonomy of the respective states of the Union. The above
proposal by James Madison represents a clear denial of that reading. The deliberate attempt by
proponents of a federalism reading of the Second Amendment to ignore the deliberate use of the
word “country” and its analogue “State,” which remain in the Amendment, while highlighting
and privileging its excluded conscientious-objector provisions represents hypocrisy and political
opportunism of the worst kind. It demonstrates the commitment of collective-rights not to
fidelity to the Constitution, but to their previously held conceptions of appropriate gun policy in
America.
Finally, Justice Stevens’ analysis of initial drafts of the Second Amendment ignores
elementary grammatical construction. Like many other amendments, it is quite possible and
indeed likely that initial drafts of the Amendment sought to protect multiple related rights.
Justice Scalia cites the example of the First Amendment, writing, “[it] protects the ‘right of the
people to peaceably assemble, and to petition Government for a redress of grievances.”49 These
are found in the very same Amendment which protects freedom of the press and religion. So too,
early drafts of the Second Amendment sought to protect related but distinct freedoms, an
argument which also effectively counters any assertion that the Second Amendment guarantees a
unitary right. The use of semicolons in Madison’s initial draft is telling. Separating related, but
distinct guarantees, they demonstrate that though connected, the Amendment was directed
towards multiple ends. Such a view is confirmed by the precursor to Madison’s initial draft, the
proposals sent by the Virginia Ratifying Convention. They read:
17th, That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well
regulated Militia composed of the body of people trained to arms is the proper,
natural and safe defence of a free State. That standing armies are dangerous to
liberty, and therefore ought to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and
protections of the Community will admit and that in all cases the military should
be under strict subordination to and be governed by the civil power...
19th, That any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be
exempted, upon payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his
stead.50
Here, the Second Amendment analogue and conscientious-objector protection are split
between two different guarantees. Though both employ the phrase “bear arms,” the use of this
term in the 17th proposal is substantively different than that in the 19th. While the latter expressly
possesses a military context, and indeed could only be invoked in a military context, the former
stands alone. Unadorned with specific purpose and set off from militia-related clauses by a
semicolon, it would be imprudent to arbitrarily assume an exclusively military context to the
right.
The final piece of the operative clause maintains that the guaranteed right to keep and
bear arms “shall not be infringed.” This language is instructive in that the right protected, like the
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First and Fourth Amendments, is a preexisting right. As the Court explained in United States v.
Cruikshank, “The right there specified is that o f 'bearing arms for a lawful purpose.' This is not a
right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for
its existence. The Second Amendment declares that it shall not be infringed...”51 Thus, the
Second Amendment is really just a formal recognition of the right’s common law legacy in the
Anglo-American tradition of rights and jurisprudence. As such, that history, as we will soon see
is instructive.
3.

Relationship between Prefatory Clause and Operative Clause

To adequately identify the substance of the right protected by the Second Amendment,
we must identify the proper relation between the prefatory clause and the operative clause.
Reason requires that there be an identifiable connection between the purpose announced in the
preamble of the Amendment and its substantive guarantee and effect as illustrated in the
operative provision. Absent such a relationship, the Amendment would be incongruous. Justice
Scalia illustrates, “The Second Amendment would be nonsensical if it read: ‘A well-regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to petition for
redress of grievances shall not be infringed.”’52 Therefore, it is wholly unsurprising that an
important connection exists between the prefatory and operative clauses. The question, however,
is what is the proper relation between the two. Does the former contextualize and fundamentally
limit the latter? Or, does the former announce a nonexclusive purpose or reason for codifying the
latter?
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the prefatory clause qualifies and defines
the scope of the right guaranteed in the operative clause. Such an interpretive model is justified
by precepts enshrined in the common law legacy of Sir Edward Coke. Two of his maxims for
statutorial interpretation hold: Generalis clausula non porrigitur ad ea quae specialiter sunt
comprehensa53 and Verba posteriora propter certitudinem addita adpriora quae certitudine
indigent sunt referenda.54 As such, the general grants or rights are contextualized, limited, and
defined by surrounding clarifying language. Justice Stevens further explains this point through
the use of Sir William Blackstone, writing:
the fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator is
by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made by signs the most
natural and probable... if words happen to still be dubious, we may establish their
meaning from the context; with which it may be of singular use to compare a
word, or a sentence, whenever they are ambiguous, equivocal, or intricate. Thus,
the proeme, or preamble, is often called in to help the construction of an act of
parliament.55
Thus, only by privileging the words of the prefatory clause can the Court truly stand with
Chief Justice John Marshall in saying, “it cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution
is intended to be without effect.” 56
Under such a view, the Second Amendment only protects the keeping and bearing
of arms in connection with service in a militia. As the Court held in United States v. Miller.
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that the possession or use
of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length at this time
has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the light
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to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that
this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment, or that its use could
contribute to the common defense.57
Hence, only those belonging to the militia in possession of weaponry commonly
employed by contemporary militia are protected under the Second Amendment. In this fashion,
bans on the ownership or possession of handguns, shotguns, and many semi-automatic weapons
would be entirely permissible.
And yet this interpretation remains problematic. First, it seems strange for collectiverights advocates to cling to interpretive models which privilege a prefatory clause while
simultaneously suggesting that the meaning of the operative clause is clear. Remember above,
that Justice Stevens and many others submit that the phrase “keep and bear Arms” possesses a
distinctly military context unless explicitly referring to nonmilitary activity. Perhaps, then, the
privileged-preamble mode of interpretation betrays an understanding on the part of such
proponents that the meaning of the operative clause is clear indeed in its protection of
nonmilitary uses. Applying the prefatory clause restrictively is simply another means to achieve
the preordained goal of justifying severe gun regulation.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, a federalism reading of the Second Amendment
would have serious implications in terms of what exactly the right is, and who would possess it.
Certainly a ban on handguns and other sorts of small arms will stand under a federalism reading
of the Second Amendment. However, other gun regulations, particularly restrictions on
automatic and semiautomatic weapons will crumble. Technological innovation has made the
tools of war all the more deadly. Instead of muskets, we have machine guns; instead of bayonets,
we have bazookas. In colonial times, weapons of war and self-defense were one in the same.
Today, they are wholly separate and pose unique risks. As Justice Breyer argues, “at least six
States and Puerto Rico impose general bans on certain types of weapons, in particular assault
weapons or semiautomatic weapons...These bans suggest...there may be no substitute to an
outright prohibition in cases where a governmental body has deemed a particular type of weapon
especially dangerous.”58 Ironically, then, what is guaranteed by collective-rights reading of the
Second Amendment is the very opposite of what gun regulation proponents seek - private
possession of highly dangerous weapons.
Equally troublesome is who would possess the right. As previously mentioned, all able
bodied men between the ages of 18 and 45 must register for the Selective Service and are
statutorily considered members of the Reserve Militia. Therefore, continuing to apply the Court’s
holding in Miller is to guarantee only all able-bodied males between the ages of 18 and 45 the
right to personally own and stow M-16s and other weapons of warfare. As such, some of the
most vulnerable members of society - women and the elderly - will be denied any such
protection. Unlike virtually every other right guaranteed by the United States Constitution, this
right will not be held by all people, but by a particular subgroup. Such an extreme, dangerous,
and restrictive reading of the Second Amendment simply cannot stand.
Instead, we should be guided by traditional principles of statutory and
constitutional interpretation which recognize the fundamental and inherent limitations upon the
significance of prefatory clauses. Jabez Sutherland, in his renowned treatise on statutory
construction explains, “The preamble in a statute is a prefatory statement or explanation...It is
not part of the law, in a legislative sense, and hence... cannot of itself confer any power.”59
Sutherland continues, noting that that there is, of course, an important relationship between a
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prefatory clause and operative clause, in that the former often identifies a critical concern to be
addressed by the latter. However, that does not give judges license to restrict the actual substance
of the enactment. He explains:
A clear and explicit enactment is not cut down by a more limited preamble
or recital, even though the enacting clause is in general words and the preamble
particular. Strong words in the enacting part of a statute may extend beyond it
beyond the preamble.. .Sometimes the legislature, having a particular mischief in
view, to prevent which was the first and immediate object of the statute, recites
that in the preamble, and then goes on in the body of the act to provide a remedy
for general mischiefs of the same nature but of different species, not expressed in
the preamble nor perhaps then in contemplation.60
The legislative reference is of particular help here. In construing a congressional statute,
the “Whereas” clauses are really just a series of prefatory clauses. Though useful in identifying
the envisioned harmed to be addressed by the resolution, such statements are not law and do not
restrict the scope of the actual policy action. Seen in this way, the Second Amendment could
easily be envisioned as reading, “Whereas a well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed,” or “Because a
well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear arms shall not be infringed.” Any other mode of interpreting the Second Amendment
would require the resolution of constitutional questions turn on matter of purpose rather than
effect. And though the Amendment clearly identifies a profound concern of the framers, it, like
the other concerns which acted as catalysts for other constitutional protections, ebbs, flows, and
evolves with time.
The prefatory clause to the Second Amendment embodies a concern, a purpose, but not a
sole concern or sole focus. This Court’s interest lies in finding, elucidating, and safeguarding the
core of the right at issue, an interest shared by the founders. Again, The Federal Farmer explains
that regarding the codification of rights:
these same rights, being established by the state constitutions, and secured
to the people, our recognizing them now, implies, that the people thought them
insecure by state establishments, and extinguished or put afloat by the new
arrangement of the social system unless reestablished... the little different
appendages and modifications tacked to it in the different states, are no more than
a drop in the ocean.. .it is the substance we would save, not the little articles of
form.61
Applying this mode of analysis to the Second Amendment, the protection guaranteed in
the operative clause is clearly located as the core of the right, unrestricted by the addition of any
preamble.

B
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We now turn to the substantive guarantee of the Second Amendment. As previously
demonstrated, numerous founding-era documents reveal the intent of the framers to incorporate
civilian uses of firearms under the umbrella of the Amendment. However, these statutory
distinctions are of a fundamental different nature than a constitutional guarantee. It is instructive,
therefore, to study guarantees made in various state constitutions. While it may be true that, in a
number of areas, state constitutions lacked the same scope of protection as federal guarantees, it
seems highly unlikely in the case of the Second Amendment, where there is considerable
similarity between the federal protection and various state guarantees. Indeed, the advocacy of
the Antifederalists seems to confirm this hypothesis. The Federal Farmer writes:
There are certain unalienable and fundamental rights, which in forming
the social compact, ought to be explicitly ascertained and fixed ... These rights
should be made the basis of every constitutions ... I never thought the people of
these states differed essentially in these respects; they having derived all these
rights from one common source, the British systems; and having in the formation
of their state constitutions discovered that their ideas relative to these rights are
very similar.62
Thus, united in the British common law heritage, the various state arms-bearing
protections are of identical nature to the federal guarantee.
Between the period of independence and the early 19th century, nine states chose to adopt
arms-bearing protections which explicitly refer to nonmilitary use of weapons. Of the four
choosing to adopt Second Amendment analogues immediately following independence, it
important to note that two of them - Pennsylvania and Vermont - explicitly protected the natural
law of self preservation for individuals. Pennsylvania’s Constitution, adopted in 1776 read, “That
the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state.”63 Vermont’s,
adopted in 1786 identically holds, “That the people have a right to bear arms, for the defence of
themselves and the State.”64 Similarly, New Hampshire, though not explicitly protecting a
natural right of self defense, clearly sought to protect an individual’s right to bear arms
unconnected with service in a militia by recommending the following change to the Constitution:
“Congress shall never disarm any citizen unless such as are or have been in actual rebellion.”65
Similar proposals were offered by Samuel Adams of Massachusetts and the Pennsylvania
minority proposal, the latter which read, “That the people have a right to bear arms for the
defence of themselves and their own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing
game; no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for crimes
committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals...”66 Finally, between the ratification
of the Constitution and 1820, nine states chose to adopt Second Amendment analogues. Of these,
“Four of them - Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, and Missouri - referred to the right of the people to
‘bear arms in defence of themselves and the State.’ Another three States - Mississippi,
Connecticut, and Alabama - used the even more individualistic phrasing that each citizen has the
‘right to bear arms in defence of himself and the State.’”67 Taken together with the position of
the Anti federalists that there was little substantive difference between analogous state and federal
protections, the above examples confirm the historical record that the Second Amendment
protected civilian uses of arms, particularly and centrally, a natural right of self defense.
Further evidence locating a natural law of self defense at the heart of arms-bearing
guarantees is seen in America’s inheritance of Britain’s common law legacy. Remarking on the
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origins of many of the rights to be secured, the Federal Farmer notes, “These rights are not
necessarily reserved, they are established, or enjoyed but in a few countries: they are stipulated
rights almost peculiar to British and American laws. In the execution of those laws, individuals,
by long custom, by magna charta, bills of rights &c. have become entitled to them.”68 One such
right is that to bear arms for self defense. Justice James Wilson, a founder of considerable
influence, writes, “Homicide is enjoined, when it is necessary for the defence of one’s person or
house. With regard to the first, it is the great natural law of self preservation, which, as we have
seen, cannot be repealed, superseded, or suspended by any human institution. This law, however,
is expressly recognised in the constitution of Pennsylvania.. .This is one of our many renewals of
the Saxon regulations.”69 Therefore, any comprehensive understanding of the Second
Amendment right or its various state analogues must be informed by an analysis of its British
origins.
One key source of the British tradition is found in the all encompassing work of Sir
William Blackstone, particularly his Commentaries on the Laws o f England. Blackstone, a
profound legal scholar and expositor of common law rights retained by British subjects was well
known to and incredibly influential upon the framers. And it is with this profound familiarity and
affection for a uniquely British conception of certain rights in view that the substance of the
Second Amendment must be understood. Regarding citizens ownership and use of arms,
Blackstone held, “In these several articles consist the rights, or, as they are frequently termed, the
liberties of Englishmen... we have seen that these rights consist, primarily, in the free enjoyment
of personal security, of personal liberty, and of private property.. .To vindicate these rights.. .the
subjects of England are entitled...to the right of having and using arms for self-preservation and
defence.”70 To be clear, lest a keen-eyed collectivist hijack the above language to fit their needs,
Blackstone locates the right as an individual one, writing, “The defence of one’s self, or the
mutual and reciprocal defence of such as stand in the relations of husband and wife, parent and
child, master and servant. In these cases, if the party himself, or any of these relations be forcibly
attacked in his person or property, it is lawful for him to repel force by force, (italics added)”71
Thusly, as in England, where the natural right of self-preservation was understood as central to
the Lockean pursuit of security, liberty, and property, the Second Amendment’s guarantee ought
be envisioned to encompass the very same substance, such that it may be located as central to the
Jeffersonian pursuit of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Though not contained textually
in the Constitution, it can hardly be contested that the principles of life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness are bedrock principles of our nation, principles the Constitution is directed towards
preserving.
The historical events in England leading up to the formal recognition of a right to bear
arms are found in the period between the Restoration and 1688 Revolution in which many of the
Stuart monarchs sought to disarm political opponents through the use of private militia forces.
As a result, English subjects became wary of attempts to disarm the jealous population as the
first in a series of steps to establish a monopoly of force in the hands of the Crown which,
inevitably, would be turned upon the population. Therefore, with William and Mary’s victory in
the Glorious Revolution came a guarantee in the English Bill of Rights, hold, “that the subjects
which are Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their conditions and as allowed
by law.”72 Though restricted to Protestants, the lesson is clear -Englishmen considered the
individual possession and use of arms as a fundamental liberty unconnected with service in any
organized military force. Indeed, even after the establishment of that arms-bearing guarantee,
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attempts were made to restrict individual arms-bearing protections. St. George Tucker comments
that:
In England, the people have disarmed, generally, under the specious
pretext of preserving the game: a never failing lure to bring over the landed
aristocracy to support any measure, under the mask, though calculated for very
different purposes. True it is, their bill of rights seems at first view to counteract
this policy: but the right of bearing arms is confined to protestants, and the words
suitable to their condition and degree, have been interpreted to authorize the
prohibition of keeping a gun or other engine for the destruction of game, to any
farmer, or inferior tradesman, or other person not qualified to kill game. So that
not one man in five hundred can keep a gun in his house without being subject to
a penalty.73
Unlike its predecessor, the Second Amendment’s substantive guarantee and operative
clause are unrestricted, avoiding such limiting attempts as those described by St. George Tucker
and advocated by collectivists.
Unsurprisingly, the colonists endured many of the same experiences under the reign of
George III. In the decades leading up to the revolution, the Crown sought to disarm colonists
residing in the most rebellious areas, provoking invocations of the English Bill of Rights the
common law legacy growing out of it. Justice Scalia, quoting a 1769 New York publication
explains, “it is a natural right which the people have reserved to themselves, confirmed by the
Bill of Rights, to keep arms for their own defence.”74 This interpretation was not abandoned as
the revolution culminated in independence. Such an individualist understanding of the armsbearing right was adopted by Thomas Jefferson proposing the following amendment in his draft
constitution for the state of Virginia. It reads, “No freeman shall be debarred the use of arms
within his own lands.”75 Though not adopted, this provision not only offers insight as to the
individual nature of the Second Amendment right, but also into the obvious fact that this right, as
all others, is not unlimited.
Therefore, the holding of the Court in United States v. Miller - that only weapons
suitable for militia use are protected by the Second Amendment - is hereby overruled. That case
was unable, and indeed, did not seek to undertake a thorough examination of the scope of the
Second Amendment. The respondent in that case made no appearance; the Government relied
solely on obscure English legal sources; and no one, including the Court, explored or even
mentioned the text or history of the Second Amendment.76 As such, and given the body of
evidence provided above, confining citizens’ arms-bearing right to be solely connected with
participation in a militia is unsupported by text, history, and traditional canons of statutory
interpretation. Instead, it is clear that the Amendment protects, at its core, the right of an
individual to personally own and use a firearm in the furtherance of one’s natural right of self
preservation.
This right, like many other liberties, is at its zenith in the home. Our jurisprudence has
consistently affirmed the privileged position accorded a person’s actions in their home, be it
regarding reproductive liberty, sexual intimacy, freedom from unwarranted searches, or merely a
general expectation of privacy. Explaining this fundamental importance of the domestic, the
Court, in Boyd v. United States, held that:
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The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of
constitutional liberty and security.. .they apply to all invasions on the part of the
government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies
of life. It is not the breaking of his doors and the rummaging of his drawers that
constitutes the essence of the offence, but it is the invasion of his indefeasible
right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property, where that right
has never been forfeited.77
Therefore, the relationship between personal security and the sanctity of the home is
firmly rooted in this Court’s precedent and tradition. Indeed, it stretches back even farther than
that, finding its inception in the common law. Again, James Wilson explains, “every man’s
house is deemed, by the law, to be his castle, and the law, while it invests him with the power,
enjoins him the duty, of the commanding officer. ‘Every man’s house is his castle,’ says my
Lord Coke in one of his reports, ‘and he ought to keep and defend it at his peril’... For this
reason, one may assemble people together in order to protect and defend his house.”78 This
British common law heritage confirms the central location of the natural right of self
preservation as in the home, in defense of one’s hearth, family, and self.
Hence, while the individual’s interest is at its apex in the home, the State’s corresponding
interest is substantially weaker. As Justice explains in his dissent in McDonald v. Chicago, “The
State generally has a lesser basis for regulating private compared to public acts, and firearms
kept inside the home generally pose a lesser threat to public welfare as compared to firearms
taken outside.”79 This is not to say that the State has no interest in passing certain safety
regulations whose reach extends to the home; it simply suggests that those policies must be
narrower in scope than they otherwise would be in public. The converse is also true: as
individuals are farther removed from their private sphere in the home, the State’s interest in
enacting reasonable regulation to safeguard the public welfare increases significantly.
C
However, our current jurisprudence has yet to articulate a clear standard of review to
determine the constitutionality of any gun regulation. Despite statements in Heller and
McDonald as to certain regulations’ constitutionality, both opinions have not sought to delineate
any sort of bright-line to differentiate acceptable legislation from the unacceptable. As a result,
judges sitting on lower courts have been sent on a kind of “mission impossible,” required to
divine the constitutionality of rules from blanket statements as to the types of regulations this
Court believes to be sensible. Justice Stevens explains that those decisions, “invite an avalanche
of litigation that could mire the federal courts in fine-grained determinations about which state
and local regulations comport with the Heller ... under a standard of review we have not even
established.”80
Strict scrutiny seems ill-suited to address Second Amendment inquiries as the
Government’s interest in protecting the lives of its citizens will always prove compelling.
Indeed, as Justice Breyer rightly points out, the approval of a broad set of regulations - waiting
periods, licensing requirements, prohibitions of possession of firearms by the metally ill implicitly rejects the applicability of strict scrutiny, as such policies are not narrowly
tailored.”81 Indeed, any attempt to apply strict scrutiny merely devolves into an interest balancing
inquiry in terms of weighing the individual’s interest in self defense against the government’s
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interest in public safety. Such an approach, however, is inappropriate and constitutes a marked
divergence from tradition. Justice Scalia explains, “We know of no other enumerated
constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding “interest
balancing” approach. The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government even the Third Branch of Government - the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the
right is really worth insisting upon.”82 Such a method is a a judge-empowering one, likely to
yield, not constitutional interpretation, but the enactment of preferred policy positions.
The test we adopt, therefore, in assessing the challenged Miami ordinance is an undue
burden analysis holding that given state regulations: (1) may not unduly burden the fundamental
right, that is, severely, capriciously or arbitrarily, restrict the core of a given right; and (2) must r
reasonably relate to a legitimate government interest. Justice O’Connor explains in Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. that, “If the particular regulation does not ‘unduly
burden’ the fundamental right, then our evaluation is limited to our determination that the
regulation rationally relates to a legitimate state purpose.” Such a test strikes an effective
balance between protecting the heart of a given right on the one hand, and the legitimate interests
associated with State legislation on the other. Nowhere is such a test more appropriate than in the
area of gun regulation.
As we have said, the disputed ordinance completely bans the possession of any firearm in
the home. The City, seeking to reduce gun violence and prevent accidental injury, asks us to
confirm that a policy as this is reasonably related to the legitimate government interest of
protecting the safety of the citizenry. This we cannot do. Few regulations in the 200 history of
this country approach the extremity of the one we consider today. Far from imposing reasonable
or due restrictions on the right in question, the City’s ban on firearms wholly precludes any
exercise of the right itself. To uphold the constitutionality of a uniform ban on the personal
possession of any firearm for any purpose whatsoever is to effectively deny the constitutionality
of the Second Amendment and, in so doing, read that guarantee out of the Constitution. And
given that the inherent right of self defense has been revealed as the central guarantee of the
Second Amendment, we cannot accept an absolute ban on the possession of firearms, especially
given the availability of less-intrusive but nearly equally effective policy alternatives.
Such a position does not deny the fact that the right to keep and bear arms, like all other
rights, is not unlimited. As with speech, religion, and assembly, reasonable time, manner, and
place restrictions may be levied on our arms-bearing right. Put another way, “the right was not a
right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever for whatever
purpose.”84 In fact, the historical record confirms prohibitions on certain classes of weapons in
pursuance of public safety objectives. James Wilson, drawing on Blackstone, explains, “Affrays
are crimes against the personal safety of the citizens; for in their personal safety, their personal
security and peace and undoubtedly comprehended...In some cases, they may be an affray where
there is no actual violence; as where a man arms himself with dangerous and unusual weapons,
in such a manner, as will naturally diffuse a terrour among the people.”85 As such, the inherent
right to self defense does not comprise a right to defend oneself with any weapon of choice, but
rather, as the Court explained in Miller, those weapons “in common use at the time.”86
As such, we find that the Second Amendment guarantees a personal right to possess a
handgun, rifle, or shotgun for self defense in the home. Such a list is not arbitrary; rather, it is
informed by those weapons overwhelmingly preferred by Americans as instruments of self
defense. Regarding handguns, Justice Scalia explains, “There are many reasons that a citizen
may prefer a handgun for home defense: It is easier to store in a location that is readily accessible

The Histories, Volume 10, Number 2

81

in an emergency; it cannot be easily redirected or wrestled away by an attacker; it is easier to use
for those without the upper-body strength to lift and aim a long gun; it can be pointed at a burglar
with one hand while the other hand dials the police.”87 Similarly, the shotgun was entirely
devised as a self defense weapon as it is easier to aim than a pistol and delivers more force, thus
making it more likely to stop an intruder. Finally, the rifle, a descendent of the musket while not
necessarily the ideal instrument of self defense in urban settings, may be entirely preferable in
rural communities. And given that the right is exercised primarily in one’s home, as most choose
not to walk the streets toting their rifle, deference ought be given to the individual’s choice of
weapon since the State’s interest is at its lowest. Thus, our analysis makes three critical
distinctions: first, between the purposes of sought arms (ie- self defense versus hunting); second,
between the classes of weapons most suited for those different purposes; and third the location
where the natural right of self preservation is at its height.
Consequently, in furthering the state interest of public safety, be it through decreasing the
number of weapons in circulation or prohibiting especially dangerous weapons, bans on the
private possession of certain classes of arms in the home are entirely warranted. The schema we
propose is a three-tiered one. The first tier, those weapons, places, and purposes least subject to
regulation is described above. As Justice Stevens explains:
The decision to keep a loaded [gun] in the house is often motivated by the
desire to protect life, liberty, and property. It is comparable, in some ways, to
decision about education and upbringing of one’s children... heads of household
must ask themselves whether the desired safety benefits outweigh the risks of
deliberate or accidental misuse that may result in death or serious
injury... Millions of Americans have answered this question in the affirmative, not
infrequently because they believe they have an inalienable right to do so because they consider it an aspect of ‘the supreme human dignity of being master
of one’s fate rather than a ward of the state. 8
The second tier comprises arms desired for hunting, sport, and other non-defense related
objectives. Such weapons, automatics, sniper rifles, and others may kept, but not necessarily in
the home. It would be reasonable to require the storage of such weapons in a gun locker at a
range. The third tier includes military hardware, those weapons which seem peculiar to warfare.
This class of weapons, given the public safety risks of widespread public ownership of weapons
as M-16s, bazookas, mortars, and tanks, are most subject to State regulation and indeed may be
banned outright.
Some, however, may suggest that upholding the constitutionality of bans on military
hardware entirely detaches the prefatory clause from the operative clause, relegating the former
to having no bearing whatsoever on the latter. That is not entirely true. One must necessarily
concede that a person familiar with the maintenance and discharge of a handgun, is likely to be
more well trained in arms than would be his/her non-arms bearing counterpart. Justice Breyer,
citing a Military Officers’ Brief explains, “civilians who are familiar with.. .marksmanship and
safety are more likely to be able to safely and accurately fire a rifle or other firearm with minimal
training upon entering military service.”89 Furthermore, Justice Scalia, citing State v. Kessler
explains that, “In the colonial and revolutionary war era, [small arms] weapons used by
militiamen and weapons used in defense of person and home were one in the same. However,
these arguments avoid the fundamental point. In colonial times, defense was to be provided by a
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militia composed of the citizenry, who, as in the Revolution, would bring to the battlefield all of
the lawfully and privately owned arms. Over time, our Nation has moved away from this
preference, lodging nearly all responsibility for security in the national standing army. With the
abolishment of conscription, and the establishment of an All-Volunteer Force and National
Guard, the idea of the citizen-soldier has withered, and it very well could be true that a
contemporary militia would require highly elaborate and highly dangerous weaponry. However,
as Justice Scalia puts it, “the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit
between the prefatory and operative clause and the protected right cannot change our
interpretation of the right.”9
We now consider the second challenged portion of the Miami ordinance: that lawfully
owned firearms be stored in a locked container, bound by a trigger-lock, or unloaded and
disassembled. While such a mandate certainly infringes on an individual’s unimpeded right to
self defense in the home, it does not unduly burden that right given the competing state interest
in precluding accidental discharge, especially among adolescents and children. As a City Council
Committee of Washington D.C. recently noted, “for every intruder stopped by a homeowner with
a firearm, there are 4 gun related accidents within the home.”92 History confirms the historical
constitutionality and permissibility of such reasonable storage regulations. A number of colonial
laws from Pennsylvania to New York to Massachusetts required that gunpowder be stored
separately from arms. For example, a law enacted in Boston imposed a fine on “any Person who
shall take into any Dwelling-House, Stable, Barn, Out-house, Ware-house, Store, Shop, or other
Building, within the Town of Boston, any... Fire-Arm, loaded with, or having Gun-Powder.”93
As such, leaving citizens the choice of acquiring a trigger lock, gun safe, or disassembling the
weapon and stowing ammunition separately is reasonably related to the compelling
governmental interest of preventing gun related accidents in the home.
The final piece of the ordinance to be reviewed in the City’s prohibition on concealed
carrying of firearms. Again, as persons move farther beyond the special protection afforded by
one’s home, the State’s interest in regulation increases. As such, the State has a reasonable
interest in requiring that guns be visible be it for enforcement of registration requirements or a
public safety interest. History confirms this point. According to Justice Scalia, “the majority of
19th century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons
were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues.”94 One such law is described by
Justice Breyer. It reads, “Any free person who shall habitually carry about his person, hidden
from common observation, any pistol, dirk, bowie knife, or weapon of the like kind, from the use
of which the death of any person might probably ensue, shall for every offense be punished by a
fine not exceeding fifty dollars.”95 Thus, regardless of the prudence of the policy, the ordinance’s
restriction on concealed carrying must stand.
Seen in this light, it becomes clear that an affirmation of an inherent right of self defense,
coupled with the judicious application of an undue burden analysis does not, in one fell swoop
call into question time-honored restricts on gun ownership. Registration requirements,
prohibitions on possession of firearms by felons, and laws banning the possession of firearms in
sensitive areas as government buildings, airports, schools, and the like remain good law, law
directed at the very real problems posed by gun violence in the United States.
Ill
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But before squaring the above protection with the disputed regulations we are asked to
review today, we must determine whether the right of self preservation guaranteed by the Second
Amendment is incorporated via the Fourteenth Amendment against the States. One theory of
incorporation - total incorporation - was espoused by Justice Black. He maintained that the
entirety of the Bill of Rights was applicable to the States through Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Though never adopted, the Court has consistently moved in that direction,
energetically applying nearly all protections contained in the first eight amendments through a
process known as “selective incorporation.” Aside from guarantees of fair process, the Due
Process Clause seeks to provide special protection against government meddling with certain
fundamental rights and liberties defined by Justice White in Duncan v. Louisiana as those
“fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institution.”96 Or, as Chief Justice Rehnquist says, “We have regularly observed that the Due
Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties, which are, objectively,
‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’... and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,’ such that, ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’”97
Second, this Court has required that substantive due process cases articulate a precise
description of the asserted liberty or right. Such a standard serves as a check on judicial activism.
As Justice Scalia writes in Reno v. Flores, “‘Substantive due process’ analysis must begin with a
careful description of the asserted right, for ‘the doctrine of judicial self restraint requires us to
exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.’” 8 Absent
such a requirement, it would be difficult to conceptualize due process rights as anything other
than the Justices’ personal preferences read into the Constitution. Laurence Tribe, though
speaking of the Ninth Amendment, illustrates the general point effectively. He writes, “the Ninth
Amendment,” and indeed we would submit the Fourteenth, “might plausibly come to be seen as
the well from which courts could draw.. .rights of all sorts.. .I would find it hard to convince
myself that they were truly being drawn from the well rather than being poured into it.”99 As
such, the specific contours of the right ought be clearly identified and rooted in the AngloAmerican scheme of liberty.
Balanced against these rights is a longstanding tradition of respect for broad exercise of
States’ police power. Justice Stevens, dissenting in McDonald, explains the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment, “‘did not unstitch the basic federalist pattern woven into our
constitutional fabric’...The Constitution still envisions a system of divided sovereignty, still
‘establishes a federal republic where local differences are to be cherished as elements of liberty’
in the vast run of cases, still allows a general ‘police power.. .to the States and the States
alone.’”100 Generally included under police power is regulation of a population’s health, safety,
welfare, and morals. A particular articulation of this police power is described by Justice Breyer
to include, “the power to ‘protect.. .the lives limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and
the protection of all property within the State,’ by enacting ‘all kinds ot restraints and burdens on
both persons and property.’”101 Identified as important areas of state concern, the Constitution
has long afforded States special deference in enacting legislation in these areas.
The reason for such a privileging of state power is found in the general preference for
democratic solutions to empirical problems. Indeed in a system of representative democracy, the
majority is empowered to enact desired legislation so long as it passes constitutional muster. The
ultimate desirability of that legislation is decided by the people who have the power to hold their
•elected representatives, unlike unelected judges, accountable for those decisions. Furthermore,
legislators are simply better equipped to amass the data and empirical evidence or proposed
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policy prescriptions and draw accurate conclusions from them. Courts, by contrast, “cannot
easily make empirically based predictions; they have no way to gather and evaluate the data
required to see if such predictions are accurate... nor can judges rely upon local community
views and values when reaching judgments in circumstances where prediction is difficult
because the basic facts are unclear or unknown.” 102
Thus, State flexibility and adaptability may be desirable. The above disadvantage of
judicial solutions to empirical problems suggests that State legislatures are the best stewards of
policy regarding local preferences and conditions, both key virtues of federalism. The pitfalls,
then, of imposing top-down judicial solutions upon state and local officials precludes States from
acting as “laboratories of experimentation” whose process of trial-and-error often benefits the
entire American community. Concerning nonprocedural rules of the Bill of Rights, however,
some suggest that “it is not clear that greater liberty results from the jot-for-jot application of a
provision of the Bill of Rights to the States,” because, “precedents require perfect state/federal
congruence only on matters, ‘at the core’ of the relevant constitutional guarantee.”103 Thus, the
States are left with more legislative tools at their disposal to address concerns lying at the heart
of their police powers.
Yet the rationale for explicitly codifying a Bill of Rights was to enshrine forever those
rights which are beyond the reach of the sovereign, be they King or Congress. The Federal
Farmer explains, “People, ad very wisely too, like to be express and explicit about their essential
rights, and not to be forced to claim them on the precarious and unascertained tenure of
inferences and general principles, knowing that in any controversy between them and their
rulers, concerning those rights, disputes may be endless, and nothing certain.”104 Accordingly,
this Court has eschewed doctrines applying only a diluted version of an incorporated right to the
States. Justice Brennan in Malloy v. Hogan explains, “The Court.. .has rejected the notion that
the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a watered-down, subjective version of the
individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights.”105 Truly it would bizarre to have protean rights,
morphing according to the actor attempting to infringe it. Applying divergent standards of review
depending on whether a claim was made in federal or state court would be wholly inconsistent.
Consequently rights guarantees “are all to be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth
Amendment according to the same standards that protect those federal rights against federal
encroachment.”106 So too here - the undue burden analysis proscribed above is the minimum
threshold of protection to be applied to the Second Amendment’s protection of the natural law of
self preservation.
As previously explained, it cannot be denied that the State has a legitimate interest in the
regulation of guns. Similarly, proposed incorporation of the Second Amendment involves
substantially different protections than do standards of review for other rights - the protection of
insular minorities through identification of suspect classifications, protecting participation in the
democratic process, and protection of individuals who may suffer unequal treatment at the hands
of the majority. Yet, to suggest that the fundamental right protected by the Second Amendment
is any less essential to liberty is equally wrongheaded.
The historical and textual analysis undertaken above conclusively establishes self-defense
as the central guarantee of the Second Amendment. The history of the English common law,
demonstrated most visibly in the English Bill of Rights as well as the commentaries of both Sir
Edward Coke and Sir William Blackstone, confirms the right to keep and bear arms in defense of
oneself, one’s family, and one’s home. This legacy is unmistakably a part of the jurisprudential
DNA of the American colonists who invoked their right to bear arms in reaction to George Ill’s
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attempts to disarm them. This profound fear of general disarmament is enshrined in the advocacy
of the Antifederalists who argue, “we should have fine times indeed, if to punish tyrants, it were
only sufficient to assemble the people. Your arms wherewith you could defend yourselves, are
gone ... Will your Mace-bearer be a match for a disciplined regiment? ... Of what service would
militia be to you, when most probably you will not have a single musket in the State.”107 It was
in response to these fears and in a desire to affirm a number of critically important English
common law rights that the Bill of Rights was demanded. The Federal Farmer writes, “we
discern certain rights ... which the people of England and America of course believe to be
sacred, and essential to their political happiness.”108 Such an individual conception of the right is
supported by the implicit congruence between state analogues ratified in that very same time
period and the federal guarantee.
Perhaps the best evidence of 18th century Americans’ belief that the Second Amendment
right is fundamental to the Anglo-American scheme of liberty and justice is found in the
advocacy of St. George Tucker. Commenting of the Second Amendment, he writes:
This may be considered as the true palladium of liberty. ... The right of
self defense is the first law of nature: in most governments it has been the study of
rulers to confine this right within the narrowest limits possible. Wherever standing
armies are kept up, and the right of the people to keep and bear arms is, under any
color or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already annihilated, is on
the brink of destruction. In England, the people have been disarmed, generally,
under the specious pretext of preserving game: a never failing lure to bring over
the landed aristocracy to support any measure, under that mask, though calculated
for very different purposes (italics added).109
No clearer affirmation of the centrality of that right to our scheme of limited and ordered
government could be articulated. Moreover, this is not an understanding that faded with time.
There is substantial evidence indicating the intention of the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment to incorporate the Second Amendment against the States. Justice Alito provides the
words of Representative Stevens concerning the disarmament of freedmen in 1868. He says,
“Disarm a community and you rob them of the means of defending life. Take away their
weapons of defense and you take away the inalienable right of defending liberty.” 10
In sum, we are aware of the very serious problem of gun violence in the City of Miami as
well as the country in general, and sympathize with the concerns claiming that only a ban on
firearms can ultimately prevent their dissemination and use. The City of Miami has, at its
disposal, a menu of legislative options for combating gun violence; many are described above.
However, a blanket prohibition on the possession of any firearms is not among them. While the
arguments advanced in favor of a blanket ban may well be true, the Constitution cannot condone
such a sweeping policy which turns the fundamental guarantee of the Second Amendment into
idle prattle. While the utility of the Second Amendment in a modem area marked by standing
armies and police forces may be questionable, what cannot be questioned is that it is not the
province of the Supreme Court to place the right on the endangered species list. The right to keep
and bear arms has, at its center, a protection of the inherent right of sell defense, a right at the
very center of our scheme of government which seeks to advance life, liberty, and property.
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VI
Operation Lentil: Soviet Ethnic Cleansing of the Chechens
By Tom Shattuck ‘13

On February 23, 1944, Lavrentii Beria ordered for the NKVD to systemically remove all
of the Chechen people from their homes in the Caucuses to Kazakhstan and Kirghizia in Central
Asia. Before this cleansing, the Chechens had a history of tension with the Russians. This ageold conflict culminated after the Germans retreated when the Soviet Union charged the entire
Chechen population with treason for aiding the Germans. Despite the fact that several thousand
Chechen men had volunteered in the Red Army to help fight the Germans, Stalin still used the
pretext of a German retreat through an area of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic to
condemn them all. In reality, Stalin just wanted to finally end the Chechen problem. Because
the cleansing removed every Chechen from their home, the process proved to be brutal and
deadly for the Chechens. The NKVD loaded the Chechens on to train cars in a similar way that
the Nazis loaded the Jews on to trains on their way to concentration camps. After the NKVD
removed all of the Chechens in the Autonomous Republic, Stalin erased all references and
memory of these oppressed people. No matter the reason given for the ethnic cleansing of the
Chechen people, Operation Lentil proved only to be an excuse for Joseph Stalin to remove one
of the many problems involving the Soviet Union’s minority nationalities.
In order to make the removal of the Chechen people from their homes appear legitimate,
the Soviet government needed an official reason to give to the public. The official reason given
for their removal, treason for collaborating with the Germans, made it extremely easy for the
Soviets to cover up the true reason. The official report said that “many Chechens and Ingush
were traitors to the homeland, changing over to the side of the fascist occupiers, joining the ranks
of diversionaries and spies left behind the lines of the Red Army by the Germans. They formed
armed bands at the behest of the Germans fighting against Soviet Power. 1 This language plays
to the people’s emotions by claiming that the Chechens worked with the Germans. After the
brutal battles against the Germans, charging the Chechens with treason was not difficult for the
people to accept. They charged every Chechen with high treason, and the punishment would be
forced removal from their homes into Central Asia. However, the Soviets had little, if any,
evidence to prove Chechen collaboration with the Nazis. In reality, many Chechens fought on
behalf of the Red Army against the Nazis. “Thousands of Chechens loyally fought for the Soviet
1Norman M. Naimark, Fires o f Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge. Harvard
University Press, 2001), 94.
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homeland in the Red Army during the German invasion. Between 18,000 and 40,000 Chechens
were mobilized to fight in the Soviet ranks and many Chechens received medals and promotions
for their heroism during the war.”2 During World War II, the Chechens fought against the Nazis,
but would later be charged with collaboration and treason. The only charge that would have had
any justification involved Chechens who deserted. Lavrentii Beria, the Minister of Internal
Affairs, claimed that between 1941 and 1942, 1,500 Chechens deserted.3 However, this small
number of deserters cannot justify the removal of every Chechen to Central Asia. What the
Chechens actually did during the war and what the Soviets charged the Chechens with does not
add up.
While the Soviet government claimed the Chechens committed treason, they really had
other motives for their removal. Two areas stand out that explain why the Soviet government
wanted to remove the Chechens from the Northern Caucuses: politics and past issues. The
Chechens successfully resisted almost all Soviet attempts to propagandize and to install
Socialism. Despite collectivization, the Chechens consistently resisted socialism by having
private plots of land.4 The Soviets had a difficult time indoctrinating the Chechen people with
their propaganda, which caused much discontent. The other area of interest, past issues between
the Chechens and Soviets, helps to explain Stalin’s motivation to remove the Chechens. Since
the Bolsheviks took power, the Chechens continuously resisted Soviet interference. Because the
Chechens resisted successfully, the Soviet government wanted to find a way to get rid of this
problem. “The attachment of the Chechen and Ingush to their homelands, the difficulty of
imposing modem state forms on a resilient traditional society, and the ability of the Chechens
and Ingush to resist both direct pressures from Moscow and the modernization expected from the
granting of national institutional forms made the Soviet leadership determined to deal with them
once and for all.”5 These reasons explain why the Soviets falsified charges of treason against the
Chechen people during World War II. The Soviets used the false pretext of the war to get rid of
an ongoing problem.
Because the Soviet government wanted to end this problem once and for all, they
conducted the removal of the entire Chechen population in an efficient and quick manner.
February 23, 1944 started off with celebrations because it was Red Army Day, but the Soviets
used this holiday as an excuse to bring in soldiers not for celebration but to remove the
Chechens: “No one suspected that disaster was at hand. Studebaker trucks rolled up . .. Soldiers
holding automatics appeared. The Chechens were held at gun point. In every village the decree
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was read, announcing the total deportation of the
Chechens and Ingush for treason and for collaboration with the enemy.”6 The Soviets tricked the
Chechens into thinking that the soldiers wanted to partake in the celebrations on this special day.
However, they would later find out that the Red Army came to take them away to Central Asia.
The Studebakers came from the United States to help with the war effort against Germany, but
the Soviets used them round up its own people. In total, they moved 603,193 people in

2 Brian Glyn Williams, “Commemorating "The Deportation" in Post-Soviet Chechnya: The Role of Memorialization
and Collective Memory in the 1994-1996 and 1999-2000 Russo-Chechen Wars,” History and Memory 12, no. 1
(2000): 6.
3 Lavrentii Beria, “From the Report of the NKVD Department of Special Settlements. September 5, 1944,” from
www.soviethistory.org
4 Ibid.
5 Naimark, Fires o f Hatred, 95.
6 Aleksandr M. Nekrich, “The Punished Peoples,” from http://vip.latnet.lv/LPRA/Punished.htm.
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Operation Lentil, and 496,460 of those were of Chechens and Ingush descent. These statistics
came from the official Soviet report by Beria, but the numbers differ greatly between sources.
Due to the number of deaths in the process, it is impossible to know the exact number of people
transported. The Soviets removed every Chechen from the Autonomous Republic and began to
remove Chechens living in other areas in the Soviet Union. The Red Army loaded up the
Chechens on to trains and sent them to Kazakhstan and Kirghizia in Central Asia.
In the process of moving over half a million people, the NKVD demonstrated brutal
tactics to make the people obey their orders. The Soviet forces claimed the removal occurred
smoothly and only 50 Chechens died in the process,8 but in reality, thousands of Chechens died
during Operation Lentil. In one instance, the NKVD killed an entire village of Chechens: “The
most glaring example of numerous reports of Soviet excesses was the Soviet annihilation of the
Chechen mountain village Khaibakh, in Shatoi raion, where more than 700 Chechens were
locked in a [barn] and burned alive.”9 This one massacre alone exceeds the original Soviet
number of 50 deaths. The troops made sure that anyone who attempted to escape was shot, so no
one could get away. Similar experiences occurred in other villages: they gunned down people in
their homes and in the streets and killed the young and the old alike with grenades.10 In addition
to these brutal methods, Lavrentii Beria gave orders to eliminate any person that a soldier
considered “untransportable.” This category included the young, old, and diseased. They killed
these people on the spot and did not even take them to the trains for transportation.11 The mass
killings of people considered “untransportable” demonstrates the brutal nature of Operation
Lentil.
The Chechens and other minority nationalities that the Soviets transported into Central
Asia faced terrible conditions during Operation Lentil, and many died as a result. The number of
deaths in the process will never be known because so many people died at different stages in the
Operation. Many died from attacks in the villages, but many more died during the journey to
Central Asia. “Some 3,000 perished even before being deported . . . One can extrapolate from
these separate figures that roughly 10,000 died from disease, hunger, and cold.”12 Those
numbers are only estimates because the Soviets attempted to cover up Operation Lentil and to
erase the Chechen people from memory. Nevertheless, these numbers provide the best estimate
because it takes into account the horrid conditions on the railcars: “The Chechens were sealed in
the guarded carts for two to three weeks as the trains made their way across the Soviet Union . . .
The people were mowed down by typhus, they were not able to bury those who died. On the
rare stops on the empty steppes, soldiers walked through the wagon taking off bodies.”13 These
conditions are very similar to those that the Jews faced during their transportation to
concentration camps during the same time period. The Nazis rounded up the Jews and put them
on railcars just like the Soviets did to the Chechens. Even more Chechens died during re
settlement, but it is impossible to know exactly how many died during their time in Central Asia.
One estimate claims around 25% of all minority nationalities in Operation Lentil died from 1944
7 Lavrentii Beria, "From the Report o f L. B. Beria to I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and A. I. Maienkov. July 1944," From
www.soviethistory.org. (1992)
8 Jeffrey Burds, “The Soviet Wars against ‘Fifth Columnists:’ The Case of Chechnya, 1942-4,” Journal o f
Contemporary History 42, no. 2 (2007): 304.
9 Ibid, 305.
10 Williams, “Commemorating "The Deportation" in Post-Soviet Chechnya,
11 Burds, “The Soviet Wars against ‘Fifth Columnists,” 305.
12 Naimark, Fires o f Hatred, 97.
13 Williams, “Commemorating "The Deportation" in Post-Soviet Chechnya,
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to 1948.14 No one exact number will ever be produced due to the secret nature of Operation
Lentil, but a large number of Chechens died during the forced removal due to the poor treatment
by the NKVD and horrid conditions during travel.
In addition to removing the Chechens from the Northern Caucuses, the Soviets
unsuccessfully attempted to remove any memory or knowledge of the Chechens from the
records. Stalin used two methods to try to remove the Chechens from memory: dissolving the
Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic and trying to remove Chechen culture. Once the NKVD
completed Operation Lentil, Stalin allowed for Georgia, northern Ossetia, Daghestan, and
Stavropol to absorb the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic.13 Georgia received most of the
land, but the people of all of the regions moved into the abandoned Chechen villages. After
moving into the areas, Stalin wanted to remove all traces of the Chechens from the villages. He
removed anything that could go back to a Chechen origin: “Mosques were demolished, literature
in the Chechen language burned, signs in Chechen destroyed and, most importantly, the revered
graveyards of the Chechens were plowed over. The expunging of the memory of the Chechens
extended to town and topographical names”16 By removing anything Chechen, it seemed like
they never even existed, let alone lived in the area. No one in the Soviet Union dared to mention
them or what happened to them. In Kazakhstan and Kirghizia, the Soviets refused to allow the
Chechens to speak their native tongue and did not allow public displays of their culture.
Everything Chechen became either forgotten or outlawed.17 In order to ensure the lasting
success of Operation Lentil, Stalin attempted to remove all aspects of Chechen culture from
memory.
Despite Stalin’s efforts to eliminate any memory of the Chechen people, they continued
to endure in Kazakhstan and Kirghizia until 1957 when they returned to their native home. They
initially returned home slowly, but by “the end of 1957, the Chechen and Ingush Autonomous
Republic was reestablished, and all the Chechens and Ingush were allowed to return to their
homes.”18 Some violence did occur when the Chechens tried to regain their former territory and
homes. Despite Stalin’s best efforts, the Chechen people carried on in Kazakhstan and
Kirghizia. Their resilience allowed for them to survive: “Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn wrote of the
Chechens: ‘Only one nation refused to accept the psychology of submission.’ And this applied
‘not to individuals, nor to insurgents, but to the nation as a whole...no Chechen ever tried to be of
service or to please the authorities. Their attitude towards them was proud and even hostile.’”19
They realized what Stalin wanted to happen, but they refused to allow him that convenience by
living on. The Chechens not only survived in Central Asia, but they also thrived in a sense.
During their exile, they had the highest birthrate in all of the Soviet Union in an attempt to keep
their people alive. “The number of Chechens who returned to their homeland after their release
from exile in 1956- 1957 was almost as high as that deported [in 1944].”20 Despite their major
losses in Operation Lentil, the Chechen people lived on.
In Operation Lentil, Stalin ordered the systemic removal of the Chechen people from the
Northern Caucuses to rid the Soviet Union of the historic Chechen problem. Under the guise of
the high treason by collaborating with the Nazis, the Soviets removed the Chechens to Central
14 Ibid.
15 Naimark, Fires o f Hatred, 98.
16 Williams, “Commemorating "The Deportation" in Post-Soviet Chechnya,” 11.
17 Naimark, Fires o f Hatred, 98.
18 Ibid, 99.
19 Williams, “Commemorating "The Deportation" in Post-Soviet Chechnya,” 11.
20 Ibid, 10.
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Asia. However, in reality, the true motivations behind their removal go back before World War
II. The Chechens resisted Soviet Socialist practices and culture/propaganda. Therefore, the
Soviet government forcibly removed the entire Chechen population in late February 1944. This
removal led to the death of thousands and thousands of Chechens by Soviet hands in the streets
of their villages. Even more died en route to Central Asia on packed railcars. Their situation and
Operation Lentil have many similarities to the German treatment of the Jews in the same time
period. Both populations were murdered in their homes, brutally assaulted, packed in railcars,
and transported to a foreign land not meant to survive. In the end, the Chechen people survived
and returned home from exile in 1957.
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Book Review I
Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945-1953
By Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk

Reviewed by Michael McCabe ‘12
Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945-1953, by Yoram Gorlizki
and Oleg Khlevniuk, is a monograph of Stalin’s reign after the end of World War II until
the death of the dictator in 1953. While not the first book to examine Stalin’s relationship
to his inner-circle, Cold Peace breaks substantially with existing historiography on the
subject in two major ways. First, Gorlizki and Khlevniuk had access to a significantly
greater amount of primary sources than previous historians. Previous books primarily
relied on newspaper articles and a very small amount of leaked reports; however, Cold
Peace notably builds upon the existing source material through “a rich vein of archival,
memoir, and publish materials that were unavailable to earlier authors” (11). In addition,
Gorlizki and Khlevniuk were able to gain access to several unpublished Central
Committee resolutions.
Second, the thesis Khlevniuk and Gorlizki put forth differs drastically from other
historians on the end of the Stalinist era. Cold Peace dispels any notion that Stalin was
not in complete control of major policies enacted by the Soviet Union or that there were
rivals to Stalin’s leadership. As the authors state “in contrast to recent accounts, which
discern a general radicalization of policies and perceptions in the postwar period, our
book suggests that in terms of governmental practices and procedures, as well as of some
substantive policy discussions, the postwar period was one of relative equilibrium and
institutional consolidation” (12). The authors would reject any argument suggesting
Stalin’s actions did not follow a political logical and solely stemmed from his paranoia
and insecurities.
The two authors are both highly qualified to undertake such a work. Yoram
Gorlizki is a professor at the University of Manchester (UK) and has authored two other
books—both of which were initially published in Russian. Some of his other work
includes “Stalin and His Circle” (a journal article coauthored with Khlevniuk), “The
Political (Dis)Orders of Stalinism and National Socialism, and Ordinary Stalinism: The
Council of Ministers in Stalin’s last years”—along with many other articles published in
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both English and Russian.1 Oleg Khlevniuk is a senior researcher at the State Archive of
the Russian Federation, Moscow. In addition to the several pieces he has coauthored
with Gorlizki, he wrote The History o f the Gulag, which was originally published in
Russian and later translated to English.2 Both authors specialize in the reign of Stalin and
Cold Peace builds upon their previous work.
In the book Gorlizki and Khlevniuk argue that Stalin created a monopoly of
political power. There was no dissent by his lieutenants and rarely did any of his
entourage push forward a major-policy initiative. While Stalin ‘reformed’ the Politburo,
it was always “entirely obedient to Stalin’s whims” (45). Unlike previous historians, the
authors do not contribute Stalin’s power politics solely to his suspicious, paranoid, or
vindictive nature. Gorlizki and Khlevniuk believe that every action undertaken by Stalin
after the war followed a certain political logic. Stalin’s reign was marked by
contradictions, and his final years are no exception. At times contrary to his monopoly
on power, post-war Stalinism was marked by dedication to creating and maintaining an
efficient economy.
The authors separate Cold Peace into three sections to breakdown Stalin’s final
years in power— 1945-1948, 1949-1951, and 1952-1953. Each of these sections is
covered in two chapters. The first section details Stalin’s efforts in recreating the Soviet
hierarchy after the allies’ victory. During this time Stalin undertook a campaign to
discredit every member of his inner circle. While some historians have seen Stalin’s
actions being derived from paranoid fear of his followers, Gorlizki and Khlevniuk argue
that these actions were carefully planned by Stalin. The attacks on his entire inner-circle,
but specifically Malenkov and Beria, “were part of a broader action by Stalin to destroy
the system of leadership that had emerged in wartime. Stalin sought to nip in the bud any
signs of autonomy within the ruling group and to restore the Politburo to the norms of the
immediate post-purge period” (29). Stalin simultaneously reorganized the high-level
political structure and subjugated the Politburo. Still the authors admit there was an
element of randomness to Stalin’s methods of governance, simultaneously moving
between different elements (64).
The second portion of the book details the last of Stalin’s purges from 1949-1951.
The authors argue that there were growing challenges confronting Soviet authority both
internationally and within the Bloc. The United States and its allies formed NATO as a
military alliance to challenge the Soviet Union in Europe. Additionally, Germany was
partitioned in 1949, giving the allies a foothold in Central Europe. As tension increased
with the west so too did the challenge within the Bloc, as relations with Yugoslavia
became strained after a personal dispute between Stalin and Tito. The authors argue that
in response to these external disputes of Stalin’s power, Stalin ordered his last purges “to
prevent disobedience and to harden official discipline” (70). Stemming from these
international challenges purges in nearly all of the Bloc states governments occurred,
replacing the former leaders with new ones who were more compliant to Stalin’s will.
Gorlizki and Khlevniuk argue that Stalin’s purges fit in with his post-war attitude because
they carried a political logic.
1University of Manchester, “Prof Yoram Gorlizki—publications,” Accessed online April 25, 2012,
http://www.manchester.ac.uk/research/yoram.gorlizki/publications
2 Yale University Press, “The History of the Gulag,” Accessed online April 25, 2012,
http://yalepress.yale.edu/vupbooks/book.asp?isbn=9780300092844
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The final piece of Gorlizki and Khlevniuk’s argument surrounds Stalin’s final
years and his legacy. The authors argue that the end of Stalin’s reign was significantly
marked by two features: the Gulag and lack of food (124). In the case of the labor camps,
almost five million individuals at the beginning of 1953 were imprisoned, required to
move into special settlements, or forced to labor for the Soviet state. The authors argue
that Stalin’s devotion to the penal labor system never trickled down to the members of his
inner-circle. In fact, immediately after Stalin’s death, Beria launched a major offensive
aimed at dismantling the Gulag (131). However, given Stalin’s monopoly on power and
his dedicated to his Gulag no one in his inner circle dared to speak out against him.
Gorlizki and Khlevniuk counter Stalin’s unrelenting control of the Gulag with the
Soviet crisis in agricultural product following the end of World War II. Unlike the
Gulag, discussions over agricultural reform between Stalin and his lieutenants occurred
before Stalin’s death. Despite these dialogues the authors argued that Stalin continued to
view “any challenges to his long-cherished policy principles with extreme suspicion and
hostility” (141). Despite Stalin’s stubborn unyielding nature, he continued to protect his
power with extreme energy until the day he died. The authors argue that Stalin followed
Lenin’s blueprint when he denounced Molotov and Mikoian, and flooded the Soviet
leadership with relatively unknown individuals (144). Despite his failing health Stalin
continued to push the “apparatus of repression and ideological discipline into one final
offensive” (163).
Skeptics of Gorlizki and Khlevniuk’s work might point out that when hooves are
heard in Central Park think horses, not zebras—meaning the Stalin’s actions in the post
war years derived simply from paranoia, not from a grand political scheme. It is very
hard to assess the psychological motivations of historical characters because primary
sources may not give complete insight into the thought process of those characters;
moreover, modem psychologists have a difficult time placing motives behind people’s
actions during a psychological interview, let alone when assessing someone who lived
over half a century ago. What has made it so difficult to derive a motive from Stalin’s
actions has stemmed from how contradictory his actions were. The authors admit that
there was a random element to many of Stalin’s decisions; however, Gorlizki and
Khlevniuk effectively respond to this claim in Cold Peace by justifying every major
decision by Stalin by stating the political ramifications of that decision. For example, the
authors justify Stalin’s discrediting of several members of the Politburo in 1951 due to
the fact the created a balance of power between Stalin’s inner-circle that suited Stalin’s
political game (113).
One of the most impressive elements of the book is that the monograph draws
from a substantial amount of archival sources—sources that were previously not open to
the public. Earlier historians on the inner workings of the Stalin era have been accused of
creating a patchwork story. Historian T.H. Rigby states that Gorlizki and Khlevniuk’s
account not only supplements these previous works, but supplants them through the
authors’ use of archival sources, and newly published and unpublished materials to create
a “comprehensive analytical narrative.”3 It is a short, compact work with a giant impact
for the historiography of the post-War Stalin years.

3 T.H. Rigby, “Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945-1952 by Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg
Khlevniuk,” in Russian Review 64.1, January 2005, 159.
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Historians have widely accepted and promoted the thesis of Gorlizki and
Khlevniuk; however, there have been some criticisms. Historian Norman Naimark
correctly criticizes the title of the work. Naimark claims that Cold Peace deceives the
reader into believing the work would detail the beginning years of the Cold War from an
international perspective, not from the inner workings of the Soviet States (and not
mentioning the United States in any significant detail).4 Additionally Naimark correctly
points out at times Gorlizki and Khlevniuk argue that Cold War events are pretexts for
Stalin’s domestic agenda and at other times that they are causes.5 Gorlizki and
Khlevniuk might have been better served either avoiding completely the international
politics of the Cold War or lengthening their work to give a broader history from an
international perspective. That criticism aside, Cold Peace is an excellent addition to the
historiography of the final years of Stalinism.

Publisher: Oxford University Press
Number of Pages: 248.
Year: 2004
Genre: Soviet History
Price: $28.95

4 Norman M. Naimark, Reviewed work(s): Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945-1953.
By Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, in The Journal o f Modern History 78.1, March 2006, 285.
5 Ibid.
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Book Review II
Napoleon
By R.S. Alexander

Reviewed by John Prendergast ‘13
As evident by the thousands of works detailing his life, Napoleon is one of the
most intriguing characters in modern history. Authors spend years trying to uncover the
very core of Napoleon’s character, and he is seen as anywhere from good to evil,
conqueror to unifier, et cetera. Pieter Geyl has called Napoleon “the debate without end,”
as a consensus to Napoleon’s character will likely never be reached.1 An Associate
Professor of History at the University of Victoria in Canada, R.S. Alexander avoids the
trap of a blow-by-blow, chronological account of Napoleon’s life. Instead, Alexander
takes a unique approach by analyzing the many reputations associated with Napoleon and
how these reputations have evolved over time.
Alexander uses the first chapter to highlight the critical parts of Napoleon’s life as
well as France’s condition during the time period. This is the first and only occasion in
the book where such a chronological setup is employed. Napoleon was bom in Corsica in
1769 to Carlo and Letizia Buonaparte. His father was never really around much, typically
off on business—both professional and adulterous.2 This left Letizia to care for Napoleon
and his siblings, but even Napoleon was soon off to military school. He entered the
military school of Brienne in 1779 at age 10; nine years later he was commissioned as a
lieutenant, still a mere teenager. Soon, France fell prey to turmoil. Louis XVI was
executed in 1793, the extremists initiated the Reign of Terror, and many members of the
nobility fled the country. This paved the way for people like Napoleon, who used his
training coupled with success in the field to gain recognition. He was so promising that
he landed himself in prison for much of August 1794 by Saliceti due to a feared takeover.
The very next year in October, Napoleon was charged by Paul Barras to suppress a

1R.S. Alexander, Napoleon, London: Oxford University Press (2001), 6.
2 Ibid, 11.
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royalist uprising—from which we derive his famous phrase that he had cleared the streets
with a “whiff of grapeshot.”3
Napoleon really got his first taste of rule in Italy, where his success ultimately led
to an “oriental complex”4 of sorts: he wanted a piece of the Middle East. He landed in
Egypt in June 1798, but he departed the next year after defeat as well as news of French
losses in the European theater. His return to France in August 1799 signaled the
establishment of the Consulate which some might have saw as a precursor to dictatorship,
but this is not clear.5 What is clear is that Napoleon formed a significant power base
within the army and public, he made himself First Consul, the Church became a puppet
of the state, and criticism of the state was put down—this was the so-called price of
effective government.6 Ultimately, Napoleon crowned himself Emperor on December 2nd
1804. Key government posts were given to his family members in France and abroad as it
became clear that France sought to expand her limits. He divorced Josephine in 1809 and
married Marie-Louise, mostly because Josephine could not provide him with an heir.
Napoleon continued his look outward with wars of liberation in 1813-1814, but the
Empire eventually fell because “Napoleon failed to extricate himself from Spain prior to
taking the Grand Army deep into Russia.”7 Alexander provides some analysis in that
Napoleon was unwilling to settle for anything less than victory.
Unfortunately for Napoleon, defeat led to an exile to Elba where he was under
close watch from Francis I of Austria who held Marie-Louise and Napoleon’s son to
ensure good behavior. This did not deter Napoleon, and Napoleon returned to Paris in
March 1815 amid potential plots against the regime. He essentially declared that he was
the revolution, and he threatened to “hang priests and nobles from the lampposts if they
did not desist in attacking the rights of the nation.”8 The following period, known as the
Hundred Days, led to a movement of Napoleon’s followers to take back the government
but, ultimately, they were defeated at Waterloo on June 18th 1815, and Napoleon was
transferred to St. Helena where he would remain until his death.
Alexander next shifts the focus to the post-Napoleon period of the nineteenth
century, particularly how his character and leadership shaped those after him, as well as
the adoption of Napoleonic principles from both the Left and Right, also known as
Bonapartism. When Louis-Napoleon rose to power, he tried to emulate his uncle’s
philosophy—“liberal division of powers combined with a strong executive led by an
Emperor who would implement the will of the people.”9 He also understood the idea of
“France first” when advancing the military into conflicts for expansionist reasons. His
defeat at Sedan damaged Bonapartism until the 3rd Republic and the New Right but, even
then, patriotism became exclusive to “France only” and there lost a sense of “bringing
progress to less fortunate peoples”10—an ideal of the Left that was in line with
Napoleon’s vision.

3 Ibid, 16.
4 Ibid, 18.
5 Ibid, 19.
6 Ibid, 20-24.
7 Ibid, 30.
8 Ibid, 32.
9 Ibid, 46.
10 Ibid, 52.
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Napoleon as the Great Commander and Man on Horseback also came to fruition
in the nineteenth century. The latter image refers to the leader whose power originates
from a military position but then soon broadens to encompass the social and political
arena. Alexander notes that Napoleon certainly had his fair share of defeats in battle, but
“[his] failures were more than balanced by his victories.”11 He often employed a high-risk
strategy, one which saw casualties as essentially irrelevant. Most European commanders
were hesitant about this, but there are elements of this philosophy in World War I and
II—this notion of “seizing the initiative and imposing [your] will on [your] opponents”12
was appealing but, generally, casualties were not as liberally accepted as Napoleon would
have it. Napoleon, after all, is viewed as the first modem dictator by many and, thus,
there comes with that a certain role which does not always bring out the most humane
qualities that one would typically look for in a leader today.
In this vein, there developed what Alexander describes as the Black Legend, an
attempt to demonize Napoleon during the nineteenth century. These portrayals originated
abroad, usually from German, Italian, and Russian writers which leads one to suspect that
they were simply jealous of France’s success against their own people. These authors
paint Napoleon as “scheming, ungrateful, cruel, and a physical coward”13 who turned his
back on those loyal to him. They also invoked powerful language, such that Napoleon
was “the source of all evil and the end of all good...a patricidal demon spawned by
Hell...” et al. Some of the darker tales speak of Napoleon’s poisoning of his own troops
at Jaffa, and his slaughter of Turkish prisoners at El Arish.15 Many people took all this for
what it was, rhetoric, but the French government actually incurred some criticism, so this
technique did work to an extent. After all, most Europeans viewed Napoleon as a
conqueror.
Despite this, there are many commanders who use Napoleon’s style as a model
for their own undertakings—and rightfully so given Napoleon’s undeniable talent and
success in the military realm. Alexander points out the four Haitian Men on Horseback,
specifically Henry Christophe and Faustin Soulouque as drawing the closest comparison
to Napoleon. Alexander also invokes General Santa Anna of Mexico for comparison,
noting how both he and Napoleon used plebiscites to keep the hoi polloi involved, they
recognized the importance of propaganda, and the “prevention of alternative accounts [of
propaganda] when they had the power to do so.”16 Santa Anna’s flight in the face of
American invaders also boasts a similarity to Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow, although
Napoleon has an entire overture to show for his failing, Santa Anna does not.17
Alexander keeps the topic still slightly on character comparison in Chapter 4 but, instead,
entertains the question: was Napoleon the precursor to fascism? This analysis is simply
the result of circumstance. In other words, Napoleon would not be studied in this light
had it not been for the European hegemony movement of the twentieth century by the
likes of Hitler and Mussolini. The answer to this question also depends on how fascism is
11 Ibid, 66.
12 Ibid, 67.
13 Ibid, 71.
14 Ibid, 72.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid, 80.
171 am alluding to Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky’s 1812 Overture, musically depicting Napoleon’s retreat from
the Russian capital after yielding to “Mother Winter’s” fury.

The Histories, Volume 10, Number 2

106

defined, but Alexander does his best to situate Napoleon within the general, broad
interpretation of fascism: “[Napoleon] exploited disillusionment with parliamentary
government to establish the authoritarian regime that emerged as the Empire” and he
“likened himself to famous forerunners... [and associated himself] with a seemingly
incongruous variety of heroes.” Moreover, Napoleonic Rule was that of one person, not
one party, and his government repressed “all political and social organization, not just
opposing associations”18—plebiscites were really only there to be used at his
convenience. While it is true Napoleon was concerned about public opinion, “the ethos of
the regime was less to represent than to direct opinion.”19
On the other hand, Alexander answers his own assertions. First, France’s police
state was too benign when compared to the fascist regimes of Hitler and Mussolini.
Additionally, Napoleon’s renewal of social hierarchy has more in common with
conservative ideology than a fascist one. It is also interesting to point out that Napoleon
never made claims for land as the Nazis had done through lebensraum policy, but yet the
French Empire was obviously rooted in a desire to conquer and expand. Alexander does
not take a concrete position here in regards to Napoleon and fascism, but he does note
that “the image of Hitler and Mussolini are sufficiently powerful that they do not need
any association with Napoleon to heighten effect.”20
The focus shifts in the next few chapters to Napoleon as depicted in literature and
art, as well as how he stands next to the common man. Art renderings almost always
show Napoleon in a positive, superhuman light. Placing his hand to stomach at an almost
90 degree angle of his arm is a popular depiction—divine-like, yes, but also a modest
image. Simplicity was a way of saying that it was the talent beneath which made this man
special. Jacques-Louis David is probably the most notable Napoleon artist that Alexander
mentions, and it was always David’s goal to depict Napoleon as “symbolic of France,
glory, and selfless dedication.”21 Because of such extraordinary portrayals, Alexander
believes, opponents felt compelled to respond with equally embellished interpretations,
albeit written, via the Black Legend.
Napoleon has been used by many authors in literature throughout the years, each
obviously in different ways. In Crime and Punishment, Fyodor Dostoyevsky invokes not
Napoleon ‘the man,’ but rather Napoleon as a ‘type’ of person. Napoleon had Europe in a
state of terror right before his retreat and, moreover, he died with the blood of thousands
on his hands—yet he celebrated and glorified by many. Similarly, the protagonist
Raskolnikov in the Dostoyevsky work wanted to be glorified after he committed murder,
thus comes the line: “I wanted to make myself a Napoleon, and that is why I killed her.”22
Alexander discusses other authors who reference Napoleon for the ‘type’ of person he
was, but most notably is Arthur Conan Doyle. In Sherlock Holmes, Doyle’s protagonist
Detective Holmes describes his rival Professor Moriarty as “the Napoleon of crime!”23
This implies a sense of genius, one who is “unswerving in relentless application if his
will.”24
18 Alexander, 92-95.
19 Ibid, 95.
20 Ibid, 113.
21 Ibid, 123.
22 Ibid, 136.
23 Ibid, 141.
24 Ibid, 142.
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Many students are not convinced that Napoleon shared characteristics with the
common man. After all, pensions in the army were low, he did little to improve medical
service, and there was certainly a lack of food, clothing, and arms provisions. With that
said, Alexander notes Napoleon drew his greatest support and loyalty from the rank and
file because he was friendly towards them: he learned the names of veteran servicemen,
appeared amongst the men at campfires, and he even rode along through the lines before
battle. By identifying as the “Little Corporal,” Napoleon made himself more human and
likeable but, at the same time, he was still the protector of the people.25 This idea changed
a bit in the twentieth century, especially through movies. No longer was there this image
of a martyr awaiting his Christ-like death on St. Helena, but rather Napoleon was a
tyrant—indifferent to the people.26 Able Gance’s 1927 work presents Napoleon as “a
man of destiny.. .conquering the elements, with no time to waste of crowd adoration.”27
Alexander concludes that Napoleon was “singularly talented and not truly of the people,
but there are many aspiring Napoleon’s among the people.”28
Alexander wraps up his study with yet another question: will Napoleon be
remembered as a conqueror or unifier? It is once again appropriate to invoke Geyl’s “a
debate without end,” though Alexander attempts to somewhat help along the ‘unifier’
advocates. Napoleon promoted the modern state outside of France, which was assisted
through the exportation of the Napoleonic model. Additionally, the power of the central
government was extended, and the model enhanced the means through which the state
could act. With that said, Alexander comes back to the idea of ‘conqueror’—the concept
of “France first” during the Empire cannot be ignored.
Just as Alexander depicts the good and bad about Napoleon, there are both good
and bad qualities regarding this work. First off, Alexander utilizes a thematic, topical
organization which puts him off to a good start. Blow-by-blow chronologies can often be
boring and too long-winded, losing the attention of the reader. Alexander elects to use the
thematic setup to analyze how Napoleon’s reputation has evolved throughout the past
two-hundred years. If there is a particular area the reader wants to explore, they have the
luxury to do so without reading the entire work (aided by a simple, yet nice table of
contents). Another big strength of this work is its very diverse, large range of citation.
Both the chronology table and bibliography are, to phrase it in Latin, mirabile visu. This
demonstrates a well-researched piece of literature not cheated by lack of preparation.
Alexander compliments the range of reference with a few photographs throughout to
illustrate the relevant theme—but they were employed so few and far between that their
use was of dubious effect.
The major flaw with Alexander’s work is the lack of a clear and concise thesis.
When there is such a lack of a tangible thesis, the reader is left to assume that the thesis
lies implicit within the work, but even this does not seem to be the case here. Just about
every chapter makes a point but then issues a rebuttal to that point. There is nothing
wrong with rebuttal or playing devil’s advocate—such ability actually adds analytic
25 Ibid, 158.
26 This idea/image of Napoleon lacking virtue reminds me of his statement, They wanted me to be another
Washington; I could not be a Washington.” Regardless of how he presented himself to the people, he was,
first and foremost, power-driven. If you impeded this mission, you were expendable.
27 Alexander, 167; This reinforces the aforementioned point.
8 Ibid, 173.
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depth to such a work. However, the author must come back and rebut the rebuttal, so to
speak. Only then can conclusions or arguments be put forth. Unfortunately, Alexander
fails in this regard; for instance, in the conqueror vs. unifier debate, he demonstrates the
points for each but then does not take a position. The same can be said for the fascism
debate. He offers very little analysis throughout the work but, when he does, it does not
advance any argument—it merely contextualizes a minor point. Putting forth all of the
competing visions of Napoleon without establishing a superior point of view leaves
nothing more than a confused audience member.
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